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Preface
This doctoral dissertation presents applied research at the level of the individual firm. It
is composed of two main parts, which relate to different fields of research. Chapters 1 and
2 use economic theory for an analysis of the law on the market for intellectual property.
Chapter 3 uses econometric techniques for an investigation of supplier behaviour on the
electricity market.
The central theme common to all chapters is the understanding of how firms adjust their
strategic behaviour in response to changes in their environment. In game theoretic par-
lance, how firms react to changes in the rules of the game. These rules can be artificially
imposed on a game, e.g. laws imposed by a regulating authority, or may arise naturally,
e.g. physical laws or technological constraints in production. We will analyse specific
instances of both types.
Understanding the effects of these rules on firm behaviour is important for sophisticated
policy making. The impact of a new law or policy crucially depends on how existing and
future economic actors react to the change. Since in real-life it is not possible to perfectly
predict the outcome of a specific policy, both the ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of these
policies are important to ensure success. The importance of evaluating policies is obvious
by the cost of implementing these measures to society. In Germany, for example, the
expenditure for research and development made up 2.85% of gross domestic product
in 20131. When evaluating policies, it is important to pay attention to the market
specificities, because the impact that rules have on firms is very much context dependent.
The structure of the market also affects the economic tools available to us for their
analysis. While some markets yield detailed and precise data that allow us to disentangle
the causal effects of policies, others do not. We therefore focus our analysis of the two
types of rules on different markets and employ both theoretical and empirical tools.
1Source: Commission of Experts for Research & Innovation, (EFI) (2015) - EFI annual report.
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In the first half of this dissertation, we look at the impact of artificial rules in the context
of the market for cumulative innovations. The intellectual property market provides an
interesting environment to investigate the effects of some artificial rules for two reasons:
First, the state’s interference with the natural market for innovation by granting patents
is rather invasive2 and, second, many rules employed to incentivise innovation are heavily
contested3, e.g. the US treble damages doctrine (details below).
Furthermore, the importance of innovation for economic growth is widely recognised4 and
many government policies aim at encouraging innovative activities5. Patent protection is
one means of encouraging innovation by granting exclusion rights to innovators. Based
on the premise that stronger protection rights foster more innovation, many governments
have strengthened intellectual property rights over time6.
In chapter 1, we look at the strategic patenting incentives of incumbent firms and how
these incentives are affected when a patent strengthening policy is imposed by regulators.
Specifically, we analyse the effect of the US treble damages doctrine for wilful patent
infringements on firms in the market. This doctrine allows the award of three times the
damages to a patentee in case of a patent infringement, when the infringement is judged
to have been conducted on purpose. The possibility to receive treble damages strengthens
the position of patent holders, but is strongly criticised for discouraging other firms from
studying competitor patents and inhibiting the diffusion of patented knowledge7.
We show that the excessive patenting of low quality ideas can be a way to reduce market
entry for incumbents that are committed to litigating entrants. In order to do so, we set
up a theoretical model in which the entrant can decide to use the study of prior art in
order to reduce the probability of losing in litigation upon market entry. Then, when the
studying costs depend on the size of the incumbent’s portfolio, the incumbent can use
the inflating of the size of his patent portfolio as a “raising rival’s cost” strategy. This
result could contribute to explaining the surge of low value patent filings observed at the
US patent offices in recent decades8.
2See Lemley and Tangri (2003), Kitch (1977).
3See Means (2013), Schmidt (2010), Lemley (2008).
4See Menell and Scotchmer (2007) for a brief survey.
5See Commission of Experts for Research & Innovation, (EFI) (2015) for numerous examples.
6See Takenaka (2000) and Jaffe (2000) for the evolution in Japan and the US, respectively.
7See FTC (2003).
8See Moore (2005).
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Furthermore, we show the utility of the treble damages doctrine in reducing the incentives
of incumbents to patent excessively. This result arises because treble damages reduces
the profitability of studying prior art by making studying errors more expensive. As a
result, entrants invest less in the study of prior art. As the study of prior art decreases,
the raising rival’s cost impact that the incumbent can induce using an excess patent is
reduced. While the reduction of excess patenting incentives is beneficial to society since
it avoids the wasteful spending of efforts on patenting worthless ideas as well as reduces
the strain on the patent office, the treble damages doctrine itself represents a burden
on the entrant. We thus highlight a trade-off on the pros (reduces strain on the patent
office) and cons (reduces information-sharing nature of the patent system) for the patent
strengthening treble damages doctrine and give policy recommendations depending on
the public goal. Thereby, we contribute to the active discussion of the treble damages
doctrine in the United States.
However, the view that stronger exclusion rights are the best means to achieve the goal
of more innovation has been challenged by developments in the recent past. Faster
product life and innovation cycles have emphasized the impediment that stronger patent
protection may bear for cumulative innovators and the diffusion of knowledge. The
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector is a strong example. The
recent growth of this sector has been accompanied by a high rate of patent disputes and
litigation activity. This has stimulated much research by academics and policy changes
to deal with the challenges imposed by the new innovation environment9.
In the ICT sector especially, technologies often rely on intellectual property contained in
many patents and held by many parties. Furthermore, the need for interoperability is
particularly pronounced in this sector and has been one of the driving forces behind the
creation of standards in that industry. When patents become essential for the implemen-
tation of a standard, they gain a lot of value due to the hold-up potential that standard-
essential patents (SEPs) have. Standard setting organisations (SSOs) and regulators
alike have increasingly become aware of the hold-up potential in composite technologies
and have adopted voluntary rules or general regulation, respectively, in order to restrain
SEP holders’ ability to abuse their market power. A commonly imposed commitment is
the FRAND commitment for SSOs and patent pools. This commitment demands that
the licensing of SEPs occurs at fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory rates and aims
9See Lerner and Tirole (2013) and Regibeau and Rockett (2011)
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to curb the bargaining power of SEP holders in licensing negotiations. While FRAND
terms represent a serious commitment enforced by the courts10, there exists no generally
accepted definition of FRAND terms nor ex-post tests. Consequently, the strength of a
FRAND commitment depends crucially on the wording of a FRAND commitment and
how the commitment is embedded with other clauses in the agreements. In particular,
other clauses may provide exceptions to the rule or soften conditions.
In chapter 2, we look at a specific contractual clause, called partial termination, from the
patent pooling agreement of the MPEG-2 patent pool and investigate its effects in light of
the recent developments of US antitrust law with respect to patent holders. The partial
termination clause gives pool members a bargaining advantage in the negotiations for
non-essential patents owned by licensees of the patent pool. This clause merits attention,
because the MPEG-2 pool is the only patent pool to include such a clause in its licensing
agreement and some puzzling observations from the literature suggest that the FRAND
commitment of the MPEG-2 pool is weaker than that of other pools11.
We use a simple theoretical model to illustrate the competitive and licensing relationship
of a patent pool member and a licensee of that patent pool. This setting allows us to
compare the incentives of a licensee to invest in cumulative innovation under the two
regimes, where the patent pool member has access to the partial termination clause and
where it does not. We show that when the threat of partial termination is credible, the
pool licensor is able to capture some of the rents from cumulative innovations made by the
licensee of the pool. Also, we show that the credibility of the partial termination threat
depends on the strength of the essential patent right granted by the courts12.
Our analysis is able to shed light on the previously mentioned puzzles from the literature.
First, we are able to contribute a possible explanation for the drop in innovation rates of
firms that research in the technological proximity of the MPEG-2 pool. This result follows
from the capture of innovation rents by pool members. Second, we provide a possible
explanation for why vertically integrated firms are overrepresented (under-represented)
among the MPEG-2 pool members (outsiders) as compared to other patent pools. This
structural effect arises from the fact that the partial termination clause increases the
value of joining the pool for vertically integrated firms only, the joining incentives of pure
upstream firms are unaffected.
10See section 2 of chapter 2 for details and references to case law.
11See Vakili (2012) and Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2011).
12In legal terms, whether a property rule or liability rule applies to holders of essential patents.
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Furthermore, we show that the current organisational rules of the MPEG-2 pool exacer-
bate the threat of partial termination, because these rules does not actively restrain firms
from over-declaring essential patents. Our analysis thus also contributes to the debate
on whether SSOs and patent pools should take active responsibility in the determination
of the essentiality and validity of SEPs.
In the second half of this dissertation, which is joint work with Alexis Bergès13, we study
a natural rule of the game, namely uncertainty. Theory predicts that uncertainty is
costly to firms when they face dynamic costs14. Dynamic costs refer to the costs incurred
by producers when the volume of production varies. These costs are inherent to some
production technologies15. When faced with uncertainty, we expect that suppliers with
dynamic costs smooth production volume over time in order to minimise these dynamic
costs. In this third chapter, we find support for this prediction.
The question of dynamic costs on the electricity market is an important and topical one.
In order to avoid costly power outages, the generation must closely match consumption
at all times. Thus, given constant consumption, the outage of a generation plant must
rapidly be compensated for by other plants. The quick increase in production for the
other plants is expensive, if not impossible due to capacity constraints. For this reason,
the intermittency of the generation from renewable energies poses major challenges to
the electricity system as a whole. The topic was brought to the attention of the general
public by the media recently. In Germany alone, the solar eclipse (occurring around
midday of March, 20th 2015) induced a variation of solar generated electricity with a
gradient of up to -272MW/min for the ramp-down and up to +348MW/min for the
ramp-up16. The volumes of the total ramps have been compared by companies and media
to the quantities produced by up to 10 (for ramp-down) and 20 (for ramp-up) average
sized nuclear power plants. These ramps occurred within the space of a few hours and
electricity producers announced to have prepared to face this challenge together for more
than a year in advance. While we do not focus on this specific event, the example helps
to emphasize the importance of better understanding firm behaviour in the presence of
dynamic costs.
13Doctoral candidate at the Paris School of Economics, France.
14See Bergès and Martimort (2014).
15Most notably for traditional production techniques on the electricity market(gas, coal, nuclear).
16See Weniger et al. (2014) and www.opower.com.
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Our analysis is based on an empirical methodology and focuses on the French electricity
market. This market is a divisible goods auction and particularly suited for our analysis,
because it provides a rare level of data insight: we can observe the full aggregate supply
and demand functions for every hourly auction. From the demand functions, we can
capture uncertainty about the realisation of market demand. Furthermore, uncertainty
on the electricity market also arises from the fact that renewable production (e.g. wind
and solar) is a local and dispersed production, but feeds into a national market with a
single price. When meteorological conditions change, the geographic production profile
also changes. This further complicates the predictability of renewables generation and
contributes to the uncertainty that electricity producers face when playing on the elec-
tricity market17. With the growth of installed capacity for generation from renewable
energies (which has strongly been supported by government policies in the recent past),
this source of uncertainty has gained importance in recent years. We study how both
sources of uncertainty affect the strategies of suppliers facing dynamic costs.
We show that firms on the French electricity market take uncertainty from meteorolog-
ical forecasts as well as uncertainty from demand realisation into account and interpret
the result as a sign that expected dynamic costs matter on this market. More precisely,
we show that the electricity suppliers react to an increased level of uncertainty by bid-
ding more volume elastically in order to minimise dynamic costs, which increase with
the uncertainty. While our findings hold for the central part of the bid functions, they
disappear towards the extremities of the bid functions where capacity constraint consid-
erations seem to dominate. Our results also indicate that not only supplier bidding is
affected by uncertainty, but that the level of uncertainty also impacts bidding from the
demand side of the market.
The results are obtained using a reduced form model. However, in order to make most
of the observed data structure, we adjust our empirical methodology. Our work is non-
standard with respect to two methodological building blocks. First, we develop a method-
ology to concentrate the full market data from the French electricity market, that is, we
reduce the hourly bids in the form of full demand and supply functions into a fixed num-
ber of points per function18, where each point is representative of a part of the original
function. This methodology allows to run a reduced form model on the selected points
while circumventing traditional problems of endogeneity that occur when working with
17See Meibom et al. (2009).
18Using landmark registration techniques (Silverman and Ramsay, 2005).
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equilibrium outcomes. Second, we develop a technique to aggregate the local impact of
weather at the national level. This technique is based on a new bottom-up approach
and allows to describe exogenous weather variables at a sufficiently aggregated level to
include them in the reduced form analysis.
We contribute to the literature in a number of aspects. First, our analysis is able to
find statistically significant support for the importance of dynamic costs. Our approach
to separate out the uncertainty from market demand expectations and predictability of
renewables generation is novel. The proxies used to capture the level of both types of
uncertainty are also new. Second, we employ a number of data-intensive adjustments to
leverage our dataset. For example, we control for both daytime and longer seasonality
using continuous variables rather than dummies. Thereby, we are able to increase the
sample size for each of our regressions, avoid the “black-box” interpretation of dummies
and improve the precision of our estimates. Third, the functional focus of our empirical
strategy allows to analyse a much fuller transcript of the firms’ strategies. The func-
tional approach allows to investigate the players behaviour both in the region where the
equilibrium is likely to occur as well as in regions that rarely have an impact on the
equilibrium outcome. Our technique relies on a non-parametric selection of representa-
tive points. Compared to previous, parametric work using functional data, we are able
to overcome some underlying structural restrictions, e.g. the symmetry of the logistic
function approaches19.
With this dissertation, we hope to foster the discussion on how rules are set and managed.
In particular, we want to stress the importance of both the ex-ante and ex-post evaluation
of policies. A rigorous evaluation of policies will allow us to better understand firms’
behaviour in changing environments. Only when policy makers learn from past policies,
we can improve policy making in the future.
Both halves of the dissertation are fully independent. Furthermore, all chapters them-
selves are self-contained (with their own introductions and appendices) and may be read
independently. The bibliography is joint for all chapters at the end of the disserta-
tion.
19See Préget and Waelbroeck (2005), Özcan (2004), Belsunce (2011).
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Chapter 1
Do More Patents Mean Less
Entry?
Patenting strategies in cumulative innovation under the
threat of litigation
1.1 Introduction
Based on the premise that stronger patent rights foster more innovation, the United
States have implemented patent strengthening policies since the 1980s. At the same
time, we have witnessed an unprecedented explosion1 of the size of patent portfolios that
firms demand through patent filings or acquire via financial transactions.
However, many scholars were unable to establish a direct link between the stronger patent
rights and the patent surge (Jaffe (2000), Qian (2007), Lerner (2009)). Using a survey,
Cohen et al. (2000) find that the effectiveness of patents as a means to protect innovations
has not increased in the eyes of the innovating firms following the pro-patent policy
changes. Kortum and Lerner (1999) promote the view that the patent surge is driven
by factors outside of the patent system. Their work suggests that improvements in
research productivity have driven the surge in patent filings, an argument that rests on
the assumption that firms have been able to create more (valuable) innovations for which
the said firms demanded patent protection. We are also interested in the link between
1Most notably in recent years: US patent grants have increased by 58% over the 5-year period from
2008 to 2013, the ratio of grants per applications was 47.8% in 2012 (Data from US PTO Patent Monitor
as of June 2014).
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stronger patent rights and the patent surge, but focus on another aspect, namely the
observation that numerous granted patents are commercially and even legally worthless2.
We ask in this chapter, if the excessive patenting of low quality ideas may have contributed
to the patent surge and if a particular patent strengthening policy, the treble damages
doctrine (details later), could have influenced such a strategy?
The following observations motivate our analysis. First, the lack of standards at the
patent office has been lamented by many scholars, e.g. Gallini (2002), Shapiro (2001),
Bessen (2003). Also, the US Supreme Court has acknowledged the “notorious difference
between the standards applied by the Patent Office and by the courts” (Meurer, 1989). As
a result, a high number of patent disputes end up in court and almost half of the litigated
patents are held invalid when contested in court (Allison and Lemley, 1998). Effectively,
the true opposition of patents occurs in court and firms innovate under the threat of
litigation. Second, when litigation occurs, the opposing parties contest the validity of a
patent in light of the existing knowledge, i.e. prior art. Prior art is often contained in
multiple patents and claims and thus in practice, the litigation process opposes patent
portfolios. The court rule in favour of or against an incremental innovation depends on
the value-added of the new innovation relative to the value of the prior art, i.e. on both
the quality of the new patent as well as the strength of the patents composing the prior
art (Llobet, 2003). Third, although a patent is publicly available, its patent strength
is private information. Thus, an information asymmetry arises between the owner of a
patent portfolio and an observer. The larger a portfolio, the stronger the information
asymmetry concerning that portfolio will be. Only a costly3 effort of searching and
studying existing patents gives an indication of the strength of prior art.
These observations suggest the argument that firms use patents as strategic tools in
competition. We set up a simple and tractable model that uses the above observations
as its main ingredients. Using this model, we show that the excessive patenting of low
quality ideas by incumbent firms can be rationalised as a means to reduce market entry.
This result could contribute to explaining the surge of low value patent filings observed
in the US.
2Referring to patents that have no impact on profits and which would be invalidated with certainty
if contested in court. For a detailed account on worthless patents see Moore (2005).
3Studying of a patent is costly in effort for any reader. Furthermore, “not being engaged in the
development process, a competitor is likely to know less about the content of the prior art (Meurer,
1989)”. Also, the mere search for prior art may be costly, since the disclosed prior art in a patent is
often insufficient. For critiques on the low performance of disclosure in patents, see Merges (1999a) and
Kitch (1977).
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Our result relies on the study of an entry game with two firms. An entrant aims to enter
a market that is protected by a patent by designing around the existing patent, while
an incumbent aims to deter entry by litigating all entrants. Market entry in this setting
triggers infringement litigation in which the courts decide whether an infringement has
occurred or not based on the relative strengths of the firms’ patents. Given that patent
strengths are private information, the outcome of the litigation is uncertain. In order
to reduce this uncertainty, the entrant may invest in the study of competitor patents
(called screening henceforth) before entering the market. Because the screening costs of
the entrant depend on the size of the incumbent’s portfolio, the incumbent can reduce
screening of prior art by the entrant by inflating the size of his patent portfolio, i.e.
excessive patenting. This strategy works by the mechanism of a raising rivals’ cost
argument. When the entrant switches away from screening before entering, he either
stays out of the market straight away or enters without screening depending on the
quality of his innovation (weaker innovators stay out, better innovators enter directly).
It is the former switch that is in expectation profitable for the incumbent, who can save
litigation costs and avoid competition. Inducing this switch motivates an excess patenting
strategy in the model. On the other hand, the latter switch is costly for the incumbent
since litigation costs have to be paid more often. We characterise the trade-off for the
incumbent to pursue a strategy of excessive patenting.
We use this setting to investigate how the treble damages doctrine affects this strategic
use of patents. The treble damages doctrine allows a US court to treble the damages to
be paid to the defendant (284 United States Code 35, 2006) in case of a wilful patent
infringement. This question is an important one since a famous concern about the treble
damages doctrine is that it discourages firms from reading competitor patents (FTC,
2003; Lemley, 2008; Lemley and Tangri, 2003). When firms stop reading existing patents,
the information-sharing nature of the patent system is undermined and therefore costly
to society4.
We show that the treble damages doctrine reduces the incentives of an incumbent to invest
in an excess patenting strategy. The result is driven by the fact that when screening
is imperfect, both false positive (enter and lose in litigation) and false negative errors
(forego profitable entry) occur for the entrant with positive probability in equilibrium.
4“Failure to read competitors’ patents can jeopardize plans for a noninfringing business or research
strategy, encourage wasteful duplication of effort, delay follow-on innovation that could derive from
patent disclosures, and discourage the development of competition” (FTC, 2003).
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The treble damages doctrine multiplies the cost of false positive screening errors only
and, thereby, represents an additional cost to screening. Given that weaker entrants are
more prone to this type of error, the increased screening cost disproportionately affects
weaker entrants. Thus, under treble damages, the previously described strategy switches
that an excess patent can induce are affected: The profitable switch away from market
entry on weak entrants is reduced more than the costly switch towards market entry
for stronger entrants. Hence, the effectiveness of using an excess patenting strategy is
reduced.
We conclude that treble damages have the positive effect of reducing the excess patenting
incentives of incumbents. This is notable if policy makers are concerned about the strain
on the patent office due to the flood of patent filings. However, the reduction in excess
patenting incentives comes at the expense of entrants reading fewer competitor patents.
This undermines the effectiveness of the patent system in sharing knowledge. Conse-
quently, positive externalities for society arising from the information-spreading nature
of patents are reduced under a treble damages regime. With these insights, we contribute
to the legal debate on treble damages in the US.
This chapter draws on multiple strands of both the legal and economic literature. It
provides a model on the economic implications of the treble damages doctrine in order
to support a highly active legal debate. The model uses elements from the economic
literature on innovation under the threat of litigation, searching and reading prior art,
as well as entry deterrence.
A few papers are particularly notable for our modelling of litigation. In order to investi-
gate the effect of treble damages, our model must yield that infringement findings occur
in equilibrium. This can be achieved either using probabilistic patent strengths, e.g.
Ménière and Parlane (2008)5, or using imperfect information concerning these strengths,
e.g. Llobet (2003). We opt for the latter approach and adopt Llobet’s market structure
and litigation procedure. However, we do not adopt imperfect courts that only observe
noisy signals on the patent strengths and assume no settlement possibility. Llobet uses
his setting to derive optimal licensing rates for the patent of an incumbent facing entry.
5They assume (exogenous) endowments of patent portfolios, which yield probabilistic success rates if
asserted against an opponent’s portfolio, in order to better understand the threat of hold-up litigation.
They derive the optimal level of infringement fees based on the trade-off between positive (counter over-
investment incentives from an R&D race) and negative (deter from investment) effects of infringement
litigation on innovation.
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We adjust the setting to focus on how the institutional framework of the patent system
affects firms’ patenting strategies.
A second relevant strand of the literature is the one looking at when firms invest in
the reading of patents. Atal and Bar (2010) analyse the search and study incentives of
innovators vis à vis the patent office. Langinier and Marcoul (2007) focus on using the
effort of patent examiners as a policy tool to improve prior art disclosure in patent filings.
Caillaud and Duchêne (2011) study the overload of the patent office while focussing on
examination fees and toughness as policy tools. While these papers focus on the prior-art
search for patent approval, our work sets itself apart by looking at firms’ strategic study
of rival patents in a context of market entry. Our focus on the reading of competitor
patents in light of the treble damages doctrine is novel and contributes to a vibrant
debate.
Moreover, the classical I.O. literature (initiated by Salop and Scheffman (1983)) on entry
deterrence by means of raising rivals’ cost arguments deserves a brief mention. The
present model puts the traditional mechanisms into the current institutional context of
the patent system and investigates the response of players using such strategies to treble
damages as a policy tool. This chapter can hence be seen as a reinterpretation of the basic
ideas from a raising rivals’ cost consideration à la Gilbert and Newbery (1982), where
this paper uses a different set-up to focus on the private nature of information on patent
strengths. In contrast to their paper, we can thus rationalise the excessive patenting of
worthless ideas by incumbents and see how this strategy performs in a context where
courts award treble damages.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 1.2 the model set-up is proposed. Section 1.3
presents the results for the baseline model. In section 1.4, we apply the model to shed
light on the effect of the treble damages doctrine on the behaviour of both incumbent
and entering firms. Section 1.5 looks at extensions and robustness of the model, section
1.6 discusses the results. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Model set-up
The model focuses on a two-player setting with an incumbent (I) and an entrant (E). The
model relies on two institutional aspects of the patenting system that were introduced in
the introduction.
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First, patent strength6 is private information, but observable at a cost. This means that
a competitor must spend a costly effort s > 0 to study an existing patent in order to learn
its strength. However, the number of patents (N) that a competitor holds is observed
for free.
Second, patents are granted by the patent office without proper scrutiny. In the model,
the argument is taken at the extreme and any idea (even worthless ones) will be granted
a patent. The true opposition of patents occurs in court. Thus, cumulative innovation
occurs under the threat of litigation.
Storyline
I earns profits from the sale of a product that generates an exogenous consumer valuation
of vI . I’s market (or production technique) is protected by a patent portfolio of breadth
b. We assume that I is committed to litigating any entrant7.
E has an idea to enter the market by engineering around8 existing IP. E’s entry generates
a small exogenous increase in the consumer valuation vE. E gets a patent of quality qE
for its alternative production technology9.
Given I’s commitment to litigate, E’s entry triggers litigation on infringement of I’s
patents. The court decides if an infringement has occurred and whether damages have
to be paid. Market entry is only profitable for E when it wins in the legal process, i.e.
when the design-around does not infringe the existing patents of the incumbent.
1.2.1 Litigation
When I litigates, it files an infringement suit against E. The entrant’s defence is based on
the validity of its design-around patent. For E’s patent to be upheld valid by the courts,
it may not infringe on the claims of I’s patent. We thus have an opposition of the patent
strengths in court, where the entrant’s quality qE must be sufficiently large the overcome
6We use the terms patent “strength”, patent “quality” and patent “breadth” synonymously.
7This is the case when an incumbent has a reputation to pursue imitators in court to fight entry.
Such a strategy has been used for example by Apple under Steve Jobs against Android phones.
8The invention of an alternative idea that produces the same output as a given patented idea, while
not infringing the original patent’s claims.
9The insights of the paper remain the same if the entrant does not obtain a patent, but merely
produces the output using an alternative production technology.
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the patent breadth b of the incumbent’s patent portfolio10. Given that both I’s and E’s
patents describe different ideas to produce the same output, we assume that both b and
qE are drawn from the same interval [0, q̄]. More on this in subsection 1.2.2.
During the legal process, the court observes the true qualities of the patents in question
and decides in favour of the stronger patent. This is based on the idea that for an
infringement case, a better engineering around idea has a higher chance of surviving
the legal enquiry. In the same logic, a stronger incumbent patent (e.g. broader and
more general claims) will reduce the survival chances of the entrant’s patent in court.
We assume that courts are perfect and use a deterministic litigation technology. The
probability of the entrant’s patent not being invalidated is given by a threshold decision
rule:
m = P{qE > b} =
 1 if qE > b0 if qE ≤ b
where b is the strength of the incumbent’s existing patent and qE is the strength of the
entrant’s patent. We have ∂m
∂qE
≥ 0 and ∂m
∂b
≤ 0.
The court has a re-distributional character. Under litigation, the total surplus generated
by the producers is dispatched. During the litigation, the market structure generates
payoffs as described below in the subsection 1.2.3. In case of infringement, the entrant
has to compensate I for the lost profits (vI). This corresponds to single damages. The
variation to treble damages is introduced and analysed in the application of the model
in section 1.4.
Furthermore, going to court is inefficient as litigation costs K > 0 arise and will be borne
by the loser of the case. This corresponds to the legal doctrine on the burden of litigation
costs as practised in most European countries and does not match the analysis of treble
damages which is a US concept. However, it simplifies the analysis and is thus used
in this initial model. Robustness of our results to this specification is shown in section
1.5.
1.2.2 Innovation
The general technology for innovating is as follows. The idea for an innovation is obtained
for free, but in order to realise the advantages of an innovation, the innovator must
10If we think of b as the “radius” of ideas around I’s technology that are protected by I’s patent
portfolio, then E’s patent must be sufficiently “far” away from that technology, where the distance
between the design around and the original idea is measured by the patent quality qE .
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develop the idea into a patent and implement it at a cost ci, i ∈ {I, E}. The quality
of an innovation qi is drawn i.i.d. from a uniform distribution U(.) on support [0, q̄]:
qi ∼U[0, q̄]. The distribution and its support are common knowledge.
For the entrant, this means that it learns the idea for a design-around and its quality
qE ∼U[0, q̄] for free. Implementing the design-around costs cE > 0. E knows qE since it
knows the existing technology (which it is trying to imitate) and the dimension in which
it is engineering around. However, E does not know the breadth b of the patents which
I holds to protect its IP.
For the incumbent, this means the following: Its existing patent portfolio of size N is
protecting its intellectual property with a breadth of b. Implementation costs for this
portfolio are sunk. We make two simplifying assumptions. (i) Although I knows the
individual qualities qI of the patents that compose its portfolio, it does not know the
breadth of the overall protection b which it actually enjoys11, i.e. I does not know
its own “type”. (ii) We assume that b (the aggregate patent breadth of I) is drawn
from the same distribution as qE (the quality of the entrant’s patent): b ∼U[0, q̄]. The
first assumption allows us to abstract from signalling aspects in the model. The second
assumption enables us to restrict attention to linear payoff functions12.
The excess patent for the incumbent is a particular case: I gets an idea to patent a
commercially and legally worthless idea (qI = 0) at an implementation cost cI > 0.
Given that it is worthless, neither the aggregate portfolio strength b, nor the consumer
valuation vI that I’s product generates is affected - only the size of I’s patent portfolio
is increased from N = n to N = n + 1. In equilibrium, E is aware that the additional
patent is worthless, however E cannot distinguish it from valuable patents ex-ante (e.g.
the worthless patent was filed simultaneously with the valuable patents13).
11This could be motivated by a story where design-arounds can occur in many different dimensions
and I does not know in which dimension to measure it.
12It would be more realistic to set b = max qn, ∀n = {1, .., N} and assume it is taken from a Beta
distribution of the last order statistic (or impose any other dependency between b and the individual
qI). This would, however, complicate the analysis without yielding any additional insight as long as b is
exogenous to the model.
13The excess patent can also be thought of as the costly effort by the incumbent to split a single patent
claim into multiple patents of smaller complementary claims. Other strategies that fit our model setting
are discussed in section 1.6
15
Chapter 1
1.2.3 Screening
By studying (“screening”) all14 its opponent’s patents, E can learn b, the strength of
the existing patent portfolio of I. This gives E an indication of the outcome of the
litigation in case entry occurs. Per patent screening costs s > 0 are constant. The total
screening costs S thus depend linearly on the size N of the patent portfolio to be screened:
SN = s ∗N .
When not screening, the entrant forms an expectation E[b] based on the common knowl-
edge about the distribution that b is drawn from. The costless estimate of the incumbent’s
patent strength is given by b̂ = E[b] =
∫ q̄
0
1dU(b) = q̄
2
.
When E screens, it delays its entry decision and observes a signal (message) m̂ : {b ; qE} →
{1 ; 0} on how the courts will decide the infringement case. We assume that the action
of screening is not observable by the incumbent, but verifiable by the courts ex-post15.
Initially, we consider perfect screening: E observes m without imprecision.
m̂ = m =
 1 if qE > b0 if qE ≤ b
where m is the true information on the court decision. Therefore, payment of the screen-
ing fee erodes uncertainty about I’s patent portfolio strength and allows E to take a
perfectly informed entry decision.
A technical assumption is made to obtain that screening occurs with positive probabil-
ity in the baseline: S < S̄ = ∆
(
1− ∆
vI+K
)
, where ∆ = vE − cE represents the net
benefit from non-infringing entry for E. The assumption signifies that screening is not
14For simplicity, we assume that E needs to screen the whole portfolio of I to learn b. Our results are
robust to alternative settings as long as total screening costs increase in the number of patents screened:
(S′(N) > 0). We could thus relax this assumption as follows: The entrant screens a sub sample of
I’s patent portfolio to learn a signal m̂. The precision of the signal depends on the proportion of the
full portfolio that is screened. A larger patent portfolio is hence more costly to screen for E, because
either the entrant screens a larger sub sample (thus paying more for screening) or the entrant does not
increase the size of the screened sub sample, but accepts a decrease in the precision of the signal m̂
(which increases the likelihood of screening errors).
15The first part of the assumption is realistic as patents are public and their study occurs in the
absence of the patent holder’s knowledge. This assumption is necessary (at least until the decision to
litigate by I is taken) to exclude the signal (of whether screening has occurred or not) to I in this model
since it would reveal information about the quality of E’s patent. The second part of the assumption
corresponds to the ability of courts to find proofs for the study of competitor patents ex-post. In practice
this could refer to “smoking gun” proofs (e.g. explicit email correspondence or whistle-blowers) in the
wilfulness investigation by courts. We need this assumption for treble damages to have deterring effect
from screening in equilibrium. We give more details on why this assumption matches the beliefs of US
firms in section 1.4.
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prohibitively costly. It implies that avoiding infringement by screening and then deciding
not to enter is profitable for E: ∆− vI −K < −S.
Mechanism, Payoffs and Timing
The channel of the effects goes through the screening of the entrant. By demanding an
excess patent, I increases the size of its patent portfolio and thereby increases the effort
demanded from E to screen its portfolio, if E decides to do so. Due to the additional
patent, screening costs of E increase by a constant factor τ > 0 from Sn = s ∗ n = S to
Sn+1 = s ∗ (n + 1) = S(1 + τ). In other words, I can use the excess patent as a raising
rival’s cost strategy. We repeat for clarity, that the excess patent does not affect the
success probabilities in litigation16.
We assume Bertrand competition between the firms. As mentioned, we have that I
generates a consumer valuation of vI . The unit consumer has utility u(v) = v − p.
We focus on the case where E’s entry marginally increases the consumer valuation by
0 < vE < v̄E =
vI+K
2
+ cE. The upper bound on vE ensures that, ex-post, market entry
is only profitable for E when its design-around technology is deemed non-infringing by
the courts. Ex-ante, entry without screening is only profitable when infringement is
sufficiently unlikely: qE > E[b].
We simplify notation as follows: vI = v, cI = c. The Incumbent earns Π
M
I (v) = v if it
produces alone. If only the entrant produces, then it earns ΠME (v,∆) = v + ∆. Under a
duopoly, the profits are ΠDI (v,∆) = 0 and Π
D
E (v,∆) = ∆. For entry without screening,
the risk of single damages payments in case of infringement leads to the following ex-ante
payoffs:
ΠlE = ∆− (v +K)P{b ≥ qE}
ΠlI = v − (v +K)P{b < qE}
In words, E earns ∆ from the sale of its product when entering the market, but has to pay
damages v and litigation costs K in case of infringement, which occurs with probability
P{b ≥ qE}. Similarly, I earns v absent market entry, but loses these profits v and litigation
cost K in case of successful entry, which occurs with probability P{b < qE}.
The timing is as given by the tree in figure 1.1 (cubic decision nodes belong to na-
ture):
16We treat commercial and legal value (affecting the litigation probabilities) of the excess patent in
the extension in section 1.5
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1. The incumbent I has the option to demand the grant of a commercially and legally
worthless patent. Thereby, only its portfolio size increases from N = n to N = n+1.
2. The entrant E obtains a design-around idea of quality qE for free.
3. E decides whether to screen I’s patent portfolio to learn a signal m̂ about the
outcome of the litigation (b ≶ qE).
4. E decides whether to enter the market or not.
5. If market entry occurs, litigation arises. The court adjudicates whether infringe-
ment has occurred and, if so, redistributes profits.
In the game tree, the entry subgame starts at t = 3. We differentiate the entry subgame
absent an excess patent (N = n, right-hand-side of the game tree) and the entry subgame
given an excess patent (N = n + 1, left-hand-side of the game tree). In the entry
subgame, E has the option to choose a strategy σE among the three pure strategies
{(NS, NE),(NS, EN),(S, D)}, where the abbreviations stand for “Not Screen & Not Enter”,
“Not Screen & ENter” and “Screen & then Decide on entry” respectively.
1.3 Model Results
All proofs are given in the appendix, starting on page 37.
1.3.1 Under perfect screening
Assuming that the entrant can perfectly learn the strength of the opposing patent port-
folio when screening and, hence, does not make errors when anticipating the court’s rule,
we obtain the following results.
Lemma 1.3.1 (Optimal strategy for the entrant)
In the entry subgame absent an excess patent (N = n), the entrant has an optimal,
composite strategy (σ∗E) conditional on the realisation of the quality of its idea (qE).
σ∗E =

No Screening, No Entry (NS, NE) if qE ≤ qS
Screening, then Deciding (S, D) if qS < qE ≤ qT
No Screening, ENtering (NS, EN) if qT < qE
where qS = q̄
(
S
∆
)
and qT = q̄
(
∆−v−K+S
∆−v−K
)
.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the composition of the strategy. The optimal strategy to E is
given by the upper envelope of the strategy payoffs. In the graph, the thresholds have
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an additional upper index of 0 to indicate that they result from the perfect screening
specification.
Figure 1.2: Expected payoffs to E plotted against the quality of its idea qE
Note: In order of increasing slope: The expected profit to E for the strategy NS,NE is given by
the blue horizontal line (coincides with the qE-axis). Expected profits under S,D are given by
the orange line of positive slope. Expected payoffs under NS,EN are given by the dark black
diagonal of the highest slope.
For qualities less than qS, E will stay out of the market without screening. For qualities
above qT , E will enter the market without screening. For intermediate qualities between
qS and qT , E will screen I’s patent portfolio and enter only in case of no infringement
(i.e. qE > b) and stay out otherwise.
Proposition 1.3.2 (More patents mean less screening)
An excess patent by the incumbent increases screening costs for the entrant and reduces
the range of qualities for which the entrant screens.
The optimal strategy for the entrant given an excess patent (N = n+ 1) is given by
σ∗E′ =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
NS, NE if qE ≤ qS′
S, D if qS′ < qE ≤ qT ′
NS, EN if qT ′ < qE
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where qS′ = q̄
(
S(1+τ)
Δ
)
and qT ′ = q̄
(
1− S(1+τ)|Δ−v−K|
)
. Note, qS′ > qS and qT ′ < qT .
The impact of an excess patent is illustrated in figure 1.3. It becomes immediately
visible that the induced increase in screening costs causes a constant downward shift of
the expected payoff function under screening. Thereby, it impacts both the thresholds
qS and qT , which move closer together and reduce the range of qualities over which E
screens.
A 
B 
Figure 1.3: Impact of an excess patent on E.
Note: We depict the payoff function under S,D twice: The dark orange line refers to the payoffs
under S,D given an excess patent. The dotted orange line is the payoff under S,D in the absence
of an excess patent (identical to the dark orange line of figure 1.2). The dash on the lower index
of thresholds indicates that these levels result from the situation with an excess patent.
In figure 1.3, A represents the range over qE for which E switches strategy from S,D to
NS,NE, i.e. stays out instead of screening. B represents the range where E changes from
S,D to NS,EN, i.e. from screening to entry without screening.
Proposition 1.3.3 (Less screening means less entry)
In the setting of a design-around, where the entrant’s product generates only a marginal
increase in consumer valuation, less screening translates into less entry:
|A| > |B|
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The graphical intuition behind proposition 1.3.3 is that A is measured directly against
the qE-axis (= E[ΠE|NS,NE]), whereas B is measured against E[ΠE|NS,EN] of increasing
slope. Translated onto the qE-axis, B is smaller than A, because the difference in slopes
between E[ΠE|S,D] and E[ΠE|NS,EN] is sufficiently large when infringement is sufficiently
expensive for E.
Lemma 1.3.4 (Excess patenting incentives for the incumbent)
The incentives for the incumbent to produce an excess patent for the purposes of raising
rivals’ costs of screening are given by:
−c+ S ∗ τ
∆
v +K
2
≥ 0
The condition is interpreted as follows: The cost c of demanding an excess patent must
be set off by the expected benefit v+K
2
that I gets from reducing E’s screening incentives
times the probability S∗τ
∆
that its strategy will have an impact on E. The first term
results from avoiding litigation cost (K) and price competition (v) for I. The second
term is the explicit expression of A
q̄
and thus reflects the likelihood of meeting an entrant
who will stay out due to increased screening costs. Last, we note that the European
splitting for litigation costs has considerably simplified the analysis since the switch from
strategy S,D to NS,EN by E has no profit implication for I.
1.3.2 Under imperfect screening
By introducing screening errors, we move away from the assumption that the entrant can
perfectly anticipate the court’s decisions. This is more realistic since perfect screening
is likely to be prohibitively costly in real life. This setting will be useful to analyse the
treble damages doctrine since it yields the result that infringement occurs with positive
probability in equilibrium.
The entrant now screens with an exogenous precision of g < 1. I.e. the signal m̂ that E
observes on the patent portfolio strength of the incumbent is wrong with a probability
(1− g). Two types of errors thus arise for E. Type I errors refer to false positive signals
(m̂ = 1 6= m = 0). As a result, E enters although its patent is too weak (qE ≤ b) and
will lose in litigation. Type II errors refer to false negative signals (m̂ = 0 6= m = 1). In
this case, E decides to stay out of the market even though its patent is strong enough
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(qE > b) to be upheld valid if contested by I. We note that we have assumed that both
types of errors occur with the same probability.
The screening precision is restrained to be sufficiently large (g > ḡ = max{ ∆
v+K
,
(
1− ∆
v+K
)
})
such that the dominant strategies in the entry subgame (conditional on the reading signal
m̂ of I’s patent portfolio strength) are unchanged17. Thus, the signal m̂ remains infor-
mative even though errors occur. Again, we restrict attention to screening costs that
are sufficiently small (S < S̄IS) in order to exclude prohibitively costly screening and
to ensure that screening occurs with positive probability in equilibrium18. Consequently,
E uses screening for some positive range of values of qE and takes a misguided entry
decision with the probability (1− g) > 0.
Lemma 1.3.5 (Costs of screening errors depend on their type)
Imperfect screening introduces type I (false positive) and type II (false negative) errors in
the entrant’s entry decision post screening, where
E[Cost of a type I error] > E[Cost of a type II error]
The result is driven by the assumption that the design-around only marginally improves
the consumer valuation for the product. When E enters while liable for infringement
(type I error), it earns ∆ from the sale of its product, but has to pay litigation costs (K)
and damages (v). When E stays out of the market when in fact no infringement would
have been adjudicated by the courts, it merely foregoes profits of ∆. Consequently, a
type I error is more expensive than a type II error to E.
Lemma 1.3.6 (Screening errors reduce the use of screening)
In the entry subgame absent an excess patent (N = n), given screening errors, the entrant
has an optimal, composite strategy (σ∗E) conditional on the realisation of the quality of its
idea (qE).
σ1∗E =

NS, NE if qE ≤ q1S
S, D if q1
S
< qE ≤ q1T
NS, EN if q1
T
< qE
where q1S =
q̄[S−(1−g)(∆−v−K)]
g(∆)−(1−g)(∆−v−K) > qS and q
1
T =
q̄[S−(1−g)(∆−v−K)]
g(∆)−(1−g)(∆−v−K) < qT . I.e. the entrant
reduces the range of qualities qE over which it screens before taking the entry decision.
17For a full derivation of this assumption see the appendix on page 40.
18We extend the assumption used in the perfect screening setting. Precisely, S̄IS =(
∆−v−K
v+K
)
[−g(∆) + (1− g)(∆− v −K)] + (1 + g)(∆ − v − K). For a derivation of this assumption,
see the appendix on page 42.
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Screening errors impose an additional cost on the screening strategy for the entrant,
similar to the excess patent analysed above. In line with the previous interpretation, a
downward shift of E[ΠE|S,D] occurs and the range over which the entrant screens decreases
likewise.
However, an additional effect occurs due to the discrepancy between the costliness of the
types of errors that can be made due to a false screening signal: Because false positive
errors are more expensive than false negative errors (by lemma 1.3.5), the expected cost
of screening is increased proportionally more for weaker entrants (low qE). Therefore,
the downward shift of E[ΠE|S,D] is left-side heavy, i.e. the expected payoffs fall more for
low levels of qE and thereby the slope of the payoff function under strategy S,D increases.
The graph in figure 1.4 visualises this analysis.
Figure 1.4: Impact of screening errors on E.
Note: The dark orange line represents payoffs under S,D given imperfect screening. The dotted
orange line depicts payoffs under S,D given perfect screening (identical to the dark orange
line of figure 1.2). Superscripts “1” indicate the threshold levels under imperfect screening.
Superscripts “0” indicate the threshold levels under perfect screening.
Corollary 1.3.7 (Less screening means less entry)
Given imperfect screening, Proposition 1.3.3 holds true.
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The intuition behind corollary 1.3.7 is that excess patents and screening imperfections
are substitutes since both factors represent an additional cost on screening. Proposition
1.3.3 showed that overall market entry is reduced when a constant cost is imposed on
screening for entrants of all types qE. The net reduction in market entry resulted from
the fact that the reduction in entry of low quality entrants outweighed the entry increase
from high quality entrants. It is thus not surprising that this result holds when the
imposed screening costs decrease in qE, i.e. affects weaker entrants more.
Proposition 1.3.8 (Steeper slope reduces excess patenting incentives)
Given imperfect screening, screening becomes more costly for the entrant and thus is used
less by the entrant, resulting in less entry (Corollary 1.3.7). Consequently, the excess
patenting strategy becomes less profitable for I, since
A1 < A
where19 A = q
S′
− q
S
and A1 = q1
S′
− q1
S
.
The incentives to excessively patent for the incumbent are given by(
gSτ
g∆− (1− g)(∆− v −K))
)[
v +K
2
]
− c ≥ 0,
a condition which is more stringent than the one given in Lemma 1.3.4.
Proposition 1.3.8 yields that the effect of an excess patent is reduced in a setting with
imperfect screening as compared to a perfect screening setting. This is because the
reduction in entry that the excess patent commands is reduced in a setting where the
entrant makes screening errors.
The shifts (termed A and A1) of the intercept of E[ΠE|S,D] with the qE axis determine
by how much entry is reduced when the incumbent demands an excess patent (in the
perfect screening and imperfect screening settings, respectively). As the slope of E[ΠE|S,D]
increases under imperfect screening, the downward shift of the function by a constant
shift Sτ results in a smaller shift of q
S
to q
S′
(given by the intersections of E[ΠE|S,D] with
the qE axis). Thus, the entry reduction due to the excess patent is diminished. Figure
1.5 visualises this effect20.
19Recall that the upper index 1 refers to the effect due to screening errors and the dash (′) on the
subscript refers to the effect of an excess patent.
20The increase in entry given by the shift of length B1 of the threshold q1T to q
1
T ′ is neglected here in
the text since under the considered European litigation cost regime, the strategy change from S,D to
NS,EN has no profit implication for I. The results are qualitatively unaffected if a US cost regime is
assumed. Robustness is shown in section 1.5.1.
25
Chapter 1
A1 B1 
A 
B 
Figure 1.5: Steeper slope reduces effect of an excess patent.
Note: This graph adds the impact of an excess patent to the payoff functions from figure 1.4.
The upper index 1 refers to the effect due to screening errors and the dash (′) on the subscript
refers to the effect of an excess patent. From bottom to top (from solid to finely dotted), the
four orange payoff functions for E under S,D represent: (i) Payoff under imperfect screening
given an excess patent, (ii) Payoff under imperfect screening absent an excess patent, (iii) Payoff
under perfect screening given an excess patent, (iv) Payoff under perfect screening absent an
excess patent.
The intuition behind this mechanism is that, when screening errors occur, the variability
of the profits ΠE, that the entrant can earn, increases
21. Given a larger range of expected
profits (and consequently costs) for E, the same constant increase of a single cost factor
loses importance in the overall entry decision. In other words, E bases its entry decision
not only on the screening costs, but also on the cost of (the newly introduced) screening
errors. The constant change in screening costs due to an excess patent now makes up a
smaller proportion of overall costs and, thus, the raising rival’s cost measure of excessive
patenting loses effectiveness.
21I.e. the range E[ΠE |S,D]
∣∣
qE=q̄
− E[ΠE |S,D]
∣∣
qE=0
increases.
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1.4 Treble damages
The proposed model framework allows to analyse the effect of the treble damages (TD)
doctrine. A quote22 from the FTC (2003) motivates this application:
[Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §284,] a court may award up to three times the amount
of damages for a defendant’s wilful infringement of a patent - that is, the
defendant knew about and infringed the patent without a reasonable basis
for doing so23. Some Hearings’ participants explained that they do not read
their competitors’ patents out of concern for such potential treble damage
liability24,25.
Furthermore, the FTC (2003) mentions that
recent data suggests that courts enhance damages in a significant percentage
of decisions that find infringement26. [Data] from the records of all patent
cases tried from 1983 through 1999, show a finding of willfulness in 39% of
the 888 decisions that found infringement and enhanced damage awards in
70% of the 219 cases in which judges considered enhancement issues.
Consequently, it attributes a “disproportionately large in terrorem effect” to the treble
damages doctrine as testified by panelists.
1.4.1 Adapting the model set-up
In the model, the treble damages doctrine is translated as follows: When a firm screens
and reads the wrong signal m̂ on the outcome of the litigation process and enters, the
courts will award treble damages to the incumbent as a compensation for the infringe-
ment. It is hence assumed that a screening error will be sanctioned with treble damages
although entry is based on a screening error and not on a deliberate decision to enter.
Courts can here not distinguish between the two types of mal-entry.
22Parts in square brackets [] have been sourced from a different part of the same source.
23[Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988): “The test is whether, under
all the circumstances, a reasonable person would prudently conduct himself with any confidence that a
court might hold the patent invalid or not infringed.”]
24[Panelists expressed considerable dissatisfaction with a state of affairs that in effect exposes firms
to greater potential damages for trying to learn if they are infringing any patents than if they keep
themselves blissfully ignorant.]
25[Many firms discourage employees from reading patents out of fear of wilful infringement.]
26See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box,
11 FED. CIR. B.J. 209 (2001)
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Without going into the practical, legal details on how courts know that E screened27,
this application models the state of affairs of the US patent system as perceived by the
firms in the market and described in the quotations from the FTC (2003). The provided
quotations suggest that firms hold the belief that reading competitor patents bears the
risk of treble damages adjudications and that they adjust their strategies accordingly.
Seaman (2011) gives additional empirical support to the view that firms do not read out
of fear for treble damages. He shows that although in theory the standard required for
wilfulness findings is high28, it seems to be much lower in practice, especially when cases
are decided by a jury. We discuss his findings in more detail in section 1.6.
1.4.2 Model results under treble damages
Lemma 1.4.1 (Treble damages multiply the cost of type I errors only)
In a setting where screening is imperfect, the introduction of treble damages acts as a
multiplier on the cost of type I errors (false positives) only. Consequently, the slope of
the payoff function from screening increases as it forces a left-side-heavy translation of
the expected payoff function under screening.
Graphically, the introduction of treble damages forces an increase in slope of the screen-
ing payoff function similar to that described in figure 1.4. The difference is that the
translation of the expected payoff function under treble damages shifts down the inter-
cept of E[ΠE|S,D] with the ΠE-axis, while it does not change the value of E[ΠE|S,D] at
qE = q̄.
Corollary 1.4.2 (Treble damages reduce screening and thereby entry by E)
Treble damages reduce the range over which E screens due to the (left-side-heavy) down-
ward shift of the screening function.
The intuition behind corollary 1.4.2 is analogous to that of corollary 1.3.7, namely that
the strategy of screening has become more expensive and is thus used less in equilibrium.
27In practice, courts may find proof for the study of competitor patents ex-post on the basis of smoking
gun proof, e.g. explicit email correspondence or whistle-blowers.
28“Plaintiff must prove wilfulness by clear and convincing evidence. This is a higher degree of per-
suasion than is necessary to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. Plaintiff proves wilful
infringement if it shows that defendant (1) was aware of plaintiff’s patent and (2) had no reasonable
basis for reaching a good faith conclusion that its making, using or selling its device avoided infringing
the patent. Plaintiff may also prove wilful infringement by proving that defendant did not exercise due
care to determine whether or not it was infringing plaintiff’s patent once the defendant had actual notice
of plaintiff’s patent. Infringement is not wilful and deliberate if defendant had a reasonable basis for be-
lieving that the patent is invalid or not infringed.” Quote from the 5th Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions
- Civil under Chairman Judge Martin C. Feldman, 2006.
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In the present setting, the reduction of screening leads to less market entry by potential
rivals.
Corollary 1.4.3 (Treble damages reduce excess patenting incentives for I)
The left-hand-side translation of the screening function increases its slope and thus di-
minishes the reduction of entry that an excess patent can command (intercept A on qE
axis is reduced).
Furthermore, treble damages increase expected profits to I when E screens, thus further
decreasing excess patenting incentives.
Two effects come into play (even in the European litigation cost setting), when treble
damages are introduced. This is because both shifts of the thresholds qS and qT have a
profit implication for I and are thus relevant. Both effects go in the same direction and
reduce the excess patenting incentives of I. The first is analogous to the one analysed
before, namely that the cost impact commanded by an excess patent is reduced. This
effect arises from the steepened slope of E[ΠE|S,D].
The second and new effect is that treble damages increase the expected profit of the
incumbent when the entrant has screened. Hence, the shifting together of both the left
and right hand side boundaries of the screening interval is relevant. These shifts reduce
the range of qualities qE for which E screens (which has now become more profitable
to I). Therefore, the incentives for the incumbent to excessively patent are further
reduced.
1.5 Extensions and robustness checks
1.5.1 US litigation cost setting
In the baseline model, an EU litigation cost splitting has been considered where the loser
of a court case has to pay the total legal costs of both parties (KEU). This simplifies
considerably the terms of the calculations in the output, because then the switch by E
from strategy S,D to NS,EN (represented by the shift B in the graphs) has no profit
implication for I.
In the US system, each party has to bear its own litigation costs KUSi , ∀i = {I, E}29.
Inducing the strategy switch from S,D to NS,EN for E is now costly to I (litigation costs
29Note KUSi 6= K
EU
2 , i.e. the level of court costs is generally not the same in Europe and the US.
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KUSI have to be paid) even when the entrant’s patent is weaker than I’s patent (qE ≤ b)
and I wins in litigation. Under the strategy S,D, player E would have stayed out of the
market and saved I the defence costs.
Proposition 1.5.1 (Robustness against a US litigation cost setting)
The model insights are robust to a US litigation cost setting. However, excess patenting
incentives are lower compared to a European legal fees regime.
The mathematical expressions change, however the qualitative insights from the model
remain the same because the strategy considerations for I based on reducing entry (A)
dominate those based on fostering entry (B). This is the case for two reasons. First,
the payoff impacts in region A outweigh those in region B. In region A, I benefits from
foregoing litigation costs and competition (KUSI + v) when inducing a strategy change
from S,D to NS,NE by an E, who would have won the litigation. In B, I only loses
litigation costs (KUSI ), when E changes strategy from S,D to NS,EN although I wins
the litigation process. Second, the region A exceeds the region B in size as given by
proposition 1.3.3.
Although the general case in the US is that each party bears its own litigation costs, 35
U.S.C §285 allows for the recovery of reasonable attorney fees in exceptional cases. The
baseline model analysed in the paper can hence be seen as the setting where recovery of
attorney fees is presumed.
1.5.2 Valuable Patents
Incumbent’s patent value: For simplicity, the incumbent’s additional patent was
assumed to be of zero commercial and legal quality. The only effect from I’s additional
patent was an artificial increase of I’s portfolio size, which translated into a raise of the
screening costs for the entrant. However, our model framework also allows to analyse the
patenting incentives of both commercially and legally valuable patents.
Proposition 1.5.2 (Patent value affects the incumbent’s patenting constraint)
The baseline model represents a lower-bound on the excessive patenting activity by in-
cumbents. When additional patents bear commercial or legal added-value, the constraint
to demand an additional patent for the incumbent is relaxed.
The intuition of the results is the following. First, positive commercial value effectively
reduces the implementation cost cI for the additional patent. Additional commercial
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value also increases the level of damages to be paid by E in case of infringement. Thus,
E’s expected profits from market entry are reduced for strategies NS,EN and S,D30.
Therefore, the commercial value of the additional patent strengthens the entry-reducing
effect from increasing the portfolio size.
Second, legal value increases the portfolio strength b and thereby improves the probabil-
ities for I to win in case of litigation. This effect is entry-reducing as it makes market
entry more expensive in expectation for E and will induce some entrants’ types to switch
to less risky strategies (e.g. NS,EN to S,D in region B and S,D to NS,NE in region A).
Both types of switches thus reduce entry into I’s market.
Since both effects of commercial and legal value go in the same direction (namely reduce
market entry and increase incentives for I to demand an additional patent) and any
valuable patent encompasses the increase in screening costs for the rival (because the
portfolio size still increases for valuable patents), the baseline model can be viewed as
a lower bound on the additional patenting activity that we observe in a market. More
patents mean less entry is, hence, valid to a larger extend when additional patents by I
bear value. Furthermore, when additional patents have commercial or legal value, the
raising rivals’ cost aspect can become a by-product of the patent application.
Entrant’s patent value: So far, the model assumes both commercial (vE) and legal
(qE) value for the patent of the entrant. In order to obtain the results of the baseline
model, the latter may take values in the interval [0, q̄], which corresponds to the full
range.
Commercial value of the entrant’s patent, however, was limited to the interval vE ∈ (0, v̄E]
corresponding only to a marginal increase in the exogenous consumer valuation. The
idea behind the technical assumption on vE is that entry should be unprofitable when
infringement occurs. The sufficient condition for this is ∆ < v + K rather than the one
used so far: 2∆ < v+K, which is more stringent and results in a case restriction. When
relaxing this condition to the sufficient one, the main results remain unchanged, but the
intermediate steps are less clear cut31.
Proposition 1.5.3 (Larger commercial value of the design-around)
When v+K
2
< ∆ < v+K, the large commercial value that the entrant can generate reduces
30Note that the latter is true only when screening is imperfect.
31In the setting of US litigation costs splitting, we cannot validate the result of proposition 1.3.3.
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its sensibility to a raising rivals’ costs effort by the incumbent since the entrant relies less
on screening.
Consequently, the model results are attenuated under larger vE and large vE may lead to
the excess patenting constraint not being satisfied under a US litigation cost regime.
It is logical that the higher the expected profit of entry is, the less important is the
uncertainty about the competitor’s patent portfolio strength and the less screening will
be used. Therefore, we focus in our baseline model on the case when screening is an
integral part of competition (∆ < v+K
2
) and we check robustness here (in proposition
1.5.3). The analysis loses its interest when ∆ > v + K since the entry is profitable
regardless of infringement. We neglect the last case. Overall, we take away that entrants
with smaller commercial value of their innovation are more sensitive to excessive patenting
by I.
1.5.3 Independent legal opinion
“Judges are more likely to find willfulness when the infringer does not present an attorney
opinion as a defense” (Moore, 2004). This hints at the fact that in practice, firms can
avoid findings of wilful infringement by securing a counselling letter by an independent
legal counsel on the validity of the incumbent’s patents. The practice in question is as
follows (FTC, 2003):
Other testimony indicated that when troublesome patents are identified, firms
frequently seek to show due care and dissipate wilfulness concerns by securing
opinion letters regarding invalidity or non- infringement from outside coun-
sel32. Some testimony questioned the value of that practice and noted that
attempts to inquire about or pierce the surface of opinion letters can raise
thorny disputes over attorney-client privilege33.
This strategy can be modelled as a method to circumvent award of treble damages, how-
ever further increases the costs of screening. I.e. it makes the constant downward shift
of the screening payoff stronger and hence increases the effectiveness of an excess patent.
Now, the treble damages doctrine does not have grip on wilful infringers anymore (if they
32[See Sung 2/8 (Patent Session) at 147 (a competent, independent legal opinion, even if incorrect,
will usually help to rebut an allegation of wilful infringement).]
33[See, e.g, Thomas 10/25 at 155 (rather than getting quality advice from counsel... we’re getting
sort of pats on the back that, you might as well continue and here’s your shield from triple damages),
177-78 (not suggesting that patent bar will cynically dish out any kind of opinion); Gambrell 10/25 at
169; Taylor 10/25 at 160.]
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can disguise their wrongdoing by legal counsel), however it still has an externality on en-
trants since their screening costs have gone up in order to acquire additional legal advice.
Screening and entry is thus still adversely affected by the treble damages doctrine.
Furthermore, the excess patenting strategy gains in effectiveness, since the steepening
of the slope (volatility range that E faces when entering) of the screening function is
cancelled and replaced by an increase of the constant downward shift of the screening
function due to a multiplication of the screening costs. In technical terms, τ is increased,
while the slope
∂ΠE |S,D
∂qE
does not change.
Allowing firms to escape treble damages by obtaining legal counsel erodes the purpose of
treble damages. However, Moore (2004) details some of the factors which reduce the use
of legal opinion letters:
There are two problems with disclosing attorney opinions during discovery.
The first is that it gives the patentee a detailed blueprint as to likely defences
early in the litigation process. The second is that the patentee can use the
opinion against the defendant if at any point the defendant pursues a litigation
strategy that differs from the opinion.
For the above reasons, it is not uncommon for firms to refrain from legal counselling and
then the insights from the model application to treble damages hold. What is necessary
for the model insights to be relevant is that there exists a positive probability of treble
damages adjudication in case of infringement by the entrant.
1.6 Discussion of the results
The model has shown that the entrant uses screening for intermediate patent qualities.
Screening reduces the costly uncertainty over the strength of the incumbent’s patent
portfolio. Imperfect screening makes unsurprisingly the screening incentives lower. How-
ever, the setting with imperfect screening provides the correct counterfactual to compare
the setting with and without the treble damages doctrine since litigation must arise in
equilibrium for treble damages to have an effect. It is clear from the model that for the
setting of engineering around, the treble damages doctrine reduces the incentives of the
incumbent to patent excessively. This is a good thing since it avoids society the wasteful
spending of efforts on patenting worthless ideas as well as it reduces the strain on the
patent office. However, the treble damages doctrine itself represents a burden on the
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entrant since it exacerbates the cost of type I (false positive) errors. Consequently, it
can be seen as a substitute for the incumbent’s excessive patenting strategy that reduces
entry itself, but avoids wasteful activity by the incumbents. Policy should note these
points.
The model implicitly assumes that entry post screening will result in the adjudication
of treble damages. This is not perfectly accurate in real life, but the qualitative insights
from the model remain valid as long as firms face a positive probability in equilibrium
to be condemned for treble damages if they screen. Seaman (2011), Lemley and Tangri
(2003) and Moore (2004) discuss the effects of the wilfulness doctrine pre and post the
2007 Seagate decision34 and present the facts that treble damages have been awarded
both before and after Seagate in a significant (and similar) proportion of litigation cases,
with an especially high number of treble damages adjudications when the court cases
were decided by a jury. This lends validity to the model as it suggests that treble
damages apply in unpredictable situations35 and supports the idea that firms shy away
from activities sanctioned by treble damages where commonly cited defence tools (e.g.
legal opinions on infringement or validity of prior art) have no statistically significant
power in avoiding enhanced damages (Seaman, 2011).
In the same line of thought, the model can be seen as providing differentiated predictions
based on the nature of an industry. For example in the pharmaceutical industry, patent
claims can be very precise with the protection of a molecular formula, whereas in other
industries the limits of claims are more blurry. If wilful infringement is more likely to be
found in case of infringement in specific sectors, then the model results gain importance
in that field.
When treble damages are granted, the court may in addition also award attorney’s fees
to the prevailing plaintiff (Moore, 2004). This is equivalent to passing a US court case
under a European litigation costs splitting, equal to the main setting presented in this
paper. This strengthens the results from the model since it increases the amount of
the damages. The case without attorney’s fee awards is compared in section 1.5.1, the
qualitative insights of the model remain valid.
34by the Federal Circuit in the US which toughened the standard applied to determine a wilfulness
finding, for details see re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1365
35E.g. the following factors had no significant predictive ability of wilfulness findings in Seaman (2011):
opinions of counsel, attempts to design around the patent, re-examination at the PTO, and bifurcation
of wilfulness from liability at trial.
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The model and its application have a strong validity in the context of technologies that
rely on the bundling of patents from different stake holders. This fragmentation of patent
rights is also known as patent thickets36. When each individual patent holder of a frag-
ment of the composite technology owns IP protection for this fragment in the form of
patents, then each of these right-holders may have an incentive to excessively patent. The
accumulation of excess patents exacerbates the effect of the raising rival’s cost argument
as compared to the setting of a single incumbent. The insights of this model thus give an
additional rationale for incumbent firms to invest in creating a dense web of overlapping
patent rights à la Shapiro (2001).
In the context of multiple entrants, a reasoning à la Choi (1998) is applicable. In his
paper, patent litigation serves as an information transmission mechanism (revealing the
strength of an incumbent’s patent portfolio) where the costs of transmission are borne
by the first plaintiff. Other firms interested in the free information transmitted by the
litigation process have a free-riding incentive to wait and let another entrant initiate
costly litigation. The threshold for the first player to litigate is thus increased. In
the current setting, it would apply by increasing the threshold to enter for the first
entrant. Subsequent entrants would learn for free the quality of the incumbent’s portfolio.
Therefore, entry would occur after a longer time lag, but then all entrants with higher
quality ideas than the incumbent would enter.
The current paper is particularly suited to explain excess patenting, however also ap-
plies to other situations, where a raising rival’s cost strategy works by the mechanism
of furthering information asymmetries. The basic considerations of a raising rival cost
strategy are widely discussed in the economics literature, even their existence in patent-
ing (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982). This paper sets itself apart from the previous literature
in the sense that our set-up allows to investigate the impact of the treble damage doc-
trine and respects the private information character of patent strength. By introducing
the novel screening mechanism on patent qualities, this paper is able to rationalise the
excessive patenting of even commercially and legally worthless ideas. This is in contrast
to Gilbert and Newbery (1982), where preemptive patenting steals the legal and com-
mercial value of the entrant’s idea in a patent race. Our setting does not need to rely on
valuable preemptive patenting to reduce market entry, a result that seems to fit strongly
the observed explosion of low quality patent filings at the patent office.
36For accounts on thickets, see Galasso and Schankerman (2010); Graevenitz et al. (2011).
35
Chapter 1
Finally, it is useful to detail what is meant by “more patents” in the title of this paper
when talking about reducing entry. The model insights apply to all raising rival’s cost
strategies which have an effect on the entrant through the channel of increasing screening
costs. Next to a mere additional patent, the following strategies fit the model set-up: (i)
Introducing ambiguity in patent claims (Chiang, 2012) and thereby blurring the bound-
aries of the claim, (ii) Citing irrelevant prior art (Means, 2013) and thereby blurring the
limits of entrant’s affirmative duty to read all relevant patents, (iii) Monitoring entry
in order to warn and inform potential entrants of patent infringement (Crampes and
Langinier, 2002) and thereby focussing their resources on the study of patents that they
would otherwise not be aware of.
1.7 Conclusion
This is a first step looking at the incentives of firms to flood the market with patents
and their interaction with treble damages as a policy tool. The predictions of this model
are testable since both patent numbers and entry are easily observable. The screening
decision, on which read intermediate results, is not observable, but the account by the
FTC (2003) matches the results of the model.
The model is able to put the treble damages doctrine into an analysis that provides policy
recommendations depending on the public goal. If a policy objective is the fostering of
the mutual reading of competitor patents (e.g. if large positive externalities are to be
expected from this activity), then the treble damages doctrine should be removed to
re-incentivise firms to screen competitor patent portfolios. If, however, the reduction of
excess patenting of worthless ideas by the industry is the goal (e.g. because the stress on
the patent office shall be reduced), then the maintenance of the treble damages doctrine
ensures reduced incentives for firms to so. This effect however comes at the expense of a
reduced information-sharing ability of the patent system as entrants will read less.
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1.8 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.3.1
We solve the game by backwards induction. In the entry subgame, E has a dominant
strategy to play depending on the relative strength of its patent (qE) against that of the
incumbent (b).
First, look at t=4. Given I’s commitment to litigate, E will enter iff: ΠE ≥ cE. For any
given strategy, E’s ex-ante payoffs under litigation increase monotonely with the quality
of its own patent: ∂ΠE
∂qE
> 0. This relationship comes from the fact that the ex-ante
probability of winning litigation P{qE > b} increases with qE. Hence, entry is defined by
a threshold argument where E realises all ideas above a certain threshold q.
The outside option is always to “Not Screen, Not Enter”, which yields payoff
Eb[ΠE|NS, NE] = 0. Without screening, ex-ante profits to E from entering are as follows:
E
b
[ΠE|NS, EN] = E
b
[P{b < qE}(∆) + P{b ≥ qE}(∆− v −K)]
= E
b
[∆− (v +K)P{b ≥ qE}] = ∆− (v +K)
∫ q̄
qE
1dU(b) = ∆− (v +K)
(
q̄ − qE
q̄
)
where NS, EN refers to the strategy of “Not Screening, then ENtering”. E enters the
market when Eb[ΠE|NS, EN] ≥ 0. In order words, E realises all ideas of quality qE ≥ qNS ,
where q
NS
is defined by: q
NS
= q̄
(
1− ∆
v +K
)
.
Given screening efforts at a total cost S, E observes the signal m̂ and the message is
precise m̂ = m. By screening, the entrant has delayed the entry decision and can now
take this entry decision given perfect information about the outcome of the litigation.
Ex-post screening, payoffs to E are given by
ΠE|S, D =

−S if qE ≤ b and E stays out ←
∆− v −K − S if qE ≤ b and E enters
∆− S if qE > b and E enters ←
−S if qE > b and E stays out
where the arrows indicate the dominant strategies to be played depending on whether
the quality qE ≷ b and where S, D refers to the strategy of “Screening, then Deciding”.
Ex-ante, before learning the true strength of I’s patent, E’s payoff is given by:
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E
b
[ΠE|S, D] = E
b
[P{b ≥ qE}(−S) + P{qE > b}(∆− S)]
= E
b
[−S + ∆P{qE > b}] = −S + ∆
∫ qE
0
1dU(b) = −S + ∆
(
qE
q̄
)
Absent the strategy of entry without screening (NS,EN), E will thus screen and then decide
whether to enter when Eb[Π|S, D] ≥ 0. At equality, this defines the threshold qS above
which ideas will be realised: qS = q̄
(
S
∆
)
.
Between the strategies S, D and NS, EN, E goes for the latter whenever Eb[ΠE|NS, EN] ≥
Eb[ΠE|S, D]. This inequality defines at equality the threshold qT above which ideas’ qual-
ities must lie for E to realise them without screening:
∆− (v +K)
(
q̄ − qE
q̄
)
≥ −S + ∆
(
qE
q̄
)
⇒ qT = q̄
(
∆− v −K + S
∆− v −K
)
The thresholds are ordered in the following way: 0 < q
S
≤ q
NS
≤ q
T
< q̄. To show
that the thresholds are in increasing order, two steps: First show that the single crossing
property holds for any two of the payoff functions of E: E[ΠE|S, D], E[ΠE|NS, EN] and
E[ΠE|NS, NE]. Second, find the condition for E[ΠE|S, D]|qE=qNS > 0 to hold.
The derivatives with respect to the quality of the E’s idea are (both constant in qE):
∂ E[ΠE|NS, EN]
∂qE
=
v +K
q̄
,
∂ E[ΠE|S, D]
∂qE
=
∆
q̄
⇒ ∂ E[ΠE|NS, EN]
∂qE
>
∂ E[ΠE|S, D]
∂qE
because v > ∆, thus the single crossing property is verified. For the ordering to be as
requested above (and not the other way round), it suffices to show that E[ΠE|S, D]qE=qT >
0. Simplifying, it yields the requirement that the screening cost S must be sufficiently
small for screening to occur with positive probability in the baseline equilibrium. The
precise condition is given by: S < S̄ = ∆(1− ∆
v+K
).
Hence in t = 3, E will use a different strategy conditional on the quality qE of its idea.
σ∗E =

No Screening, No Entry if qE ≤ qS
Screening, then Deciding if q
S
< qE ≤ qT
No Screening, ENtering if q
T
< qE
Thus, screening of competitor patents will occur only for mediocre quality ideas (not the
best, nor the worst ones). 
Proof of Proposition 1.3.2
Given the excess patent, the ex-ante (t = 3) expected payoff to E from the strategy (S,D)
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is altered to :
E
b
[ΠE|S, D, n+1] = −S(1 + τ) + ∆
(
qE
q̄
)
which corresponds to a constant, linear downward shift of the curve by −Sτ as shown in
figure 1.3. The payoffs of the strategies NS,NE and NS,EN are unaffected.
As becomes immediately visible from the graph, the induced increase in screening costs
has an impact on both thresholds qS and qT , which move closer together. The new
thresholds (indicated by the dash on the subscript) are given by
qS′ = q̄
(
S(1 + τ)
∆
)
> q̄
(
S
∆
)
= qS
and qT ′ = q̄
(
1− S(1 + τ)
|∆− v −K|
)
< q̄
(
1− S
|∆− v −K|
)
= qT
The new optimal composite strategy for E, given an excess patent by the incumbent is:
σ∗E′ =

NS, NE if qE ≤ qS′
S, D if qS′ < qE ≤ qT ′
NS, EN if qT ′ < qE
The differences |qS′ − qS| = q̄
(
Sτ
∆
)
= A and |qT ′ − qT | = q̄
(
Sτ
|∆−v−K|
)
= B represent
by how much screening decreases given the excess patent. The assumptions ∆ > 0 and
|∆−v−K| > 0 ensure that both A and B are positive, hence yielding that more patents
mean less screening. 
Proof of Proposition 1.3.3
From Proposition 1.3.2, we have expressions for A and B. We have |A| > |B|:
⇔ q̄Sτ
∆
− q̄Sτ
|∆− v −K|
> 0 ⇔ q̄Sτ
[
−(2∆− v −K)
(∆)(|∆− v −K|)
]
> 0 ⇔ |∆−v−K| > ∆ (1.1)
which is always satisfied by assumption since we restrict our analysis to design-arounds
yielding only marginal increases in consumer valuation, v+K > 2∆. Hence, less screening
is synonymous with less entry. 
Proof of Lemma 1.3.4
Given the impact of an excess patent on E’s strategy, it is now possible to analyse the
excess patenting incentives of the incumbent37. The incumbent has two strategies, namely
to produce an excess patent (ExP) or not (NP), σI = {ExP, NP}. Depending on the
strategy that I plays, E will be confronted to a patent portfolio of size N = n + 1 or
N = n, respectively.
37This part simplifies due to the European setting for litigation costs. The consequence is that the
switch by E from strategy S,D to NS, EN has no profit implication for I.
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Without the excess patent, I’s payoff is:
E[ΠI |σ∗E, n] =

v if qE ≤ qS
P{b ≥ qE}(v)−K P{b < qe} if qS < qE ≤ qT
P{b ≥ qE}(v)−K P{b < qe} if qT < qE
An excess patent affects the ranges over qE for which the E plays a different strategy
(according to σ∗E). It becomes clear that under the EU litigation cost setting, only the
variation of q
S
by a distance A, has an impact on I’s profits. Therefore, it is profitable
for I to develop the excess patent if the following condition holds (the profitable region
of qE is the following: qS < qE < qS′) :
E
b
E
qE
[
−c+ P{q
S
< qE < qS′}[v − v P{b ≥ qE}+K P{b < qE}]
]
≥ 0
⇔ E
b
E
qE
[
−c+ A
q̄
(v +K)P{b < qE}
]
≥ 0
⇔ −c+ Sτ
∆
(v +K)
2
≥ 0 (1.2)
For completeness: The full game can now be solved for the Nash equilibrium in the
baseline scenario, when no screening errors are made by E. Assuming that the incentive
constraint for excess patenting in equation 1.2 is satisfied, the NE(σ∗I , σ
∗
E) of the full game
under perfect screening is NE[ExP, σ
∗
E′ ]. If the excess patenting condition is not satisfied,
then the NE of the full game is the following: NE[NP, σ
∗
E]. We focus on the former out of
interest. 
Proof of Lemma 1.3.5
Note first that both type I (false positives) and type II (false negatives) errors can occur
with the same probability (1− g) = P{b ≥ qE|b̂ < qE} = P{b < qE|b̂ ≥ qE}.
Assumption 1.8.1 (Condition on the likelihood of screening errors)
The screening errors occur with probability (1 − g) in both directions, i.e. for both false
positive and false negative signals. The condition on the probability of “no error”:
g ≥ ḡ = max
{
1− ∆
v +K
,
∆
v +K
}
ensures that the optimal screening strategies for the entrant in the screening subgame
remain unchanged, conditional on reading the signal m̂.
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Derivation of Assumption 1.8.1 In the screening subgame post screening, for EN to
remain optimal when observing signal m̂ = 1 = [b < qE], need:
g(∆− S) + (1− g)(∆− v −K − S) > −S ⇔ ∆− (v +K)(1− g) > 0
∴ g > ḡ =
∆− v −K
−v −K
In the entry subgame post screening, for NE to remain optimal when observing signal
m̂ = [b > qE], we need:
−S > g(∆− v −K − S) + (1− g)(∆− S) ⇔ ∆− g(v +K) < 0
∴ g > ḡ =
∆
v +K
Thus, screening errors must be sufficiently small for equilibrium strategies to remain
unchanged. This also implies that g > 1
2
and, in other words, means that the signal must
be informative for screening to be profitable. End of derivation.
The imperfect screening affects the expected payoff of E when it screens.
E[ΠE|S,D] =E
[
P{b ≥ qE}[P{b ≥ qE|b̂ ≥ qE}(−S)]
+ [P{b ≥ qE|b̂ < qE}(∆− v −K − S)] ← Type I error
+ P{b < qE}[P{b < qE|b̂ < qE}(∆− S)
+ P{b < qE|b̂ ≥ qE}(−S)]
]
← Type II error
= −S + (1− g)(∆− v −K)
(
q̄ − qE
q̄
)
+ (g)(∆)
(
qE
q̄
)
The costs of both types of errors are given by:
CI = E[Cost of type I error] = (1− g)(∆− v −K)
CII = E[Cost of type II error] = (1− g)∆
The cost of a type I error exceeds that of a type II error if v+K > 2∆, which is satisfied
by assumption: ⇒ CI > CII . Furthermore, the slope of the expected payoff function
under screening increases from
∂ E[ΠE |S,D]
∂qE
= ∆
q̄
under perfect screening (g = 1) to
∂ E[ΠE|S,D]
∂qE
=
1
q̄
g∆ + (1− g)(|∆− v −K|︸ ︷︷ ︸
>∆
)

under imperfect (g < 1) screening. 
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Proof of Lemma 1.3.6
For E, only the screening payoff is affected by the screening errors. Strategies NS,EN and
NS,NE remain unaffected. Consequently, the threshold qNS (intersection of the latter two
functions) is also unaffected. The new thresholds, that define the range (over qE) for
which E screens, are given by q1S and q
1
T .
q1S is defined by the intersection of E[ΠE|NS,NE] and E[ΠE|S,D]:
−S + (1− g)(∆− v −K)
(
q̄ − q1S
q̄
)
+ (g)(∆)
(
q1S
q̄
)
= 0
Reordering yields the threshold: ⇒ q1S =
q̄ [S − (1− g)(∆− v −K)]
g(∆)− (1− g)(∆− v −K)
q1T is defined by the intersection of E[ΠE|NS,EN] and E[ΠE|S,D]:
−S + (1− g)(∆− v −K)
(
q̄ − q1T
q̄
)
+ (g)(∆)
(
q1T
q̄
)
= ∆− (v +K)
(
q̄ − q1T
q̄
)
Reordering yields the threshold: ⇒ q1T =
q̄ [S − (1− g)(∆− v −K)]
g(∆)− (1− g)(∆− v −K)
Both thresholds q1S and q
1
T are in the same ordering as before (0 < q
1
S < qNS < q
1
T < q̄),
when screening occurs with positive probability in equilibrium.
Assumption 1.8.2 (Screening occurs with positive probability)
Screening occurs with positive probability in equilibrium when screening costs are suffi-
ciently low: S < S̄. In the case of imperfect screening, the precise condition is given by:
S̄ =
(
∆− v −K
v +K
)
[−g(∆) + (1− g)(∆− v −K)] + (1 + g)(∆− v −K)
Derivation of Assumption 1.8.2 For screening to occur in equilibrium, E must be
able to generate positive profits by screening when it obtains a quality qE = qNS, where
qNS is the indifference threshold between entering without screening and staying out:
E[ΠE|S,D]
∣∣∣∣
qE=qNS
> 0 ⇔ −S + (1 − g)(∆ − v −K)
(
q̄+q̄∆−v−K
v+K
q̄
)
+ g(∆
(
−q̄∆−v−K
v+K
q̄
)
> 0
Simplifying at equality yields the threshold cost of screening S̄. End of derivation.
The optimal, composite strategy to E is given by :
σ1∗E =

NS, NE if qE ≤ q1S
S, D if q1
S
< qE ≤ q1T
NS, EN if q1
T
< qE
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where the definitions of the thresholds are given above. The shifts of the thresholds are
given by the following distances (Note: the upper index 1 refers to the effect due to
screening errors):
q1
S
− q
S
=
q̄ [S − (1− g)(∆− v −K)]
g(∆)− (1− g)(∆− v −K)
−
(
q̄S
∆
)
> 0
q1
T
− q
T
=
(
q̄ [S − (1− g)(∆− v −K)]
g(∆)− (1− g)(∆− v −K)
)
− q̄
(
∆− v −K + S
∆− v −K
)
< 0
Both thresholds q
S
and q
T
move closer together, hence the range of qualities for which
E will screen is reduced. 
Proof of Corollary 1.3.7
Threshold qS moves to the right to q
1
S, a shift of distance q
1
S
− q
S
, which represents a
decrease in entry since firms who screened before, now stay out of the market without
screening.
Threshold qT moves to the left to q
1
T , a shift by distance q
1
T
− q
T
. This shift represents
an increase in the market since firms who previously screened (and possibly stayed out
after reading a signal of I’s patent portfolio strength), now enter the market without
screening.
The net effect of increased and decreased entry is an entry reduction if :
|q1
S
− q
S
| > |q1
T
− q
T
|
⇔
(g − 1)q̄
(
−∆2 + ∆(K − 2S + v) + S(K + v)
)
(−∆ +K + v)(∆ + g(−2∆ +K + v))
+
q̄((g − 1)K + (g − 1)(v −∆)− S)
∆− 2∆g + (g − 1)(K + v)
> 0
which is always true38 given the assumptions made so far on screening errors (Assumption
1.8.1) and screening costs (Assumption 1.8.2) in addition to those made in the baseline
model of perfect screening. 
Proof of Proposition 1.3.8
Visually, as before, the excess patent results in a constant downward shift of the screening
payoff function. The threshold by which entry reduction is affected is given by A1 =
q1
S′
− q1
S
. This change in E’s strategy is beneficial to I in terms of profits. On the other
hand, the entry increase, due to entrants who enter without screening instead of screening
first (given by B1 = q1
T
−q1
T ′
), is without any profit implication for I since litigation costs
are borne by the loser of the case.
The profits to I given E’s optimal strategy σ∗E are:
38Mathematica file available upon request.
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E[ΠI |σ∗E , n] =

v if qE ≤ q1S
P{b ≥ qE}(v) + P{b < qE}[g(−K) + (1− g)(v)] if q1S < qE ≤ q
1
T
P{b ≥ qE}(v) + P{b < qE}[g(−K) + (1− g)(v)] if q1T < qE
The intercept on the qE-axis that an excess patent generates determines how profitable
such a move is. In the case of imperfect screening, the slope of the screening function
increases, because of the cost discrepancy between type I and II errors. We see that:
A1 = q1
S′
− q1
S
=
q̄ [S(1 + τ)− (1− g)(∆− v −K)]
g(∆)− (1− g)(∆− v −K)
− q̄ [S − (1− g)(∆− v −K)]
g(∆)− (1− g)(∆− v −K)
=
q̄Sτ
g(∆)− (1− g)(∆− v −K)
<
q̄Sτ
∆
= A
Thus the entry reduction that can be obtained by an excess patent has decreased. The
full expression capturing the incentives to excessively patent for I is given by
E
b
E
qE
[
−c+ P{q1
S
< qE < q
1
S′
}[v − P{b ≥ qE}(v)− P{b < qE}[g(−K) + (1− g)(v)]]
]
≥ 0
⇔ −c+ E
qE
[P{A}][v − v
2
−1
2
[g(−K) + (1− g)(v)]] ≥ 0 ⇔ E
qE
[P{A}][g (v +K)
2
]− c ≥ 0
⇔ gSτ
g(∆)− (1− g)(∆− v −K)
[
v +K
2
]
− c ≥ 0 (1.3)
We verify that the incentive constraint in (1.3) is more stringent than the one of Lemma
1.3.4. 
Proof of Lemma 1.4.1
Introducing treble damages, the expected costs of errors are given by:
CTDI = E[Cost of a type I error] = (1− g)(∆− 3v −K)
CTDII = E[Cost of a type II error] = (1− g)(∆) ⇒ CTDI  CTDII
Comparing to the single damages setting, we have CTDI > CI > CII = C
TD
II . By the same
argument as in the proof of Lemma 1.3.5, we have an increase of the slope
∂ E[ΠE |S,D]
∂qE
. 
Proof of Corollary 1.4.2
Identical argument as in the proof of Lemma 1.3.6 and Corollary 1.3.7. 
Proof of Corollary 1.4.3
Identical argument as in the proof of Proposition 1.3.8, where the expected costs of
screening errors are as given in the proof of Lemma 1.4.1. Furthermore, treble damages
have a profit implication for I. The expected profits to I given E’s optimal strategy σ∗E
are:
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E[ΠI |σ∗E , n] =

v if qE ≤ q2S
P{b ≥ qE}(v) + P{b < qE}[g(−K) + (1− g)(3v)] if q2S < qE ≤ q
2
T
P{b ≥ qE}(v) + P{b < qE}[g(−K) + (1− g)(v)] if q2T < qE
Therefore, now both of the shifts of the thresholds A2TD = q
2
S′ − q2S and B2TD = q2T − q2T ′
affect I’s incentives to excessively patent.
B2TD represents a shift from S,D to NS,EN, which is payoff costly to I.
A2TD represents the shift of E from S,D to NS,NE. When v > P{b ≥ qE}(v) + P{b <
qE}[g(−K) + (1 − g)(3v)],we have two effects that yield that the excess patent is less
profitable than before. First, reduced screening by the entrant under treble damages
gives A2TD < A
1. The region impacted by the excess patent is reduced. Furthermore, the
gain from the excess patent under treble damages to I is lower under treble damages since:
v > P{b ≥ qE}(v) + P{b < qE}[g(−K) + (1 − g)(3v)] > P{b ≥ qE}(v) + P{b <
qE}[g(−K) + (1− g)(v)].
If v < P{b ≥ qE}(v) +P{b < qE}[g(−K) + (1− g)(3v)], then screening entrants are more
profitable to I than excluded rivals and the utility of the excess patent is none.
All effects go in the same direction and therefore, the introduction of treble damages
reduces the excess patenting incentives of the incumbent. 
Proof of proposition 1.5.1
When E has to pay legal costs under a US litigation scheme, its behaviour is unchanged
from the baseline model modulo a scaling factor due to the new scheme for litigation
costs. The calculations of the baseline model apply for E by substituting K = 0 and
∆ = vE − cE −KUSE .
Given US litigation costs, payoffs to I, in the absence of an excess patent, are given by:
E[ΠI |σ∗E, n] =

v if qE ≤ qS
P{b ≥ qE}(v)−KUSI P{b < qE} if qS < qE ≤ qT
P{b ≥ qE}(v)−KUSI if qT < qE
We thus see that the negative profit implication on I due to increased entry by high
quality entrants (represented by the shift B) is equal to −KUSI P{b > qE}. The profit
gain from inducing an entrant to stay out in region A is still (v + KI)P{b < qE}. We
see easily Eb EqE
[
|(v + KUSI )P{b < qE}|
]
> Eb EqE
[
| − KUSI P{b > qE}|
]
⇔ v(1
2
) +
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KUSI (
1
2
− 1
2
) > 0 if v,KUSI > 0. Thus, expected profits in region A exceed those in
region B (abstraction made of different sizes of the regions A and B - see next step).
To compare the overall payoff effect of an excess patent, we need to weigh the profit
effects due to changes in regions A and B by their likelihood of occurring. We have
from proposition 1.3.3 that |A| > |B|, i.e. the probability that the affected entrant
will switch strategy to staying out exceeds the probability that E will switch to entry
without screening. Thus, strategy considerations based on A dominate those based on
B. Consequently, the baseline analysis focussing on the shift A yields qualitatively the
same insights as one which would have taken both A and B into account.
For completeness and as a comparison, we provide the expressions of some milestones in
the calculations of the model. The condition for less screening to mean less entry is given
by the following and compares to condition 1.1:
|A|−|B| = q̄Sτ
∆−KUSI
− q̄Sτ
|∆− v −KUSI |
> 0 ⇔ q̄Sτ
[
|v|
(∆−KUSI )(|∆− v −KUSI |)
]
> 0
(1.4)
The excess patenting incentive for I under the US cost regime:
E
b
E
qE
[
−c+ P{q
S
< qE < qS′}[v − v P{b ≥ qE}+K
US
I P{b < qE}]
+P{q
T ′
< qE < qT}[−K
US
I (1− P{b < qE})
]
≥ 0
⇔ −c+ Sτ
∆
(
v +KUSI
2
)
+
Sτ
|∆− v −KUSI |
(
−KUSI
2
)
≥ 0 (1.5)
Inequality 1.5 can also be rewritten in the form of
1
2
[
P{A}[v +KUSI ]− P{B}[KUSI ]
]
− c ≥ 0
where P{.} interprets as the probability that qE falls in the range of A or B. Inequality 1.5
compares to inequality 1.2. To show that excess patenting incentives are lower under a
US regime versus a European litigation cost regime, see the following which compares
inequality 1.5 (US payoffs, left) to inequality 1.2 (EU payoffs, right):
1
2
[
P{A}[v +KUSI ]− P{B}[KUSI ]
]
−c ≥ 1
2
[
P{A}[v +KEU ]
]
−c ⇔ −K
US
I
KEU −KUSI
≤ P{A}
P{B}
which is satisfied since the LHS is negative and the RHS is positive (by prop. 1.3.3). 
Proof of proposition 1.5.2
By introducing commercial (increase vI) or legal (increase b) value, the excess patenting
incentives are satisfied more easily.
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Commercial value (increase in vI :) When the additional patent by I increases the con-
sumer valuation v by a factor ζ > 0, then the patenting constraint for the additional
patent (under European litigation costs) is given by:
E
b
E
qE
[−c+ P{q
S
< qE < qS′}[(v(1 + ζ) +K)P{b < qE}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
> payoff from condition (1.2)
+P{qE < qS}[vζ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ P{qE > qS′}[vζ P{b ≥ qE}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
] > 0 (1.6)
Compared to condition 1.2 (ζ = 0), we see that commercial patent value introduces
slack in the excess patenting condition as all additive terms are increased. We see that I
benefits from ζ > 0 in all cases when E abstains from market entry.
Furthermore, commercial value of the additional patent affects the entrant in case of
damages payments. The threshold qS increases even more given an additional patent
(with now also commercial value) when screening is imperfect. This contributes in fur-
ther making the first line of condition 1.6 larger than its counterpart in condition 1.2.
Moreover, the threshold qT ′ increases (compared to no commercial value). This reduces
the size of B due to an excess patent and is a profitable change for I. Hence, commercial
value results in enhanced entry deterrence (in A) and reduced entry fostering (in B).
Both effects relax the excess patenting constraint.
Legal value (increase in b:) When the additional patent by the incumbent bears legal
value, the litigation probabilities are affected. Assume that the new expected success
probability for I in litigation P{b̃ ≥ qE} = P{b ≥ qE} + γ, γ > 0 and γ is small s.t.
P{b̃ ≥ qE} ∈ [0, 1]. Then for E, the expected payoff function for NS,EN shift downwards
by a constant shift of −(v + K)γ. The payoff for E from S,D shifts down by constant
shift −∆γ. The latter shift is identical to an increase in screening costs if −∆γ = −Sτ .
Given the assumption 2∆ < v+K, we have that the NS,EN curve shifts down more and
threshold qT shifts right (shift of region B), inducing some E to switch from NS,EN to
S,D. Furthermore, we have in region A that the downshift of ΠS,D induces some E to
switch from S,D to NS,NE. Both effects reduce market entry and are profitable for I.
In addition, the portfolio size has increased and causes an increase in screening costs of
Sτ . Thus ΠS,D shifts down again with the effects as shown in proposition 1.3.2. Overall,
we see that legal value has relaxed the patenting constraint for I, because the legal value
47
Chapter 1
has strengthened the entry reduction in A and reduced the entry fostering effect in B
over a mere increase in the size of the portfolio. 
Proof of Proposition 1.5.3
When v+K
2
< ∆ < v + K, two effects occur: First, the expected payoff function of S,D
has a larger slope. The slopes of the payoff functions of the outside option as well as the
strategy NS,EN remain unaffected. Higher ∆ allows E to take more risks ex-ante (E can
face a stronger I without screening) and will result in more entry without screening (for
lower values of qE).
The argument is identical to corollary 1.4.3: Due to the increased slope of the screening
function, the entrant’s sensitivity to an excess patent goes down, because the raising
rivals’ cost impact is relatively smaller. Consequently, the model results are attenuated
under large vE as the incumbent faces a tighter excess patenting condition.
The second effect is that due to the decreased slope differential between the expected
payoffs of the S,D and NS,EN function, we do not validate the result of proposition
1.3.3: |A| ≤ |B|. Consequently, less screening does not mean less entry anymore. This
is because the relative magnitudes of the shifts A and B have changed, however the
directions of the shifts remain as before (i.e. thresholds move together given an excess
patent). In the European litigation cost setting, the main results are unaltered since the
shift B is payoff irrelevant for I.
In the US litigation cost setting, we thus see that excess patenting constraint may not
be satisfied even if it were satisfied under European litigation costs. This is because the
switch of an entrant from S,D to NS,NE is still more profitable to I than a switch from S,D
to NS,EN, but not necessarily more likely. Hence, larger vE affects the behaviour of E by
influencing the size of the shifts A and B, which determine whether excess patenting by I
is profitable. We see that the excess patenting constraint (1
2
[P{A}[v +KI ]− P{B}[KI ]]−
c ≥ 0) may not be satisfied when P{B} sufficiently exceeds P{A}. 
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Partial Termination Clauses
On hold-up potential in patent pools
2.1 Introduction
Technology standards often rely on the intellectual property (IP) contained in many
patents owned by different firms. Those patents that are essential to comply with a stan-
dard are called standard essential patents (SEPs). By bundling SEPs into a patent pool,
the complements problem1 in licensing can be avoided (Schmidt (2014)). Furthermore,
one-stop shopping reduces the transaction costs for implementers of the standard to ob-
tain those licenses. Both effects lead to a lower cost of access to a standard’s technology
and are generally expected to increase innovation rates for a standard (Shapiro (2001),
Lerner and Tirole (2004)).
On the other hand, the market power of SEP holders is a problem in standard setting.
When a standard becomes widely used, the owners of SEPs generally enjoy a large increase
in the market power of their patent, because it is pivotal for the implementation of the
standard. In order to reduce the ability of SEP holders to abuse this market power,
the concept of fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms has
been developed2. However, the effectiveness of FRAND critically depends on how the
1 The complements problem arises when licensors of complementary patents do not take into account
the fact that an increase in the price of the license on their own patent reduces the demand for the
licenses of each of the other complementary patents as well as the final good.
2European Commission (2012), ”Case no COMP/M.6381 - Google/Motorola Mobility” Merger Pro-
cedure Article 6(1)(b) - Decision
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FRAND commitment is implemented in practice, i.e. how FRAND terms are embedded
in the IPR policies and licensing agreements of standard setting organisations and patent
pools.
Two observations suggest that the FRAND commitment of the MPEG-2 patent pool3 is
weaker than that of other pools and motivate our analysis. First, Vakili (2012) shows
that the innovation rate of firms in the technological proximity of the MPEG-2 standard
dropped by 35% in the wake of the formation of the MPEG-2 patent pool. Second,
Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2011) show that the MPEG-2 patent pool is composed of a
higher proportion of vertically integrated firms than other patent pools. They also show
that proportionally fewer vertically integrated firms stay out of the MPEG-2 pool than
for other patent pools. These two observations taken together could suggest that, after
the set-up of the pool, vertically integrated members of the MPEG-2 patent pool were
able to capture more of the rents of outside innovators than in other patent pools. We
wish to understand if this conjecture is true and if it can be explained by the policy of
the MPEG-2 patent pool.
The policy of the MPEG-2 patent pool differs slightly from the policies of other patent
pools. In particular, MPEG-2 is the only patent pool to feature a contractual clause,
called partial termination, in its licensing agreement4. This clause gives pool members a
bargaining advantage in the negotiations for non-essential patents owned by licensees of
the patent pool. Specifically, partial termination5 allows a licensor (owning a standard
essential patent) of a patent pool to opt out of the pool with respect to a single licensee of
the pool when negotiating a licence on a related patent6 owned by that licensee. Without
the excluded patent, the pool licence does not allow the pool licensee to implement the
3The MPEG-2 patent pool is “a group of parties that created a one-stop-shopping clearinghouse by
pooling their patents. These patents are needed by entities looking to manufacture electronic equipment
that stores or transmits compressed video data. A jointly owned licensing administrator (known as
MPEG LA) licenses these patents in a single package that enables manufacturers to meet the standard
known as MPEG-2 video compression technology. The technology standard eliminates redundant in-
formation, such as images that are all the same color or figures that do not change from one moment
to the next, reducing the amount of data, storage and transmission space required to reproduce video
sequences” (Quote taken from Department of Justice (1997), slight adaptations made for brevity). See
definition 5 for details.
4Patent pools subsequently reviewed by the Department of Justice (e.g. the Toshiba DVD, UHF
RFID and 3G pools) did not feature the partial termination clause. Also, Glader (2006) confirms this
(p. 160).
5The partial termination clause may be invoked under two conditions (further specified in definition
6): (i) legal action must prevail between the licensor and the licensee and (ii) the proposed royalty rate
on the related patent may not exceed the licensor’s royalty for the essential patent. We give and discuss
the full legal definition of partial termination in section 2.2.
6A related patent is by definition not essential for the implementation of the standard. Details p. 53.
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standard without infringement. A separate licence for the excluded essential patent is
necessary and the pool licensee (who owns a related patent) must negotiate bilaterally
with the licensor of the excluded patent as if the pool did not exist. In the bilateral
negotiations, the pool member is not bound by the FRAND commitment, which the
pool member is subjected to under the pool licensing agreement. By recovering the
discrimination power over its essential patent under partial termination, the essential
patent holder has a stronger bargaining power to negotiate a low royalty on the related
patent.
The question whether the partial termination clause compromises the effectiveness of
FRAND in preventing essential patent holders from abusing their market power is an
important question since the Department of Justice (1997) reviewed the partial termina-
tion clause in its review letter of the MPEG-2 patent pool and waived the clause since
“on balance, [the clause appears] unlikely to be anticompetitive”.
This work shows that the partial termination clause introduced a hold-up threat in the
patent pool before the 2006 eBay decision. Before eBay, courts in the USA employed
a property rule for essential patent holders, which backed up the patent entitlement
by exclusion rights (i.e. injunctive relief). In a FRAND-committed patent pool like
the MPEG-2 pool, however, the SEP holder gives up its discrimination power over the
patent. By using partial termination to circumvent the FRAND commitment of the
patent pool in certain situations, the SEP holders were able to leverage the importance
of their SEPs in negotiations for licences to related patents of licensees of the standard.
Since eBay, the threat of partial termination has been significantly reduced. This is due
to the fact that the advantage, which partial termination bore for essential patent holders
pre eBay (namely the stalling of the FRAND commitment), got lost with the adoption
of a liability rule for essential patent holders by the courts. The liability rule limits the
entitlement under a patent to a right to reasonable damages only and de facto imposes
a FRAND commitment on all essential patent holders, even if the patent is not included
in a patent pool. We note that the threat of partial termination is not completely eroded
since permanent injunctions are not forbidden per se. However, the conditions required
to obtain an injunction are much harder to satisfy.
Our analysis of partial termination is able to shed light on a few empirical results that
have been established in the literature. First, this paper gives a possible explanation
for why vertically integrated firms are overrepresented (under-represented) among the
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MPEG-2 pool members (outsiders) as compared to pools that do not feature this clause
(Layne-Farrar and Lerner, 2011). This structural effect arises from the fact that the
partial termination clause increases the value of joining the pool for vertically integrated
firms, while the pool joining incentives of pure upstream firms remain unaffected by the
partial termination clause. Second, our model suggests an explanation for the drop in
innovation rates of firms that research in the technological proximity of the MPEG-2 pool
(Vakili, 2012). This result arises, because partial termination can hold-up the innovator
of a cumulative innovation ex-post when that innovator is a licensee of the pool. The
expected profits from investing in cumulative innovation are thus decreased.
In the extension of the model, we specifically look at the conditions under which partial
termination may be invoked. We highlight that the partial termination threat is exac-
erbated by the number of declared SEPs and the rules used by the MPEG-2 pool to
identify and check the essentiality and validity of SEPs. The analysis gives support to
the view that the standard setting organisations should take active responsibility in the
determination of the essentiality and validity of SEPs. This would significantly reduce
the hold-up threat from partial termination, while ensuring the benefits from partial
termination.
This chapter is closely related to the literature on the licensing of patents. Kamien and
Tauman (1986), Kamien et al. (1992) and Wang (1998) investigate the performance of
different types of licensing fees (e.g. auction vs. fixed vs. royalty) for innovators of cost-
reducing innovations. More specifically on licensing in the context of a standard or patent
pool, Kim (2004) and Schmidt (2014) investigate how the licensing of essential patents
is affected by horizontal or vertical integration. They show that when the upstream
market consists of perfect complements, vertically integrated firms have an incentive to
discriminate against downstream rivals. The situation where an essential patent holder
exploits the dependency of a manufacturer on standard essential patents, especially after
the latter incurred standard-specific investments, is well documented under the term of
patent hold-up (Shapiro (2001, 2010), Bessen (2004), Farrell et al. (2007)). The effects
of the hold-up problem on innovation as well as possible remedies are investigated by
Ganglmair et al. (2012) and Lerner and Tirole (2004, 2013). Also from a legal perspective,
the literature on hold-up is extensive (Geradin (2009), Cotter (2009) and many more) and
concludes that when the used market power is derived from the inclusion of the patent
into a standard (rather than from its intrinsic value), the hold-up strategy is considered
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to be an abuse of a dominant position (Schmidt, 2010). We contribute a simple model
to reveal the effects of the partial termination clause and give a possible explanation for
the empirical puzzles by Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2011) and Vakili (2012).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 details the institutional context of the analysis.
We set up the model and give the results in section 2.3. Section 2.4 extends the model
to generate a few predictions. We discuss the results and their limitations in section 2.5
and conclude in section 2.6.
2.2 Institutional context
We define key terms and the context of our analysis. First, we define two types of
patents since regulation relating to each type differs. Second, we describe the regulation
that exists and provide a brief account of the recent policy shift by the US Department
of Justice on essential patent holders. Third, we present the partial termination clause
from the licensing agreement of the MPEG-2 patent pool, which we want to study.
2.2.1 Types of patents
Many industry or technology standards rely on patent protected technologies. We dis-
tinguish two types of patents.
Definition 1 (Essential Patent) “An essential patent7 shall mean a Patent which is
necessarily infringed in connection with the use or implementation of the technology stan-
dard.”
Definition 2 (Related Patent) “A related patent8 shall mean any Patent which is not
an Essential Patent but which has one or more claims directed to an apparatus or a method
that may be used in the implementation of a product designed in whole or in part to exploit
the technology standard.”
The distinction between the two types of patents lies in their importance to comply with a
standard. While the related patent covers inventions that are optional to the compliance
with a given standard (e.g. small improvements and add-on features), the inventions
contained in an essential patent are absolutely necessary to implement and comply with
a fully functioning standard. For clarity, we emphasize that the difference does not lie
7Source: MPEG-2 PPL (2009), The Patent Portfolio License, §1.13, Adaptations made for brevity.
8Source: MPEG-2 PPL (2009), The Patent Portfolio License, §1.17, Adaptations made for brevity.
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in the inventive step, i.e. the intrinsic quality, of the patents. The essential part comes
merely from the proximity of the invention to the standard.
Consequently, the market power that an IP holder can derive from his patent differs for
both types of patents. When the standard becomes widely adopted, the essential patent
holder enjoys market power that is not due to the quality of his invention, but driven by
the success of the standard. As mentioned in the introduction, the concept of FRAND
was developed in order to limit the ability to abuse the market power granted by essential
patents.
FRAND stands for fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory. The commitment applies
to the licensing terms of essential patents. In our context, we interpret the FRAND
commitment as the legal obligation to propose a single price (= non-discriminatory) for
the licence on a patent to all interested parties (= fair), where the price must be lower
than a reference price set by the courts (= reasonable). We note the soft nature of the
definition and acknowledge some critiques on FRAND9.
2.2.2 Court rules
The market power considerations of SEP holders have driven the recent policy change
in the US. In litigation cases until 2006, the courts awarded the prevailing patent owner
a permanent injunction absent ”exceptional circumstances” (Cotter, 2013). This meant
that “a patent owner who prevailed in an infringement suit was effectively entitled to a
permanent injunction as a matter of right” (Torrance and Tomlinson, 2011).
In eBay v. Mercexchange (2006)10, the US Supreme Court acknowledged that the Federal
Circuit “erred in its categorical grant of (injunctive) relief”. The Supreme Court decided
that a traditional four-factor test should be applied when considering to award permanent
9 Layne-Farrar et al. (2007) propose some critiques: Goldstein and Kearsey (2004) identify the lack
of a universally accepted operational definition as one of the “core problems in the licensing of rights”
to essential patents. Legal uncertainty arises from the lack of a generally accepted test for FRAND
commitments (Swanson and Baumol, 2005). Rapp and Stiroh (2002) discuss the imprecision of a FRAND
definition in determining the size of royalties since the reasonability criterion can mean very different
things to the intellectual property owners and the licensees. Furthermore, Cotter (2013) shows that the
magnitude of FRAND royalties is very much context dependent.
10“When (..) the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal
damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the
public interest.” eBay Inc. v. MERCEXCHANGE, LL, 547 U.S. 388, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 164 L. Ed. 2d
641 (2006)
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injunctive relief to a defendant under the Patent Act11. Since the eBay case, courts
do not seem to grant permanent injunctions any more against infringers of standard
essential patents subject to a FRAND commitment (Cotter, 2013). Two major cases are
notable12: Microsoft v. Motorola13 and Apple v. Motorola14. In these cases, the courts
first confirmed the validity of Motorola’s FRAND commitment. Second, the four factor
test was not deemed to be satisfied and motions for an injunction were rejected. Third,
the rulings emphasized the importance of the courts for the determination of the level of
FRAND royalties15.
The policy shift induced by eBay is a move from a property rule to a liability rule with
respect to holders of essential patents. Note that this rule shift only applies to essential
patents and not to related patents.
Definition 3 (Property rule) Under a property rule16, an entitlement is backed up by
a right to injunctive relief.
Definition 4 (Liability rule) Under a liability rule17, an entitlement is backed up by
a right to reasonable damages only.
A liability rule differs from the property rule in that it does not grant the defendant a
right to exclude others from using its patent henceforth, but merely awards reasonable
(FRAND) damages for the future use of the intellectual property by the infringer. Com-
mon to both rules is the award of reasonable damages for past use of the patent. Thus,
in practice under a liability rule, the defendant is free to breach the entitlement and pay
11Specifically, the test requires a plaintiff to demonstrate: (1) it has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
12The US evolution is congruent with European law. For details, see Cotter (2013) and UK High
Court Denies a Patent Injunction Against Nokia in Light of a FRAND Commitment, Foss Patent Blog
(30.03.2012).
13Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10 - 1823 JLR, WL 5993202 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2012)
14Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
15 Judge Crabb states in the decision of a related ruling of the latter case (Apple, Inc. v. Motorola
Mobility, Inc., 2012 WL 5416941 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 29, 2012)): “It makes sense to allow [...] for the court
to determine license terms, if necessary. In fact, in situations such as this in which the parties cannot
agree on the terms of a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory license, the court may be the only forum
to determine license terms.”
16Patent law interpretation after Cotter (2013) based on Calabresi and Melamed (1972).
17Patent law interpretation after Cotter (2013). Torrance and Tomlinson (2011) give further details:
“the owner of an entitlement is legally powerless to keep it exclusively for herself. The owner must accept
compensation at the objectively determined value by some neutral third-party authority.”
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damages. The right holder is not able to invoke an exclusionary right by means of a
permanent injunction.
2.2.3 Patent pool (MPEG-2)
Definition 5 (Patent Pool) A patent pool18 is an aggregation of patent rights for the
purpose of joint package licensing. The portfolio combines essential patents19 , which are
complementary20 and interdependent21 for implementing the standard. Licensing of the
bundled patents underlies a commitment to license on FRAND terms.
For the sake of pool stability, many pooling agreements oblige licensors and licensees
to grant back existing and future essential patents. These standard grantback clauses
require all pool members (licensors & licensees) to include all essential patents in the pool,
even if they have been developed after the pool has been set-up22. Grantback removes
the hold-up potential by licensees owning essential patents. This is generally considered
pro-competitive and welfare enhancing23.
By definition, a related patent is not subject to the grantback clause24. However, the
partial termination clause extends this obligation to related patents of licensees of the
pool in some situations. We want to study this clause and formally define it here. In the
following, the licensing administrator refers to the managing entity (MPEG LA) of the
patent pool, the licensors refers to the owners of essential patents included in the pool
and the licensees refers to firms paying for a pool licence.
18We lean on Department of Justice (1997) for the definition of a patent pool.
19For the MPEG-2 pool: Absent disputes, the licensors merely need to reach consensus that a patent
should be included in the pool. In case of disputes, the evaluation is left to an independent expert.
20There is no technical alternative to any of the portfolio patents within the standard.
21Each portfolio patent is useful for standard compliant products only in conjunction with the others.
22For convenience, this formulation is imprecise. However, the main idea is preserved. Formally, all
pool licensors and licensees can get access to essential patents of other licensors or licensees at a cost
that is equivalent or less to what they could have negotiated absent the patent pool, be it by including
the new essential patent into the pool (MEPG-2 §2.3 AAL) or by denying the owner of the invention
access to the fully functioning pool bundle until an agreement has been reached (MPEG-2 §2.8 AAL).
23A grantback clause is used by 71% of the pools not litigated in the sample of Lerner, Strowjas &
Tirole (2007, p.619). They take non-litigated pools as a proxy for pools of complements based on the
assumption that pools of substitute patents are more likely to be litigated (since they can avoid price
competition).
24“No matter how attractive the licensee’s patented implementation of the [...] standard may be, by
definition the Related Patent will not be essential to compliance with the standard. And, not being
essential, the patent is not subject to [...] grantback (Department of Justice, 1997).
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Definition 6 (Partial Termination) 25 The Licensing Administrator, upon the in-
struction of a Licensor, shall terminate Licensee’s sublicense under any Pool Patent(s)
licensed or sublicensed to the Licensing Administrator by such Licensor in the event that
Condition 1 (Legal Action) the Licensee has brought a lawsuit or other
proceeding for infringement of a Pool Related Patent(s) against such Licensor,
and
Condition 2 (Non-FRAND Terms) Licensee has refused to grant the
Licensor a license on fair and reasonable terms and conditions under the
Pool Related Patent(s) upon which the lawsuit or other proceeding is based.
[...] The Licensor’s per patent share of royalties payable shall be presumed to
be a fair and reasonable royalty rate for Licensee’s patent(s)26.
In simple terms the clause does the following: Assume that we have a patent pool, which
licenses out a portfolio of patents needed for a standard. Consider two firms, where firm
A is a licensee of this pool and firm B a licensor of the pool (i.e. owns an essential
patent included in the pool portfolio license). Licensee A owns a related patent to the
standard in question, which makes the object of a lawsuit between licensee A and a
licensor B. Furthermore, A does not agree to license the related patent to B at a royalty
that is less than or equal to the royalty that B earns with its essential patent through
the pool license27. Given these two conditions, B can invoke partial termination and stall
the portfolio license for A only (other licensees of the pool are unaffected). Thereby, B
makes A unable to comply with the standard. If A wants to comply with the standard,
it must obtain a separate licence for the excluded patent from B.
In summary, the partial termination clause allows individual pool members to opt out of
the pool with respect to a single licensee (Merges, 1999b)28.
25Emphasis and formatting added. Slight adaptations made for brevity. Definition taken from MPEG-
2 PPL (2009): §6.3. The PT clause applies both to related as well as essential patents of licensees. For
essential patents, however, the PT clause has no additional grip on top of MPEG-2 PPL (2009) §7.3
(grantback). Consequently, we suppress the references to essential patents in definition 6.
26Note that “Licensors who are Licensees are exempted from this presumption as a result of, among
other things, the costs incurred in connection with this licensing program”.
27Recall that the quality of the patents is not specified in this argument and irrelevant for the definition
of an essential or related patent. Therefore, there is no indication that this upper bound is appropriate.
28Merges (1999b) confirms that ”the purpose of this provision [...] is to provide bargaining leverage
to any MPEG-2 (pool-)member that is negotiating for a license to a complementary patent held by an
MPEG-2 (pool-)licensee.”
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Whilst the above definition applies partial termination to situations with existing licensees
of the pool, an alternative version of the clause applies to prospective licensees of the
pool. See appendix 2.7.1 for details. We note that partial termination has been invoked
only once against a prospective licensee of the MPEG-2 patent pool.
2.3 Model
We are interested in the innovation incentives of a firm that is dependent on a licence for
an essential patent from another firm. Specifically, we investigate how these incentives
are affected by changes in the legal environment, i.e. by the rules of the game. The model
is based on Wang (1998). We first outline the status quo, we then detail the cumulative
innovation game.
2.3.1 Set-up
Market structure Our industry is composed of two markets, an upstream and a down-
stream market. The upstream market relates to intellectual property in the form of
patents, which provide know-how for the production of goods on the downstream mar-
ket. We focus on a setting with two firms, both of which are downstream manufacturers,
but only one of which owns a standard essential patent at the start of the game. The
firm owning the patent is thus vertically integrated (called the upstream incumbent I)
and stands for a simplified version of a patent pool. The other firm is not yet vertically
integrated (called the upstream entrant E).
Downstream market Consider the downstream market first without any upstream IP
licensing considerations. We assume a simple linear Cournot model. Suppliers i = {I, E}
produce homogenous goods and face a linear and downwards sloping demand function:
P = a − Q, Q =
∑
i qi. Fixed costs are assumed to be sunk. Manufacturers incur only
constant marginal costs c > 0 in the production of the final good. Demand is large
enough for a market to exist: a > c > 0. Both manufacturers maximise profits Πi =
(a−Q− c)qi, ∀i. From standard existence theorems, we know that a unique, symmetric
Nash equilibrium exists on the downstream market with qi =
a−c
3
and Πi =
(
a−c
3
)2 ∀i.
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Upstream market As mentioned, downstream production uses know-how contained
in patents, which are licensed on the upstream market. We assume that all patents
are valid with certainty and that an infringement of a patent is never profitable for the
infringer. We assume that the patents are licensed using linear royalty rates as is the
case for the MPEG-2 patent pool (Kim, 2004)29. Royalties paid by firm i (ri) thus add
to the marginal costs of downstream production. Total downstream marginal costs are
given by C ′i(r) = c+ ri.
Licensing of the essential patent We assume that the patent owned by the incum-
bent I is an essential patent. A license for the essential patent is required to produce
goods on the downstream market. I is bound by a FRAND commitment for this essential
patent and licenses it out at a fee l ≥ 0. The licence fee l is assumed to be exogenous and
cannot be adapted in the game in response to, for example, competition30. The reason-
ability criterion of FRAND means that l ≤ l̄, where l̄ is the threshold level that courts
understand as reasonable. To simplify the model, we set the exogenous l = l̄ = 0 31. The
fairness criterion also means that I is not able to exclude E from a licence32.
Thus in the status quo, both firms have access to the essential patent for free. The
downstream equilibrium remains unchanged. Both firms behave like pure downstream
manufacturers since there are no profits to be made upstream.
2.3.2 Cumulative innovation game (without partial termina-
tion)
In the context of the status quo duopoly, we are interested in the incentives of E to invest
in cumulative innovations. The (until now) pure downstream manufacturer E can invest
in a cost-reducing innovation, which is not essential, but related to the standard. If the
29Generally, linear royalties are abundantly used in practice (Layne-Farrar and Lerner, 2011), one of
the reasons for this choice is their risk sharing property (Schmidt, 2014).
30This represents the case, when multiple licensees of the essential technology make a royalty adjust-
ment unprofitable (e.g. a FRAND commitment would require to change the royalty rates for all licensees
simultaneously). This is also representative of a patent pool, where royalty determination is delegated to
the pool managing entity and revised rarely. The MPEG-2 pool in particular is known for not adjusting
its royalty over time, even as patents expire.
31Thereby, we abstract of the double mark-up problem for the entrant and focus our analysis on the
boundary case in which I only cares about the downstream market. We address the implication of this
assumption in more detail in section 2.5.2.
32The non-discrimination criterion requires the same price to apply for all licensees of the pool bundle.
This is irrelevant in a two-player setting.
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investment is made, E obtains a patent (called the related patent) for its invention, which
can be licensed to I.
Cumulative innovation When E decides to develop a cost-reducing innovation, it
pays investment costs K ≥ 0 and receives an innovation, which yields an expected con-
stant marginal cost reduction of δ(K) ≥ 0. When investing, E is rational, risk-neutral
and only cares about the expected value of the innovation, not about the uncertainty on
the outcome of the innovation. We assume decreasing marginal returns of investment33:
δ′(K) > 0 and δ′′(K) < 0. The expected cost reduction δ(K) is bounded by δ(0) = 0 and
limK→∞ δ(K) = (a−c). We also impose limK→0 δ′(K) =∞ and limK→∞ δ′(K) = 0.
The innovation is not essential to produce downstream, but optional. We therefore limit
the size of the cost-reduction due to the related patent to δ < a− c. This restriction ex-
cludes drastic innovations that would lead to the exclusion of the incumbent downstream34
(Arrow, 1962) and is motivated by the idea that the legal threshold for distinguishing a
related patent from an essential patent would likely be crossed by a drastic innovation.
A drastic patent excludes all firms without access to its IP from the downstream market
and is thus de-facto essential. Given that essential patents do not underlie the same
regulation as related patents, we do not include them in the model.
Licensing of the related patent The new related patent can be licensed to I. E
decides on and proposes a take-it-or-leave-it offer r̂ ≥ 0 for a licence on its new related
patent. Note that E is not bound by a FRAND commitment for its related patent35. I
can decide whether to accept the offer or reject it.
If I accepts the offer, it pays the royalty r̂ and both firms enjoy the marginal cost reduction
of size δ in downstream production. The payoff to the firms in the Cournot stage is then
ΠLI (δ− r̂, δ) = (a−QL−c+δ− r̂)qLI and ΠLE(δ, δ− r̂) = (a−QL−c+δ)qLE + r̂qLI . In terms
of notation, we abbreviate equilibrium quantities to firm i = {I, E} by qSi and payoffs by
ΠSi (∆C
′
i,∆C
′
j), i 6= j . The superscript S = {L,N} stands for whether licensing occurs
(L) or not (N). The first argument (∆C ′i) stands for the cost-reduction enjoyed by firm
i = {I, E} and the second argument (∆C ′j) stands for the cost reduction enjoyed by the
other firm. Πi(0, 0) refers to firm i’s status quo profits.
33These assumptions are in line with the endogenous investment model of Baye and Hoppe (2003).
34This occurs when the monopoly price under the new technology does not exceed the competitive
price under the old technology pm ≤ pc ⇔ δ ≥ a− c.
35This corresponds to the situation of a licensee, who is not a licensor of essential IP, of a patent pool.
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If I rejects the offer, it cannot use the cost-reducing innovation for downstream produc-
tion. The firms then maximise ΠNI (0, δ) = (a−QN−c)qNI and ΠNE (δ, 0) = (a−QN−c+δ)qNE
on the downstream market.
Timing and structure The game develops as follows:
t = 1 E decides on the investment level K̂
t = 2 E makes a take-it-or-leave-it royalty offer r̂ to I
t = 3 I decides whether to accept the offer or not
t = 4 Cournot downstream competition ensues
We derive the equilibrium of the cumulative innovation game without partial termination
in proposition 2.3.1.
Proposition 2.3.1 There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the cumulative
innovation game without partial termination, where the entrant invests K̂ > 0, obtains
a cumulative innovation of size δ = δ(K̂) and proposes a royalty rate r̂ = δ to the in-
cumbent, who accepts the offer. Both firms produce positive quantities on the downstream
market.
qLI =
a− c− δ
3
, qLE =
a− c+ 2δ
3
and QL =
2(a− c) + δ
3
(2.1)
Equilibrium profits to the firms are
ΠLI (0, δ) =
(a− c− δ
3
)2
and ΠLE(δ, 0) =
(a− c+ δ
3
)2
+
5
9
δ(a− c) (2.2)
The level of investment in innovation (K̂) is implicitly defined by[7
9
(a− c) + 2
9
δ(K̂)
] ∂δ
∂K̂
= 1 (2.3)
Proof See the appendix. 
In equilibrium, we obtain that E invests a positive amount in cumulative innovation and
licensing of the related patent occurs ex-post. The intuition for the result is the following.
For licensing to occur, both firms must earn at least as much as given no licensing. In
t = 3, I thus accepts any royalty 0 ≤ r ≤ δ. E’s profits are increasing in r and E will
propose the highest royalty that will be accepted by I, i.e. r̂ = δ. In equilibrium, I is
indifferent between accepting and rejecting, while E is strictly better off than under no
licensing. There exists no unilateral profitable deviation for any player. E is also strictly
better off than in the absence of innovating and thus invests a positive amount K̂ in
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innovation. The level of investment in innovation is implicitly characterised by the first
order condition in (2.3).
2.3.3 Partial termination (under a property rule)
We use the model to analyse the effect of the partial termination (PT) clause. Partial
termination is formally defined on page 57. When PT is invoked, the licensor is able
to exclude its essential patent from the pool bundle with respect to a single licensee.
In order to comply with the standard, the licensee must obtain a separate licence for
the excluded patent. Continued production downstream without the excluded patent
would constitute an infringement. Therefore, the use of PT is equivalent to returning
to the bilateral negotiations between firms in the absence of the pool and the pool’s
commitments (such as FRAND). Outside of the pool, we assume that the owner of the
essential patent enjoys a property right over its patent and is able to exclude competitors
from using it.
In the model, when I invokes PT, it is able to cut the license of E to the essential patent
and thereby, E is excluded from the downstream market. Thus using PT, I becomes
a monopolist. Even when E is excluded downstream, licensing of the related patent
may occur. Profits to the firms are ΠL, PTE = r̂
PTqPTI and Π
L, PT
I = (a − qPTI − c + δ −
r̂PT)qPTI when licensing occurs and Π
N, PT
E = 0 and Π
N, PT
I = (a − qPTI − c)qPTI given no
licensing.
However, PT can only be invoked if two conditions are satisfied. Condition 1 (Legal
Action) is assumed to be exogenously given36 when the Incumbent rejects the proposed
royalty r̂. Condition 2 (Non-FRAND Terms) is satisfied, when the proposed royalty is
not FRAND. The PT clause specifies that for condition 2 to be satisfied, the proposed
royalty on the related patent (r̂) must exceed the per patent royalty received by the
owner of the essential patent (l = 0). Therefore in our setting, I may invoke PT iff
r̂ > l = 0.
Proposition 2.3.2 There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the cumulative
innovation game with partial termination (under a property rule for essential patents),
36In particular, we note that condition 1 for PT (originating from section 2.10 of the Agreement Among
Licensors) is satisfied when the essential patent owner (licensor of the pool, here called I) initiates an
infringement suit against a prospective licensee (E) on the patent to be excluded. Legal action must
thus not be initiated by the E. See appendix 2.7.1 for details.
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where the entrant invests 0 < K̂PT < K̂ and obtains a cumulative innovation of size
δPT = δ(K̂PT) < δ.
When 0 < δ(K̂PT) ≤ a−c2 , the proposed royalty is r̂
PT = 0 < r̂ and the partial termination
clause cannot be invoked in equilibrium. A duopoly remains on the downstream market,
where equilibrium quantities and profits are
qPTI = q
PT
E =
a− c+ δPT
3
and QPT =
2(a− c+ δPT)
3
(2.4)
ΠLI (δ
PT, δPT) = (
a− c+ δPT
3
)2 > ΠLI (0, δ) and Π
L
E(δ
PT, δPT) = (
a− c+ δPT
3
)2 < ΠLE(δ, 0)
(2.5)
When a−c
2
< δ(K̂PT) < (a − c), the proposed royalty is r̂PT = δPT (same linear price as
r̂) and the partial termination clause is invoked in equilibrium. A monopoly results on
the downstream market, where equilibrium quantities and profits are
qPTI =
a− c
2
, qPTE = 0 and Q
PT =
a− c
2
(2.6)
ΠL,PTI = (
a− c
2
)2 > ΠLI (0, δ) and Π
L,PT
E = (
a− c
2
)δPT < ΠLE(δ, 0) (2.7)
The level of investment in innovation K̂PT is implicitly defined by
[
2
9
(a− c+ δ(K̂PT)
]
∂δ
∂K̂PT
= 1 if 0 < δ(K̂PT) ≤ a−c2(
a−c
2
)
∂δ
∂K̂PT
= 1 if a−c
2
< δ(K̂PT) < (a− c)
(2.8)
Proof See the appendix. 
The intuition of the results is the following. Under a property rule for essential patents
outside of the pool, the threat of partial termination is credible, because invoking PT
is always profitable for I and always costly to E. Two cases arise since E’s optimal
behaviour depends on the expected value of the cumulative innovation. In both cases
(detailed below), we obtain the result that expected profits from innovating go down for
E and hence, the optimal level of investment in innovation for E is decreased. This is
because, by using PT or the credible threat of PT, I can capture some of the rents from
innovating.
When the expected cost-reduction from the related patent is small (0 < δPT ≤ a−c
2
), then
the attainable revenue from licensing the related patent is not sufficient to compensate
E for the loss of its downstream profits. E actually finds it more profitable to share the
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related patent for free rather than be excluded from the downstream market. Conse-
quently, E proposes the highest possible royalty, which does not allow I to invoke PT: In
our setting this is the zero royalty. Since the proposed royalty is lower than the optimal
royalty in the absence of PT, E forgoes profits and its incentives to invest in innovation
are reduced.
When the expected cost-reduction is larger (a−c
2
< δPT < (a − c)), the best reaction by
E to the partial termination threat is accepting exclusion from the downstream market
and maximising revenue from the licensing of the related patent. Hence, r̂PT = δ. While
in this case the proposed (proportional) royalty rate is unchanged compared to proposi-
tion 2.3.1, E’s total profits and thus innovation incentives are hurt since E is excluded
downstream. In both cases, the equilibrium levels of investment in innovation are lower
than in the absence of a PT threat. The exact levels are characterised by the first order
conditions in (2.8).
We note that even at r̂ = 0, I would like to invoke PT, but cannot do so because condition
2 is not satisfied. This point is important and shows that the limiting conditions for the
partial termination clause create a safe harbour for E to license his innovation. However,
the above situation exemplifies that the value of the safe harbour depends strongly on the
definition of FRAND as applied to the related patent. We return to this point later.
2.3.4 Partial termination (under a liability rule)
When a liability rule prevails for essential patent holders outside of a patent pool, the
threat of PT is not credible any more. The difference between a liability and property
rule is formally defined on page 55. Recall that this is the policy shift that we have
observed in the US in the wake of the eBay decision in 2006. Where as under a property
rule an essential patent owner was able to exclude competitors, this is not possible under
a liability rule any more. Instead, the essential patent holder must accept compensation
at reasonable rates.
In the model, when I invokes PT and excludes its patent from the pool bundle, it is
still subject to a liability rule and must grant a license for the essential patent to E on
reasonable terms. Reasonable terms for the essential patent were set equal to a zero by
assumption (l = 0). This means that E continues to get the license for the essential
patent for free and cannot be excluded from the downstream market. In the negotiations
for the royalty on the related patent, I can hence only revert to not accepting the license
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offer. Bargaining based on I’s power to cut the licence on the essential patent is not
possible any more. The game is thus identical to the baseline scenario without PT.
Proposition 2.3.3 When a liability rule applies to essential patent holders, the partial
termination has no effect and the equilibrium is identical to that of proposition 2.3.1
Proof In the text above. 
We have now seen that when PT is a credible threat, E’s incentives to innovate as
well as competition on the downstream market are affected. In a linear Cournot model,
the welfare implications for consumers are directly related to the effect on the total
downstream quantity, where an increase in total quantity translates into an increase in
consumer surplus.
Corollary 2.3.4 If we assume that the cost reductions of the cumulative innovation (δ
and δPT ) are given exogenously, then the total downstream quantity under the threat of
partial termination
(i) is lower when δPT > a−c
2
(ii-a) is lower when 0 < δPT ≤ a−c
2
and δPT < δ
2
(ii-b) is higher when 0 < δPT ≤ a−c
2
and δPT > δ
2
compared to the total downstream quantity in the absence of a partial termination threat.
Proof Immediate by comparing total volumes in equations 2.1, 2.4 and 2.6. 
We compare the situation with and without PT. When E innovates in the absence of PT,
then E benefits from reduced marginal production costs, while I does not benefit from
any cost reduction. The result is that total downstream volume is increased over the
situation where no cost-reducing innovation is realised. The magnitude of the increase in
total downstream volume depends on the size of the cost reduction.
When PT is a credible threat and the expected cost-reduction is larger (a−c
2
< δPT <
(a − c)), then in equilibrium, the PT clause will be invoked by I. Now, I benefits from
the decreased competition as E is excluded from the downstream market, but I does
not benefit from a marginal cost reduction. The downstream quantity resulting from a
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monopoly served by I is always lower than that of the duopoly absent a threat of partial
termination.
When PT is a credible threat and the size of the cost reduction is small (0 < δPT ≤ a−c
2
),
then E gives out the cost reduction for free (PT cannot be invoked) and stays in the
downstream market. Consequently, both E and I benefit from the cost reduction - an
effect that results in an increase of the total downstream quantity. However, the fact
that E does not earn profits from the licensing of the innovation decreases its investment
incentives and the expected level of the realised innovation falls - an effect that decreases
the total downstream quantity. The net effect of the PT threat on the downstream
volume is thus ambiguous and depends on the specification of the innovation investment
function. In our setting, total volume will decrease (increase) if the PT threat reduces
the expected level of the cost reduction by more (less) than half its level in the absence
of a PT threat. We look at the results for a specific investment function in section 2.4.1.
2.4 Extensions
2.4.1 Comparative statics
To generate specific welfare implications, we specify a functional form for our innovation
investment function. The cost reduction of the cumulative innovation (δ) depends on E’s
investment (K): δ(K) = A
√
K, where the parameter A > 0 is a multiplier constant that
controls the concavity of the investment function. To align the functional form with the
conditions used in the model so far, we impose decreasing marginal returns (by the use
of the square root) and focus on non-drastic innovations37: A <
√
2.
Proposition 2.4.1 When δ(K) = A
√
K, then propositions 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 hold for
0 < A <
√
2.
Respectively, without and with a credible threat of partial termination, the equilibrium
levels of investment and the realised cost-reductions are given by
K̂ =
[
A
7
2
(a− c)
9− A2
]2
, δ = A2
[ 7
2
(a− c)
9− A2
]
< a− c (2.9)
and K̂PT =
[
A
(a− c)
9− A2
]2
, δPT = A
2
[ a− c
9− A2
]
<
δ
2
<
a− c
2
(2.10)
37The condition is derived in the proof of proposition 2.4.1. It ensures that 0 < δ < a− c.
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The total downstream quantity is reduced under a credible partial termination threat
(QL > QPT ) for the whole range 0 < A <
√
2.
Proof See the appendix. 
We have previously seen that, in equilibrium, the investment in cumulative innovation
and the resulting cost-reduction are reduced when the threat of partial termination is
credible. Proposition 2.4.1 shows that these results hold for a specific set of innovation
investment functions. Furthermore, it shows for a credible threat of PT that case (i) of
corollary 2.3.4 will not occur in equilibrium. This means that the realised innovation by
E is always of a sufficiently low quality (0 < δPT < a−c
2
), such that E’s best response to
the partial termination threat is the free-sharing of the innovation with I. By sharing
the innovation for free, E avoids the expulsion from the downstream market due to an
exercise of PT.
Moreover, proposition 2.4.1 shows that case (ii-b) of corollary 2.3.4 will not occur in equi-
librium either. This means that we observe a reduction in the quality of E’s innovation
due to the PT threat that is more than half its value in the absence of a PT threat
(δPT < δ
2
). As a result, the total quantity on the downstream market is always reduced.
In our linear Cournot model, this downstream volume reduction leads to an increase in
the price on the downstream market and a reduction of the consumer surplus on the
market. In addition, we have from proposition 2.3.2 that under PT, consumers expect
less innovation related to the standard. Both effects harm consumers.
We note that these results are largely driven by two assumptions: (i) the focus on non-
drastic innovations only and (ii) the set of concave investment functions considered. The
first assumption (detailed on page 60) ensures that the partial termination clause may
be invoked in principle and restricts the parameter range of A considered. The second
is a technical restriction. By focussing on variations of A, we investigate the effects of
applying a constant scaling factor on the concavity of the investment function for all
levels of K. For this set of functions and the considered range of A, we always observe
that investment incentives under PT are reduced and that total downstream volume
is decreased38. While we take away that the results of propositions 2.4.1 are likely to
38Another set of concave investment functions, e.g. δ(K) = Kα, α < 1, could be considered by varying
α. This would non-linearly scale the concavity of the investment function, i.e. change the concavity of
the function differently at differently levels of K. However, no closed-form solution is available for this
specification and, even with numerical methods, we could not prove that no counterexamples exist.
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occur, we do not exclude the possibility that the obtained results may fail for alternative
specifications of the innovation investment function. We keep this caveat in mind for the
next section.
2.4.2 Pool joining incentives
We investigate how the incentives of firms to join the patent pool are affected by the
existence of a PT clause in the pool’s policy (corresponding to t = 0 of our game).
For this analysis, we briefly clarify two aspects of our understanding upfront. First, we
understand that PT may be invoked by a pool member only if the PT clause features
in the pool’s licensing agreement. Second, firms not member of the patent pool are not
bound by the pool’s general FRAND commitment and are thus not restricted from using
their essential patents as leverage in bargaining situations (i.e. they may cut the licences
for their essential patent in a manner similar to that of PT)39.
Proposition 2.4.2 The partial termination clause (under a property rule for essential
patents outside of the pool) increases the value of joining the patent pool for vertically
integrated firms, but not for pure upstream firms.
Proof :
For pure upstream firms: Proposition 2.4.1 gives that a credible PT threat results in a
decrease of the total downstream quantity. This effect hurts upstream firms since fewer
unit licences for the essential patents are taken out. Consequently, a pure upstream firm
will never invoke PT. Furthermore, the loss of upstream revenue due the existence of
a PT threat negatively affects licensors of essential patents in and outside of the pool
equally. Therefore, the inclusion of PT in the pool licence does not affect pure upstream
firms’ incentives to join or leave the patent pool.
For vertically integrated firms: We have just seen that the PT threat hurts licensors
of essential patents, i.e. also the upstream part of a vertically integrated firm. Earlier,
proposition 2.3.2 showed that the PT threat benefits the downstream division of verti-
cally integrated pool members and, moreover, that the downstream gain outweighed the
upstream cost40. Therefore, the PT clause has a net positive value for a vertically inte-
grated firm, who will use PT when possible. Invoking PT is possible as a pool outsider
39Abstraction made of any additional commitments, such as individual FRAND commitments, which
are often demanded for the inclusion of patents into a standard.
40The constraint given by equation 2.20 on page 79 must be satisfied. It states that I must find it
profitable to invoke PT (otherwise the threat would not be credible). We show that this is the case for
any non-drastic innovation.
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or as a pool member when PT features in the pool’s licensing agreement. Consequently
by joining a patent pool that does not allow PT, the vertically integrated firm loses in
terms of its bargaining power vis-à-vis cumulative innovators. Hence compared to a pool
without PT, a pool with PT should attract more vertically integrated firms. 
We note that proposition 2.4.2 holds even when the PT threat results in an increase of the
total downstream volume41. We also note that the argument is robust to the situation,
where a standard requires a FRAND commitment by all owners of essential IP, regardless
whether they join the patent pool or not42. Finally, we note that this analysis does not
provide information on which way the causality runs: Whether vertically integrated
firms influenced the inclusion of a partial termination clause in the pool agreements or
whether the existence of the PT clause drew in proportionally more vertically integrated
firms43.
2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Findings
The context of the analysis is the following. In 1997, the MPEG-2 pool was inaugurated
and the Department of Justice waived the partial termination clause in the pool licensing
agreements. Outside of the pool, essential patent owners enjoyed a property right on
their inventions. In 2006, with the eBay decision, the Department of Justice changed its
41In this case, it is evident to see that the joining incentives for a vertically integrated firm to join
the patent pool are increased even more by the PT clause since the firm now benefits both up and
downstream from invoking PT. For the pure upstream firms, the argument is as follows: First, note
that PT is only useful for upstream firms, when there exists a downstream quantity effect, i.e. when
a vertically integrated pool member uses it to increase total downstream volume or the pure upstream
firm itself becomes a producer. Thus, consider a patent pool with at least one vertically integrated
firm. Proposition 2.3.2 showed that incentives to invoke PT are always higher for vertically integrated
firms than for pure upstream firms. Hence, ceteris paribus, the pure upstream firm will never invoke PT
(even when profitable for the upstream firm), since the threshold for invoking PT is satisfied earlier for
vertically integrated firms who will invoke PT. Furthermore, pure upstream firms benefit equally in and
outside of the patent pool. Therefore, we conclude that the inclusion of PT in the pool licence does not
affect pure upstream firms’ incentives to join or leave the patent pool. This is because a pure upstream
firm will not invoke PT itself and the cost or benefit of the PT threat is the same in or outside of the
patent pool.
42This is often the case for standard setting organisations, e.g. ETSI and IEEE (since 02/2015). In
this case, the pool joining incentives of a vertically integrated firm are increased even more by the PT
clause, since the value of staying outside of the pool is reduced.
43The fact that for most standards (incl. MPEG, but also IEEE and ETSI), the policy is fixed before
the standard is set up would suggest that the latter relationship is more probable. However, we do not
have information on the type of stakeholders who took part in the decision process of the MPEG policy.
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rule on standard essential patent holders and imposed a general liability rule on them for
the licensing of essential patents.
The empirical puzzles from the literature, which were introduced in the introduction, rely
on data from the time-period before the eBay decision. Our model provides a possible
explanation for these.
Vakili (2012) empirically looks at the impact of the MPEG-2 pool formation on the
innovation activities of firms that are in the technological proximity of the pool. He finds
that the innovation rate of technologically proximate firms drops by 35% as a result of the
MPEG-2 pool formation. Proposition 2.3.2 shows that the threat of partial termination
adversely affects innovation incentives of the pool licensees and hence can contribute to
explaining this phenomenon. The effect in our model goes through a reduction of the
marginal return on investment in innovation.
Layne-Farrar & Lerner (2011) empirically investigate the joining incentives of firms with
regards to patent pools and the effects of the different types of rent sharing rules. They
investigate nine different patent pools, only one of which has recourse to PT, namely
the MPEG-2 pool. They find that in the MPEG-2 pool, 89% of the firms are vertically
integrated, where as only 25% of the outsiders are vertically integrated. The average over
all pools, including the MPEG-2 pool, is 83% of firms within the pool and 32% of firms
outside of the pool are vertically integrated44. Proposition 2.4.2 shows that the partial
termination clause increases pool joining incentives for vertically integrated firms only.
This result could help explaining the above average participation of vertically integrated
firms in the MPEG-2 pool.
Proposition 2.3.3, however, shows that the threat of PT is not credible any more since
the eBay decision. We therefore predict that these observations should disappear in data
after 2006. Unfortunately, we do not have any data for this latest period. It would be
interesting to track these observations in an event study of the policy changes following
the eBay decision.
44Removing the MPEG-2 pool from the overall average would only exacerbate the difference.
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2.5.2 Limitations and robustness of the model
We address an important simplification of our model set-up. We have assumed a zero
license fee on the essential patent (l = 0). This simplification allows us to ignore situations
when not invoking partial termination is profitable for the incumbent.
Vertical integration of the incumbent, i.e. the incumbent does not need to pay for a
license to its own essential patent, erodes the double mark-up problem for the incumbent
himself. By assuming that l = 0, we also abstract of the double mark-up problem for
the entrant. At the same time, this assumption forces the incumbent to rely exclusively
on the downstream market since there are no profits to be made upstream. Thereby, we
look at the boundary case, where downstream considerations are the sole focus of the
incumbent’s profit maximisation programme and focus on the case where I’s incentives
to invoke partial termination are highest.
We relax this assumption and allow a positive license fee (l > 0) to be charged by the
incumbent in the game. This royalty remains exogenous and cannot be adapted in re-
sponse to play in the game. When l > 0, I now earns positive upstream profits and E
needs to pay for its use of the pool bundle. The payoff functions are adjusted accord-
ingly. For example in the status quo (before E’s innovation), the objective functions are
ΠI(0,−l) = (a−Q− c)qI + lqE and ΠE(−l, 0) = (a−Q− c− l)qE and similarly for the
other model situations45.
Proposition 2.5.1 (Robustness against l > 0) Given a positive licence fee (l) on the
essential patent, the threat of partial termination remains credible and reduces the inno-
vation incentives of the entrant, when the following conditions hold:
(i) the licence fee on the essential patent is not too high (0 < l ≤ min[a−c
2
, 2(a−c−δ)]),
(ii) the cumulative innovation is of sufficient quality (l < δ) and
(iii) the marginal cost distortion due to licensing rates is not too large (δ ≤ 5(a−c)
2
− 5l).
Furthermore, the strength of the partial termination threat (r̂− r̂PT) is reduced when l > 0
compared to the situation where l = 0.
Proof See the appendix. 
45Given licensing, the payoff functions are: ΠLI (δ − r̂, δ − l) = (a − QL − c + δ − r̂)qLI + lqLE and
ΠLE(δ− l, δ− r̂) = (a−QL− c+ δ− l)qLE + r̂qLI . In the absence of licensing the payoffs are ΠNI (0, δ− l) =
(a−QN − c+ δ − r̂)qNI + lqNE and ΠNE (δ − l, 0) = (a−QN − c+ δ − l)qNE + r̂qNI .
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When the above conditions are given, the insights from our model hold in a setting,
where the pool license is costly. The intuition for the result is the following. Condition
(i) guarantees a downstream duopoly situation before and after the development of the
related patent by E, when there is no threat of PT. This is the required setting for our
analysis of PT. When the entrant innovates, the better the entrant’s innovation (in terms
of the cost reduction δ), the more the entrant’s downstream quantity in the Cournot
game will be increased (cannibalising some of the incumbent’s sales). The incumbent
feels this in two ways. First, downstream profits decrease due to a lower volume being
supplied by the incumbent himself. Second, upstream profits increase whenever l > 0,
since the entrant will pay more unit licences for the use of the essential patent.
When the threat of PT is credible, the effects are again twofold and in the opposite
direction of those just described. The effect of PT is pro-downstream and anti-upstream
profits for the incumbent. Hence, it is clear that cases may exist, when the incumbent
has no incentive to use partial termination (unlike in the baseline model where PT was
always profitable). For example, this is the case when the profit margin on the license
for the essential patent is sufficiently large compared to the downstream margin of the
incumbent. Then, instead of invoking PT, allowing the entrant to become a monopolist
would generate a sufficient increase in the number of paid licences for the essential patent
such that the incumbent finds exit of the downstream market profitable. Therefore, the
PT threat is only credible if the downstream benefits outweigh the upstream costs of
invoking PT for the incumbent (point (iii) of proposition 2.5.1).
Furthermore, we note that the ability of the incumbent to invoke PT has been reduced
compared to the baseline model with respect to condition 2 of the PT clause. Condition 2
stipulates that the incumbent’s unit licensing revenue (l) should be used as a benchmark
to judge the reasonability of the royalty proposal (r̂) by the entrant. Only when the
royalty offer on the related patent exceeds the unit licensing revenue of an essential
patent (r̂ > l), the PT clause may be invoked. Therefore given the optimal pricing of
the related patent by the entrant (r̂ = δ), the incumbent is only able to invoke PT on
related patents of sufficient quality (point (ii) of proposition 2.5.1).
Overall, we see that the results of our model are robust to the introduction of a positive
licence rate on the essential patent (assuming l is not too large and different from δ).
Both conditions (ii) and (iii) given in proposition 2.5.1 indicate that the utility of partial
termination decreases as the size of the pool licence increases. In addition, we see that
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the strength (r̂− r̂PT ) of the partial termination clause has decreased due to the relaxed
requirement of condition 2 (FRAND criterion applied to the related patent). This aspect
highlights the importance of the definition of FRAND reciprocity as applied to related
patents, because it restricts the incumbent in his use of PT.
2.5.3 Restrictions on the use of partial termination
We have already mentioned that conditions 1 and 2 of the PT clause create a safe haven
for the innovator. With respect to condition 2, the size of the haven depends crucially
on the definition of reciprocal FRAND for the related patent. For the MPEG-2 pool,
the FRAND limit for the size of the royalty of the related patent is defined equal to
the incumbent’s per patent revenue from licensing the pool bundle. This aspect merits
attention. Given a constant price for the pool licence, we have that the larger the patent
pool, the more important is the threat of PT. Applied to the MPEG-2 patent pool, this
argument is interesting, because since its inauguration, the number of declared standard
essential patents has increased significantly, while its royalty rate has not been adjusted.
Currently, absent disputes, member firms only need to mutually agree on which patents
are to be included in the portfolio licence. This leaves scope for collusion, one possible
side-effect of which would be a strengthening of the threat of partial termination. This
result supports the view that standard setting organisations and patent pools should take
up responsibility in checking the essentiality and validity of notified patents.
With respect to condition 1, the Department of Justice (1997) restricted the use of the PT
clause in its review letter in that the essential patent holder may not force legal action by
deliberate infringement of the related patent. Our model does not address this aspect by
assuming that the condition is given exogenously. From a legal perspective, the question
of the validity of the PT clause is controversial and feeds into a larger debate. For a brief
account of the legal questions with respect to condition 1, see appendix 2.7.2.
Lastly, our model supports the Department of Justice’s opinion that licensors are them-
selves restrained in their use of partial termination. Proposition 2.5.1 indicates that
licensors’ dependency on upstream profits reduces their incentives to invoke partial ter-
mination. Furthermore, we note that incentives to abstain from using partial termination
in order to promote the development of the standard may exist, e.g. if a reputation of
not using partial termination generates an exogenous demand increase for the standard.
These aspects are not accounted for in our model.
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2.6 Conclusion
When a partial termination clause is available to members of a patent pool, we show that
two effects arise provided that a property rule applies to owners of essential patents out-
side of the pool: (i) incentives to invest in cumulative innovation related to the standard
decrease for licensees of the pool and (ii) more vertically integrated firms find it profitable
to join the pool as compared to a patent pool that does not allow such a clause. These
predictions match some observations from the literature. This paper also shows that the
threat of partial termination is no longer credible when a liability rule applies to standard
essential patent holders (i.e. since the eBay decision in 2006).
Finally, we note that this work contributes to two current legal debates. First, this work
contributes to the debate on reciprocal FRAND conditions. We highlight that the level
of the reasonability criterion, which applies to cumulative innovations, can be used as a
policy tool to trade-off investment incentives of cumulative innovators and the ability of
pool licensors to capture some of the cumulative innovators’ profits. This work is thus in
line with many others (e.g. Layne-Farrar et al. (2007), Cotter (2013), etc.) arguing for
more legal certainty on the implications of FRAND.
Second, this work also contributes to the larger debate on whether patent pools (or
standard-setting organisations) should have a liability in determining the validity and
essentiality of patents included in the patent pool bundle (or standard). The case of the
partial termination clause shows that, in the absence of objective, independent controls for
the validity and essentiality of patents included in a pool, other clauses in the licensing
agreements may have soft constraints. In our example, the collective ability of pool
members to overdeclare essential patents reduces the effectiveness of a constraint (i.e.
condition 2 of partial termination), because the constraint itself is based on the number
of declared essential patents.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Technical details on partial termination
Partial termination46 strictly speaking refers to section 6.3 of the MPEG-2 Patent Port-
folio License (PPL) between the Licensing Administrator (MPEG LA) and a Licensee. It
is as given in definition 6 in the paper and concerns both essential and related MPEG-2
patent(s). Being part of the PPL, Section 6.3 can be invoked only against an actual (not
a prospective) Licensee. It is rooted in Section 2.8 of the MPEG-2 Agreement Among
Licensors (AAL) which provides for the right of a Licensor to instruct the Licensing
Administrator regarding the termination provided for in Section 6.3 of the PPL.
Furthermore, any Licensee is free to add MPEG-2 essential patents to the Portfolio that
it or an affiliate may own on the same terms and conditions as all other Licensors (Section
7.4, “grantback”). If a Licensee chooses not to do so, however, it must agree to license
such patents to any Licensor or Licensee on fair and reasonable terms (one example of
which is the Licensors’ per patent share of royalties payable under the License). Note
that by definition, section 7.3 does not apply to related patents.
A second contractual tool with a very similar idea to PT is an agreement only among
licensors, not with licensees, contained in sections 2.9 and 2.10 of the AAL. Section 2.9
allows a Licensor to instruct the Licensing Administrator to exclude any of its MPEG-
2 Patent Portfolio Patent(s) from an MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio License to a prospective
pool licensee that has brought a claim(s) for patent infringement of an MPEG-2 Essential
Patent or an MPEG-2 Related Patent in a lawsuit or other proceeding against the Licen-
sors, where the Licensor has decided to bring a claim(s) for infringement of the patent(s)
to be excluded in the same or another lawsuit of other proceeding against the prospective
pool licensee. Section 2.10 allows a Licensor to instruct the Licensing Administrator to
exclude any of its MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio Patent(s) from an MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio
License to a prospective sublicensee against whom the Licensor has brought a claim for
infringement of the patents to be excluded. Unlike Section 6.3 of the PPL which can be
invoked only against a Licensee, Sections 2.9 and 2.10 of the AAL would be exercised
against a prospective Licensee.
46Many thanks go to Larry Horn and the MPEG-LA team for providing information (and some concise
paraphrases used in the appendix) of the AAL and PPL contracts as well as making the originals available.
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Section 2.10 of the AAL, unlike section 6.3 of the PPL, has been exercised in practice
once.
2.7.2 Related legal question on the validity of PT
We indicate that from a legal perspective, the question of the validity of the PT clause
is closely related to that of a standard essential patent holder seeking injunctive relief
albeit a FRAND commitment against a willing licensee.
Recently, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) emphasized its critical viewpoint on
injunctive relief demands for FRAND-encumbered standard essential patents: “There is
increasing judicial recognition, coinciding with the view of the Commission, of the tension
between offering a FRAND commitment and seeking injunctive relief. Patent holders
that seek injunctive relief against willing licensees of their FRAND-encumbered SEPs
should understand that in appropriate cases the Commission can and will challenge this
conduct as an unfair method of competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act. Importantly,
stopping this conduct using a stand-alone Section 5 unfair methods of competition claim,
rather than one based on the Sherman Act, minimizes the possibility of follow-on treble
damages claims.”47.
For the partial termination clause, the competitive concerns are very similar. In our
setting, the question is whether a licensee who sues for infringement of a related patent
to the standard (where the related patent is not subject to a FRAND commitment), is
considered a “willing” licensee according to the definition of the FTC. If so, the antitrust
concerns for the PT clause should be immediate.
2.7.3 Proofs
Proof of proposition 2.3.1
We solve the game by backwards induction. In stage t = 4, Cournot competition arises
with the proposed royalty rate on the related patent considered fixed.
No licensing (upper index N): When I rejects the proposed royalty, the equilibrium
quantities are (given by maximising ΠNi (., .) with respect to qi ∀i = {I, E}): qNI =
a−c−δ
3
, qNE =
a−c+2δ
3
and QN = 2(a−c)+δ
3
. Equilibrium payoffs to the firms are
47Source: Statement of the Federal Trade Commission in the matter of Robert Bosch GmbH FTC File
Number 121-0081 (Nov. 26, 2012).
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ΠNI (0, δ) =
(a− c− δ
3
)2
and ΠNE (δ, 0) =
(a− c+ 2δ
3
)2
(2.11)
With licensing (upper index L): When I accepts the proposed royalty r̂ for a licence on
the related patent, equilibrium quantities in the Cournot game are (given by maximis-
ing ΠLi (., .) with respect to qi∀i): qLI = a−c−2r̂+δ3 , q
L
E =
a−c+r̂+δ
3
and QL = 2(a−c+δ)−r̂
3
.
Corresponding equilibrium profits are:
ΠLI (δ − r̂, δ) = (
a− c+ δ
3
)2 − 4
9
r̂(a− c+ δ − r̂) (2.12)
ΠLE(δ, δ − r̂) = (
a− c+ δ
3
)2 +
5
9
r̂(a− c+ δ − r̂) (2.13)
In t = 3, E will thus choose its royalty according to the following maximisation program
in equation 2.14. Constraint 2.15 refers to the fact that I must be better off under
licensing than in the absence of licensing. Constraint 2.16 means that E must earn more
given licensing than in the absence of licensing.
r̂ = arg max
r
ΠLE(δ, δ − r) (2.14)
s.t. ΠLI (δ − r, δ) ≥ ΠNI (0, δ) (2.15)
ΠLE(δ, δ − r) ≥ ΠNE (δ, 0) (2.16)
First, we find the maximum of equation 2.14 at r = a−c+δ
2
and see that
∂ΠNE (δ,δ−r)
∂r
>
0, if r < a−c+δ
2
. Constraint 2.15 gives that I will accept r iff the following holds:
(
a− c+ δ
3
)2 − 4r
9
(a− c+ δ) + 4r
2
9
≥ (a− c− δ
3
)2 (2.17)
which is satisfied for r ≤ δ. This is smaller than the optimal royalty for E since δ <
a−c+δ
2
, if δ < a− c. Constraint 2.16 is satisfied at r = δ for all 0 < δ < a− c, since(a− c+ δ
3
)2
+
5
9
δ(a− c) ≥
(a− c+ 2δ
3
)2
(2.18)
is true. Thus in equilibrium there exists a unique licensing equilibrium for any non-
drastic innovation 0 < δ < a − c, where E proposes a royalty rate r̂ = δ, which will
be accepted by I. Payoffs to each firm are ΠLI (δ − r̂, δ) = (a−c+δ3 )
2 − 4
9
δ(a − c) =
ΠNI (0, δ), and Π
L
E(δ, δ − r̂) = (a−c+δ3 )
2 + 5
9
δ(a− c) > ΠNE (δ, 0).
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The innovation incentives to E are given by ΦE(K) = Π
L
E(δ, δ − r̂) − ΠLE(0, 0) − K.
The optimal investment level K̂ is given by K̂ = arg maxK ΦE(K) if ΦE(K̂) > 0 and
K̂ = 0 otherwise.
Precisely, ΦE(K) = (
a−c+δ(K)
3
)2+ 5
9
δ(K)(a−c)−
(
a−c
3
)2−K and we always have an interior
solution for K̂ given our assumptions on the investment, i.e. ΦE(K) > 0 for K > 0. At
the optimum, the following first order condition holds when E invests a positive amount
K̂ in innovation : [7
9
(a− c) + 2
9
δ(K̂)
] ∂δ
∂K̂
= 1 (2.19)

Proof of proposition 2.3.2
Outside option: It is immediate to see that, even if excluded downstream, E wants to
license out its related patent for any r̂PT > 0 since r̂PTqPTI > 0. I accepts any licence
(even non-FRAND) iff (a−qPTI −c+δ− r̂PT)qPTI > (a−qPTI −c)qPTI , which is satisfied for
all r̂PT ≤ δ. Following the same argument as for propostion 2.3.1, E proposes r̂PT = δ
in equilibrium, which will be accepted by I. If E was to be excluded, the monopolist I
would produce qPTI =
a−c
2
downstream. Thus, if E is excluded in equilibrium, payoffs to
the firms are (we drop the upper index L): ΠPTE = δ(
a−c
2
) and ΠPTI = (
a−c
2
)2.
We see that E’s outside option payoff has decreased under PT since for 0 < δ < a− c:
ΠNE (δ, 0) − ΠPTE = (a−c+2δ3 )
2 − δ(a−c
2
) = 1
18
[(a − c)(a − c − δ) + (a − c)2] + 4
9
δ2 > 0.
Therefore, constraint 2.16 of E’s maximisation programme (defining the lower bound of
r̂) is relaxed.
We see that I prefers to invoke PT rather then not get a licence for the related patent
since ΠPTI > Π
N
I (0, δ), if δ < a − c. Furthermore, I is always better off using PT
rather than licensing (accepting any positive or zero royalty fee), because the monopoly
is more profitable. This is shown by the following:
∂ΠLI (δ−r,δ)
∂r
< 0 for 0 < δ < a − c and
ΠPTI − ΠLI (δ − r, δ)
=
(a− c
2
)2 − [(a− c+ δ
3
)2 − 4
9
r(a− c+ δ − r)
]
> 0, if r ≥ 0 and δ < a− c (2.20)
Thus constraint 2.15 of E’s maximisation programme (defining the upper bound of r̂) is
never satisfied and I invokes PT whenever possible (r > 0). The new proposed royalty
rate under PT (r̂PT) is hence defined by
r̂PT = arg max
r
ΠLE(δ, δ − r) (2.21)
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s.t. ΠLI (δ − r, δ) ≥

ΠN, PTI if r > δ
ΠL, PTI if δ ≥ r > 0
ΠNI (0, δ) if r = 0
(2.22)
s.t. ΠLE(δ, δ − r) ≥

ΠPTE = 0 if r > δ
ΠPTE = r(
a−c
2
) if δ ≥ r > 0
ΠPTE = 0 if r = 0
(2.23)
From equation 2.20, we know that I will always invoke PT when possible (r > 0). E
thus decides whether it proposes r = 0 and stay in the downstream market or whether it
proposes r = δ and is excluded from the downstream market. E proposes r = 0 iff
ΠLE(δ, δ) = (
a− c+ δ
3
)2 > δ(
a− c
2
) = ΠPTE (2.24)
which is satisfied iff δ < (a−c
2
). We thus obtain two cases in equilibrium: For all 0 <
δ < (a−c
2
), E prefers to license out its patent for free (∴ r̂PT = 0) in order to prevent
invoking of PT (and to stay in the downstream market). For all (a− c) > δ > (a−c
2
), E
proposes the optimal royalty r̂PT = δ and becomes a pure upstream licensor. Quantities
and payoffs to firms in the two cases are
qPTi =
a− c+ δ
3
and ΠPTi = (
a− c+ δ
3
)2 ∀i = {I, E} if 0 < δ ≤ a− c
2
(2.25)
qPTI =
a− c
2
, qPTE = 0 and Π
PT
I = (
a− c
2
)2, ΠPTE = δ(
a− c
2
) if
a− c
2
< δ < (a− c)
(2.26)
The innovation incentives to E are given by
ΦPTE (K) = Π
PT
E −
(a− c
3
)2 −K = {(a−c+δ3 )2 − (a−c3 )2 −K if 0 < δ ≤ a−c2
δ(a−c
2
)−
(
a−c
3
)2 −K if a−c
2
< δ < a−c
1
(2.27)
At the optimum, the following first order conditions define the investment level K̂PT:[2
9
(a− c+ δ(K̂PT)
] ∂δ
∂K̂PT
= 1 if 0 < δ(K̂PT) ≤
a− c
2
(2.28)(a− c
2
) ∂δ
∂K̂PT
= 1 if
a− c
2
< δ(K̂PT) < (a− c) (2.29)
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The following reasoning applies to both cases: Both left-hand-side terms of the FOC
are positive. Compared to the situation without PT, the following changes occur: Given
constant δ, the first term falls, because: 2
9
(a−c+δ) < 7
9
(a−c)+ 2
9
δ and a−c
2
< 7
9
(a−c)+ 2
9
δ.
The constant on the right hand side is unaffected. Therefore, the second term δ′(K) must
rise in order to balance the equation. Given that δ′′(K) < 0, we have that K̂PT < K̂. 
Proof of propostion 2.4.1
We impose δ(K) = A
√
K. This implies δ′(K) = A
2
√
K
.
Absent a threat of PT (use subscript 0 for this case:) Using the FOC in equation 2.19,
we obtain the optimal investment level and resulting quality of the innovation as, respec-
tively: K̂0 = (A
7
2
(a−c)
9−A2 )
2 and δ0 = (A
2)(
7
2
(a−c)
9−A2 ).
Conditions on A: The conditions for positive and non-drastic cumulative innovations only
are given by (i) 0 < δ0 and (ii) δ0 < a−c. In terms of A, we require for (i): A < 3 and for
(ii): A <
√
2. The latter is more stringent. Proposition 2.3.1 thus holds for 0 < A <
√
2.
Given a credible PT threat: Here, we have to differentiate for ”low” and ”high” realised
qualities of the cumulative innovation.
(Use subscript 1 for this case:) When the realised quality is low (0 < δPT ≤ a−c2 ), the
FOC in (2.28) defines the optimal investment and realised quality: K̂1 = (A
(a−c)
9−A2 )
2 and
δ1 = (A
2)( a−c
9−A2 ). The required conditions are
For δ1 > 0, need A < 3
For δ1 < δ0, need A > 0
For δ1 <
a−c
2
, need A <
√
3.
(Use subscript 2 for this case:) When the realised quality is high (a−c
2
< δPT < a − c),
the FOC in (2.29) defines the optimal investment and realised quality: K̂2 =
A2
1
(a− c)2
and δ2 =
A2
4
(a− c). The required conditions are:
For δ2 > 0, need A < 0
For δ2 < δ0, need A < 3
For δ2 >
a−c
2
, need A >
√
2.
We see that this is outside the allowable range 0 < A <
√
2. Hence, E will never choose
K, such that δPT >
a−c
2
. The equilibrium levels are thus K1 and δ1 and from above
we know that innovation incentives for E have decreased. Therefore, we confirm that
proposition 2.3.2 holds for 0 < A <
√
2.
Net effect on total downstream volume Total downstream volume decreases when QL >
QPT ⇔ 2(a−c)+δ0
3
> 2(a−c+δ1)
3
⇔ δ0 > 2δ1 ⇔ (A2)(
7
2
(a−c)
9−A2 ) > 2(A
2)( a−c
9−A2 ) ⇔
7
2
> 2, which
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is true for all 0 < A < 3. 
Proof of proposition 2.5.1
To show that the effects of partial termination are robust to l > 0, we need to show
robustness of the following: First, the threat of PT must be credible. I must find it
profitable to invoke PT. Second, for PT to reduce the innovation incentives of E, the
threat of PT must be costly to E. We first give the explicit expressions of payoffs of the
firms in different scenarios:
In the status quo, equilibrium quantities and profits are given by (superscripts S):
qSI = (
a−c+l
3
), qSE = (
a−c−2l
3
), ΠSI (0,−l) = (a−c+l3 )
2 + l(a−c−2l
3
), ΠSE(−l, 0) = (a−c−2l3 )
2 and
both firms produce positive quantities downstream iff: l < (a−c
2
).
Under no licensing of the related patent, the equilibrium quantities and profits are (su-
perscripts N): qNI = (
a−c+l−δ
3
), qNE = (
a−c−2l+2δ
3
), ΠNI (0, δ − l) = (a−c+l−δ3 )
2 + l(a−c−2l+2δ
3
),
ΠNE (δ− l, 0) = (a−c−2l+2δ3 )
2. We maintain a duopoly iff: δ < a− c (as before) and l < a−c
2
.
Under licensing of the related patent at r̂, equilibrium quantities and payoffs are given by:
qLI = (
a−c+l−2r̂+δ
3
), qLE = (
a−c+δ−2l+r̂
3
), ΠLI (δ − r̂, δ − l) = (a−c+l−2r̂+δ3 )
2 + l ∗ (a−c+δ−2l+r̂
3
),
ΠLE(δ − l, δ − r̂) = (a−c+δ−2l+r̂3 )
2 + r̂ ∗ (a−c+l−2r̂+δ
3
).
The optimal royalty charged by E for the cumulative innovation is unchanged at r̂ = δ.
To see that, see the adjusted maximisation programme of E’s royalty setting in t = 3
in equation 2.30. I must be better off under licensing than in the absence of licensing
(Constraint 2.31). E must earn more given licensing than in the absence of licensing
(Constraint 2.32).
r̂ = arg max
r
ΠLE(δ − l, δ − r) (2.30)
s.t. ΠLI (δ − r, δ − l) ≥ ΠNI (0, δ − l) (2.31)
ΠLE(δ − l, δ − r) ≥ ΠNE (δ − l, 0) (2.32)
The optimal royalty rate in 2.30 is ropt = (
a−c+δ
2
) − l
10
. We confirm that
∂ΠLE(δ−l,δ−r)
∂r
>
0 if r < ropt and that the second derivative is negative. I accepts r iff
(
a− c+ l − 2r + δ
3
)2 + l(
a− c+ δ − 2l + r
3
) ≥ (a− c+ l − δ
3
)2 + l(
a− c− 2l + 2δ
3
)
which (Constraint 2.31) is satisfied for r ≤ δ. Furthermore, for I to accept, we need I to
stay downstream post innovation and not change its status to an upstream licensor:
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ΠNI (0, δ − l) ≥ l ∗ q
M,N
E ⇔ (
a− c+ l − δ
3
)2 + l(
a− c− 2l + 2δ
3
) ≥ l(a− c+ δ − l
2
)
(2.33)
where qMi (δ) is the downstream monopoly quantity supplied by a firm i when it has access
to the related patent. Condition 2.33 is satisfied for 0 < l ≤ 2(a− c− δ). This condition
guarantees that δ < ropt since: δ ≤ (a−c+δ2 ) −
l
10
⇔ δ < (a − c) − l
5
⇔ l < 5(a − c − δ).
Constraint 2.32 gives that E accepts to licence iff (a−c+δ−2l+r̂
3
)2 + r̂ ∗ (a−c+l−2r̂+δ
3
) ≥
(a−c−2l+2δ
3
)2
⇔ r̂ ≥ a− c+ δ
2
− l
10︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ropt
− 1
10
√(
(5(a− c)− l)2 + 5δ[2(a− c) + 7(2l − δ)]
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(2.34)
which is satisfied at r = δ. Thus, absent PT, r̂ = δ.
We now see under which conditions the effects of PT hold. For that we need the conditions
outlined above: (i) a profitable threat of PT for I and (ii) that the threat is costly to E.
Case (i) First, note that we have introduced the restriction necessary to exclude the case
where I finds it profitable to become a pure upstream licensor, i.e. I does not want to
quit the downstream market when conditions 2.33 is satisfied.
Second, I finds invoking PT profitable iff: ΠPTI > max[Π
N
I (0, δ),Π
L
I (δ − r̂, δ − l)]. The
incentive to invoke PT for I is given at r̂ = δ, when ΠPTI ≥ ΠLI (δ − r, δ − l):
⇔ (a− c
2
)2 ≥ (a− c+ l − δ
3
)2 + l ∗ (a− c+ 2δ − 2l
3
) (2.35)
which is satisfied for l < δ < 5(a−c)
2
− 5l. The same condition guarantees that we have
that ΠPTI > Π
N
I ⇔ (a−c2 )
2 ≥ (a−c+l−δ
3
)2 + l(a−c−2l+2δ
3
). Thus, when l < δ < 5(a−c)
2
− 5l, I
will invoke PT and the threat is credible.
Case (ii) The threat of PT must be costly to E for it to reduce innovation incentives.
Thus, we need: ΠPTE < Π
L
E(δ − l, δ − r̂), where ΠPTE = max[ΠLE(δ − l, δ − r̂PT ) , rUP qMI ].
qMI is the monopoly quantity of I given E’s exclusion from the downstream market and
rUP is the optimal price charged by E if it is a pure upstream firm.
Focus on ΠPTE = rUP q
M
I first: In this case, E accepts exclusion from downstream and
licenses at the rate maximising upstream profits only. It is trivial to see that rUP = δ and
qMI =
a−c
2
. Thus we need: ΠLE(δ−l, δ−r̂ > rUP qMI ⇔ (a−c+δ−2l+r̂3 )
2+r̂∗(a−c+l−2r̂+δ
3
) >
δ(a−c
2
), which is satisfied for : l < a−c
2
.
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Now focus on ΠPTE = Π
L
E(δ − l, δ − r̂PT ): Given that PT tightens constraint 2.31, i.e.
I’s outside option increases. Therefore, if E wants to keep licensing the cumulative
innovation, it must reduce its royalty offer r̂PT < r̂. We have seen before from our
maximisation in 2.30, that
∂ΠLE(δ−l,δ−r)
∂r
> 0 if r < ropt. Therefore, when E reduces it
royalty offer in order to maintain a licensing relation, it incurs a profit loss: ∴ ΠLE(δ −
l, δ − r̂PT ) < ΠLE(δ − l, δ − r̂).
Hence, we see that the credible PT threat reduces the expected payoff to E when inno-
vating and thereby E’s incentives to invest in innovation. 
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Investigating the Impact of
Uncertainty on Firms with Dynamic
Costs
A Case Study on the French Electricity Market
3.1 Introduction
There exists a consensus that dynamic costs, also referred to as ramping or adjust-
ment costs, are important on the electricity market1. These are the costs incurred by
a producer when production varies. The importance of uncertainty for the expectation
of dynamic costs is shown in Bergès and Martimort (2014). Uncertainty itself on the
electricity market has been studied by Wolak (2007). We focus on two sources of un-
certainty for traditional electricity suppliers, namely uncertainty about the realisation
of the market demand and uncertainty from the inherently unpredictable meteorological
situation (which affects renewables generation). We propose a methodology to measure
this uncertainty and its impact on firm strategies on the electricity market.
Electricity as a market is very important in and of itself ($2 trillion in worldwide sales in
2010). It is also a crucial input for many industries; power outages induce very large costs
to society (LaCommare and Eto (2004), Reichl et al. (2013)). The electricity market is,
1 Anderson and Xu (2005), Hobbs (2001), Hortacsu and Puller (2008), Reguant (2014), Sewalt and
De Jong (2003).
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however, quite different from the markets for other commodities in a few respects. First,
electricity cannot be efficiently stored. As a consequence, electricity markets are high
frequency (prices can update down to 15-min intervals) and firm strategies are purer as
they are free of stock management considerations.
Second and in addition to non-storability, a generation surplus cannot be disposed of
freely2. Thus, generation of electricity must always be matched with consumption in
real time (modulo a small tolerance). This represents a hard constraint on the market3
and forces suppliers to be reactive. However, this reactivity is costly as plant operators
incur dynamic costs when adjusting production and the larger the adjustment made, the
larger the cost. Hence, suppliers face a trade-off between cheap generation of electricity
and costly reactivity to the demand realisation. Indeed, no single generation technology
exists that satisfies both cheap generation and sufficient reactivity to allow production
fluctuations at a reasonable price. Existing generation techniques are either cheap and
unresponsive, e.g. nuclear plants, or expensive and flexible, e.g. gas turbines.
Interestingly, we also observe negative prices. In France for example, during the weekend
of the 15th June 2013, the price per MWh dropped to −200e . This contrasts to the
yearly average of approx. 45e /MWh and is generally understood as a sign that sub-
sidising consumption temporarily is cheaper for a supplier than shutting down a plant
(EPEX, 2014)4. The increase of the share of renewable generation in the energy mix
contributes to the occurrence of negative prices on the market. The intermittency of
renewables causes large residual demand shocks (EPEX, 2014). The unreliability of re-
newable generation also means that more flexible plants (i.e. plants with lower dynamic
costs) are required to provide rapid responses to fluctuations in production from renew-
ables (REN21, 2013).
Furthermore, uncertainty arises from the fact that renewable production is a local and
dispersed production, but feeds into a national market with a single price. When meteo-
rological conditions change, the geographic production profile also changes. This further
complicates the predictability of renewables generation and contributes to the uncer-
2The common assumption of free disposal as made in standard microeconomics is violated.
3Mismatches between consumption and generation ultimately result in power outages.
4“Negative prices are a price signal on the power wholesale market that occurs when a high inflexible
power generation meets low demand. Inflexible power sources cannot be shut down and restarted in a
quick and cost-efficient manner. Renewables do count in, as they are dependent from external factors
(wind, sun).”
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tainty that electricity producers face when playing on the electricity market (Meibom
et al., 2009).
This paper explores the effect that the absolute level of uncertainty about residual demand
has on players’ strategies on the electricity market. In the light of the existence of
dynamic costs, which are inherent to the production technologies, uncertainty is costly
to suppliers (Bergès and Martimort, 2014). Thus when faced with uncertainty, we expect
that electricity producers smooth production volume over time in order to minimise
dynamic costs. In a single market interaction with a symmetric oligopoly and linear
demand functions this translates to playing a steeper supply function when uncertainty
is high. The detailed intuition behind the predictions tested is given in section 3.1.2.
We show that uncertainty does impact supplier strategies. However, this prediction and
result only apply locally to the central, flat and linear part of the supply bid function. To-
wards the high and low volume extremities of the bid functions when capacity constraints
start to matter, bid functions become vertical and the effect of uncertainty vanishes. Fur-
thermore, we observe results that indicate that demand-side bidding is also impacted by
uncertainty.
We focus on the French one-day ahead market, EPEX Spot. This market is a divis-
ible goods auction and particularly suited for our analysis as we observe data on the
full aggregate bid functions for both supply and demand. We introduce the market’s
auction format and rules in section 3.2. The dataset and its sources are presented in
section 3.3.
For our investigation on the effect of uncertainty on bidding behaviour, we develop an
identification methodology, which relies on the non-parametric, comparable point selec-
tion technique presented in section 3.4.1.
We present and interpret the results in section 3.5. Finally, we discuss some overarching
points in section 3.6 and conclude in section 3.7.
3.1.1 Literature review and contribution
There exists a literature on supply function equilibria initiated by Klemperer and Meyer
(1989). In traditional models, firms choose between quantities (Cournot) or prices
(Bertrand) as their strategic quantities. In the intermediate case, firms choose a re-
lationship between quantities and prices, namely a supply function. This is the focus
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of the supply function equilibrium models. A key ingredient of these models is uncer-
tainty.
Supply function equilibrium models are very relevant for the analysis of electricity mar-
kets, since many electricity market designs allow firms to submit a price-volume function
rather than a specific price or quantity. Green and Newbery (1992), Newbery (1998)
and Bolle (1992) have used these models to analyse competition on the electricity mar-
kets. These papers have contributed to a broader investigation of the competition on
the electricity markets, which has also been looked at from empirical perspectives (Wol-
fram, 1998; Borenstein et al., 2002). While those initial papers have focussed on the
supply function equilibria of the market, they have abstracted from some technological
specificities for the sake for simplification.
One such aspect that we are interested in and that has been the subject of research in
recent years is the importance of dynamic costs for electricity production. Bergès and
Martimort (2014) extend Klemperer and Meyer (1989) to derive predictions on firms fac-
ing dynamic costs in a supply function oligopoly under uncertainty. They find that when
varying production is costly, suppliers take these costs into consideration by submitting
steeper functions when facing more uncertainty, in order to limit the range of variation
in production. Reguant (2014) develops a model and an empirical strategy to measure
dynamic costs on the Spanish one-day-ahead electricity market. She finds that “complex
bids”, which allow firms to minimise dynamic costs by linking production in one time
period to production in a subsequent time period, reduce the volatility and the level of
prices on the market. Her work is also unique in terms of data availability. By using in-
dividual bid functions she is able to produce estimates of start-up and ramping costs per
production technology. In order to quantify dynamic costs on the Australian electricity
market, Wolak (2007) derives a methodology to recover estimates of the parameters of
parametric cost functions at the level of the production unit. His identification is based
on the assumption that each profit maximising supplier knows the distribution of shocks
on the demand function when playing on the market. Uncertainty is thus an explicit
ingredient of his paper and he captures two sources of uncertainty in a single index: (i)
the uncertainty from not knowing the aggregate supply function served by all other sup-
pliers and (ii) the uncertainty about the realisation of the market demand. The recovered
cost functions quantify the cost of varying output. Forward contracts are useful to avoid
output variations. By comparing the observed level of forward contracting (assumed to
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be the profit maximising choice for production variation) with the theoretical minimum
cost production pattern, he does not find support for ramping costs.
We contribute to this literature by providing an empirical analysis of the French elec-
tricity market. Specifically, we look at the impact of uncertainty on supplier strategies
and take this as evidence that dynamic costs matter. Our approach to separate out
the uncertainty from market demand expectations and predictability of renewables gen-
eration is novel. Both proxies for uncertainty used are new, uncertainty from market
demand is inferred from the prediction errors that firms make in a demand estimation
and uncertainty from renewable production is computed in a bottom-up approach from
local weather forecasts. Instead of opting for a time series regression, we understand all
hourly auctions as a cross-sectional dataset and control for the time of the day by using
continuous transition variables for daytime periods. Similarly, we control for seasonality
using continuous variables rather than dummies. Thereby, we are able to leverage our
dataset and increase the sample size for each of our regressions and improve the precision
of our estimates.
Furthermore, our work contributes to the empirical literature testing strategic behaviour
of market participants. Generally, these studies focus on point-wise analyses for reasons
of data availability. Not only does this cause endogeneity problems when the data used
is equilibrium data, but also the analysis is restricted to an understanding of the usually
observed outcomes of the market. In our setting, we benefit from an interesting dataset
in which we observe full aggregate bid functions of players. The functions describe the
players’ behaviour both in the region where the equilibrium is likely to occur as well as
in regions that rarely have an impact on the equilibrium outcome. As such, they provide
a much fuller description of the firms’ strategies. The additional information contained
in the full aggregate bid functions has been used extensively in theoretical work (notably
in the supply function equilibria literature mentioned above). However, few papers ex-
ploit these full bid functions empirically. For the government bond market, Préget and
Waelbroeck (2005) and Özcan (2004) use a parametric approach to this functional data
for a description of the variation of bid functions with respect to exogenous factors and
an investigation of the revenue superiority of the uniform or discriminatory multi-unit
auction mechanism, respectively. While this parametric approach has worked well for
the bond market, Belsunce (2011) shows that the technique is ill-suited for an analysis of
the electricity market due to the strong heterogeneity of observed bid functions. Using a
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different approach, which relies on conditioning the analysis on different demand levels,
Wolfram (1999) leaves the analysis of equilibrium data to investigate the duopoly power
of firms on the UK day-ahead electricity spot market. She uses information from the
whole aggregate supply function to investigate the impact of price caps for electricity
producers. She shows that the introduction of price caps resulted in a counter-clockwise
rotation of the aggregate supply function. She relates these results to produce a lower
bound on the extent to which firms can increase their prices above marginal costs when
regulatory pressure makes it advantageous to do so. Thereby, she contributes empirical
evidence for the distorting effects of price caps.
Our work adds to this empirical literature using the information contained in the full bid
functions by developing a non-parametric approach which allows to condition our anal-
yses on multiple, representative points of the bid functions. The statistical ingredients
rely on Silverman and Ramsay (2005) and are detailed in section 3.4.1. Thereby we are
able to leverage our dataset, increase the sample size in individual regressions as well
as obtain a fuller picture of the effects of exogenous variables on the behaviour of elec-
tricity producing firms. We emphasize that our approach allows to overcome structural
restrictions underlying previous parametric approaches, e.g. the symmetry of the logistic
function used in Belsunce (2011).
3.1.2 Theoretical prediction
We test the impact of uncertainty on supplier strategies by testing the prediction that
suppliers bid steeper supply bid functions when faced with a larger uncertainty concerning
the outcome of the (residual) demand realisation.
In a discontinuous setting, where the supplier produces volume QH of electricity in hour
H, we assume that he faces a cost function Ci(.) for each production plant i. This cost
function depends on both marginal costs of production as well as the dynamic costs
for changing production rapidly: Ci
(
(QH), (QH − QH−1)2
)
. The larger the variation in
production between hours, the larger the dynamic costs. Even when the expected residual
demand is constant, there are still fluctuations in the production due to possible shocks
to the residual demand. The larger the shocks, the larger the change in production and
thus the larger the dynamic costs. Consequently, increased uncertainty (as represented
by shocks on the demand function) translates into increased expected dynamic costs.
We assume that the profit maximising supplier knows the distribution of shocks on the
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demand function when choosing his supply function. In order to minimise these costs,
the producer can choose a steeper supply function when uncertainty is high. We want to
test this prediction.
We illustrate the intuition behind this prediction using a stylised case in figure 3.1. The
graphs depict a situation in which a single, risk-neutral supplier bids a supply function
to supply electricity in the hours 9 and 10 of the next day. For both hours, the supplier
faces a constant expected residual demand function represented by E(D). In a static
optimisation problem, the supplier would bid a supply function S0 in both auctions.
Figure 3.1: Illustrating the effect of increased uncertainty.
The uncertainty in the market is represented by the width of the envelope of shocks that
affect the residual demand function (represented by the arrows on E(D)). Thus, in each
hour, the residual demand fluctuates between Dmin and Dmax, where the range between
the extremal demands may vary from one hour to the next.
Before submitting a supply function to the market, the supplier estimates the distribution
of probabilities of demand shocks that he will face. In hour 9, the supplier is able to
rather precisely predict the realisation of the demand function in the auction, i.e. it
realises within a tight confidence interval. In hour 10, however, uncertainty in predicting
the outcome of the demand realisation has grown strongly as represented by the much
wider confidence interval on the demand realisation.
Given a fixed supply bid function S0, the possible range of quantities to be produced by
the supplier when going from hour 9 to hour 10 has increased due to the increase in the
size of the uncertainty (interval on the Q-axis has grown from length A for hour 9 to the
dotted length B in hour 10).
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Now, we assume that the supplier faces dynamic costs, i.e. it is costly for production to
vary on top of any traditional marginal cost consideration and the larger the variation,
the larger the cost. Then in the case of a fixed supply bid function (S0 in both auctions),
an increase in uncertainty implies an increase in expected dynamic costs.
The supplier’s reaction to increased uncertainty is therefore to bid a steeper supply func-
tion S1 in order to trade-off static optimality and dynamic effects. As a consequence, the
range of volumes produced in equilibrium is reduced (the firm produces in the range C
instead of B). When seen over time, these considerations lead to a smoother production
as compared to a constant supply curve: demand shocks are absorbed through a higher
price volatility and a lower production volatility.
If cautious behaviour under high uncertainty is true for all firms on the market and each
firm has the same expectation of the probability distribution of the uncertainty, then the
reaction of bidding a more price inelastic supply function to increased uncertainty should
be observable on the aggregated supply function.
We emphasize that this prediction relies on linear demand and supply functions and does
not incorporate capacity constraint considerations (both upper and lower bounds on the
production volume of plants), which are also important on the market. Furthermore, we
have outlined our prediction using a discrete time-setting. The continuous version of this
analysis on dynamic costs is explored in detail by Bergès and Martimort (2014).
The present paper tests this mechanism empirically and understands an increase in the
slope of aggregate supply bid functions due to an increased level of uncertainty as evidence
that firms minimise dynamic costs across auctions.
3.2 The EPEX spot market
3.2.1 General background
The EPEX Spot market is an auction market, which allows firms to trade electricity
12-36h ahead of delivery. It covers France, Germany with Austria and Switzerland.
The volume traded on Epex Spot represents 12%, 40% and 30% of the total electricity
consumption in these countries respectively in 2013 (EPEX, 2014).
The EPEX Spot market has considerably gained in importance over time and the daily
trading volume has almost quadrupled since 2005, whereas the total electricity consump-
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tion has essentially remained constant. The graph in figure 3.2 shows these trends very
clearly. Furthermore, it shows the significant volatility of the market trading volume (as
indicated by the width of the grey-shaded confidence interval).
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Figure 3.2: Traded volume plotted against total annual consumption
Note: Total consumption is netted of the electricity withdrawal at the level of the production
unit. The 95% confidence interval is based on a 150-days moving window and assumes that
volumes are normally distributed in the time window. GWh and TWh stand for giga and
terawatt hours, respectively.
On the EPEX Spot market, the participants submit supply or demand bid functions to be
able to meet their next day’s supply commitment. This market is important, because it
allows the firms to adjust their portfolio to the upcoming demand. The market matches
business to business trades, where producers (the suppliers and transmission system
operators) and industrial consumers may participate.
The EPEX Spot market settles in a three-pronged market that firms use to achieve
their desired power position: The long-term bilateral contracting market, the day-ahead
market and the intra-day market. Energy cannot be stored, thus an precise power position
must be achieved at each point in time. Firms thus face a trade-off between cheap up-front
sourcing and costly uncertainty. The closer the market gets to the delivery of its power,
the less uncertainty does the firm face in determining its power requirements (pushing
firms to wait until the last minute to fill their energy position). However, the imperfect
flexibility of the electricity production landscape cannot satisfy the whole demand short-
term at a reasonable price, hence firms must anticipate their requirements in order to
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obtain cheaper power. Consequently, these three markets complement each other to allow
firms to gather a power position at a reasonable price.
3.2.2 Auction rules and mechanism
The EPEX Spot auction occurs daily, all year-round, and proceeds as follows: the order
book closes every day at noon for contracts of the following day, results are published
two hours later. Bids may be submitted 24/7 from 45 days prior until the closing of the
books.
Tradable contracts exist for each hour of the day and firms submit an individual bid
function for each of these hours, i.e. a separate, simultaneous auction is run for all hours
of the following day and trading is specific for each of these hourly tranches.
The bid submission must be a supply function (or a demand function depending on the
position of the firm) with at least 2 and at most 256 price/quantity combinations for
single contract orders. The final bid function, thus, consists of the explicitly submitted
points and all linearly interpolated points between them. The bid curves must be mono-
tonically increasing for a supply function and vice versa for a demand function. Orders
are transmitted via an online IT-platform and a redundant confirmation process aims to
avoid erroneous bids. Bids are anonymous and the final electricity distribution is done
via the French distribution network controlled by RTE EDF Transport SA.
Prices are specified in e/MWh with two decimal digits and must range from -3000e/MWh
to +3000e/MWh. Quantities are specified in whole MWh. In addition to single contract
orders for an individual hour, bidders may submit block orders. These are combined sin-
gle contract orders with a minimum of two consecutive hours. The vital difference with
multiple single contract orders is the ”All-or-None” condition, namely that the executions
of the individual contract orders forming the block are dependent on one another. That
is for a block order covering hours 17 to 20, the quantity demanded for the hour 17 is
only awarded if the corresponding quantity is also awarded for the hours 18, 19 and 20.
Each registered bidder account is limited to a maximum of 40 block orders per delivery
day, each of which is limited in volume to 400 MWh (approx. equal to 0.25% of the total
daily volume traded on EPEX Spot).
The price-quantity determining mechanism is a uniform price, multi-unit auction mecha-
nism: the summed demand and supply curves are computed and the intersection of these
gives the equilibrium price and quantity pair. The market clearing mechanism takes
93
Chapter 3
into account single and block orders simultaneously and hence solves the corresponding
programme by an algorithm of full enumeration of possible solutions, where each partial
solution is verified to provide real, compatible prices. The mechanism works under a time
limit. In the case of a curtailment, i.e. a disequilibrium with disproportionate prices due
to unmatched supply and demand or an abnormal price for a specific hourly contract,
the system proceeds to a second price fixing.
Of particular interest is the clear distribution of information. Ex-ante bidding, firms in
the market know the identities of the rival bidders they face (but neither their individual
bid functions nor their results in past auctions), the history of aggregated equilibrium
prices and quantities up to that day, their clients’ past demand realisations and their in-
dividual long term contracting position. Upon the clearing of the market, the aggregated
supply and demand bid functions, equilibrium quantity and the equilibrium price be-
come common knowledge. Each bidding account is informed of the contracts it has been
awarded, i.e. the individual quantities to be sold and bought through the system.
3.3 Our data explained
Auction market data
We have data from the French EPEX Spot market for the period 01.01.2011 to 30.06.2013.
This is the latest period, where no significant changes in the auction rules have occurred
and where data for all variables can be observed.
We observe the full aggregate bid functions for the day-ahead auctions of each hourly
contract for both supply and demand. We understand the dataset as a cross-section
rather than a time-series5 and focus on weekday trading contracts only. This sums up to
about 31 500 observations6. A single aggregate bid function is the sum of the individual
bid functions, which are not available. We also observe the equilibrium price and quantity
for each auction.
Moreover, we observe the block bidding results at the equilibrium solution only. We ignore
the blocked aspects and treat subsequent auctions as independent from one another.
5This is supported by the graph in figure 3.2, which shows a flat total consumption and average
trading volume on EPEX Spot since 01.01.2011.
631 500 observations ≈ 2.5 years of hourly (∗365 ∗ 24) demand and supply (∗2) functions for weekday
trading (∗5/7).
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The two graphs in figure 3.3 show the aggregate supply and demand bid functions for
the same hour of the same day. For a glimpse at the variation of bid functions over time,
see figure 3.4. The table 3.1 sheds some light on the raw data. For further details as well
as the plotted distribution of realised market equilibria, refer to appendix 3.10.2.
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Figure 3.3: Example aggregate demand and supply bid functions
Note: The right-hand-side graph is a zoom of the left graph on for the price range −50e /MWh
to +100e/MWh.
Figure 3.4: Aggregate bid functions for 20 consecutive days
Note: The graph shows 20 consecutive aggregate demand and supply functions for the contracts
on hour 1 (between 12am and 1am) for the time period 11/12/2011 to 31/12/2011. The graph
on the right is a zoom on the price elastic region of the curves on the left.
95
Chapter 3
Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max
Total daily volume 161,912 159,313 25,059 99,054 277,531
Average realised daily price7 46.6 48.3 17.2 -39.0 381.2
Minimum demanded agg. volume8 5,030 4,968 1,467 914 11301
Maximum demanded agg. volume 13,327 13,222 2,212 4,990 23,254
Minimum supplied agg. volume 3,721 3,526 1,344 618 10594
Maximum supplied agg. volume 14,390 14,142 3,051 6,580 35,356
Bid points per demand function 543 531 163 115 1,253
Bid points per supply function 640 632 143 184 1,283
Bidders per auction9 - - - 1 101
Table 3.1: Some descriptive statistics
Finally, we reuse the data output from section 3.4.1. Specifically, we reuse the specific
points extracted from the aggregate demand and supply bid functions, which are com-
parable across auctions. Why these points are useful for our analysis is explained in the
methodology (section 3.4).
Exogenous factors
Regarding weather statistics, we have hourly previsions for temperature, wind and cloudi-
ness from the GFS (Global Forecast System) as well as hourly observations for these
quantities and luminosity from MétéoFrance. The previsions from the GFS are in the
form of weather maps that are outputted from simulations that run one-day ahead at 6
am. This is the weather information that market participants have access to when bidding
7Average price is volume weighted over the 24 hourly contracts of the delivery day.
8Minimum and maximum volumes for both demand and supply refer to the aggregate volume bid on
the market for a single hour contract at the extremal prices of +3000e/MWh or −3000e/MWh.
9Due to the anonymity of the auction procedure, it is unknown which bidders submitted bids. Con-
sequently, it cannot be deduced how many bid steps a typical bidder submits. Number of registered
bidders for the French EPEX Spot market as of 01.10.2014.
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on EPEX Spot10. The weather observations are in the form of tables for specific weather
stations (between 100 and 200 depending on the specific parameter of interest).
Moreover, we have the location of the total installed capacity per generation type (i.e.
wind turbines, solar panels, etc.) at the level of the postcode, that is roughly a 3km pre-
cision. We obtain this data from the SOeS, a branch of the French government producing
data on environmental issues at large.
Population data and data on the level of the domestic production from the manufactur-
ing industry is obtained in monthly steps from the French National Institute of Statistics
and Economic Studies (INSEE). From the same source, we obtain the spot prices for
petrol and natural gas as well as the import prices at the border for coal, which we
use as a proxy for the domestic prices. Prices for the European CO2 emission certifi-
cates are taken from the Portuguese secondary market (SENDECO2) for European Unit
Allowances (EUA)11.
As a very coarse proxy for generation from hydro power plants, we have the total weekly
stock of water in domestic dams (in the form of the summed height of all dam water
levels in France) from RTE the grid operator.
3.4 Methodology
We want to identify the impact that the level of uncertainty has on the price elasticity
of the aggregate supply function. In data terms, this means that we aim to regress the
slope of (aggregate) supply bid functions on a proxy corresponding to the uncertainty that
existed at the time of bidding. The uncertainty may come from two different sources: (i)
uncertainty about the realisation of market demand and (ii) uncertainty on meteorological
forecasts (which affect the generation from renewables). Both types of uncertainty affect
the residual demand curve faced by each supplier12.
This regression is able to explain how supply firms adjust their bidding strategies to the
expectation of demand shocks that they face. Statistical significance of the level of uncer-
tainty on the slope of the supply function would be evidence that firms take the strategic
10The next weather simulation run takes place at 12 noon, and is therefore not being used by the
bidders on the EPEX day-ahead market, as the deadline for submitting bids is precisely 12 noon.
11Each unit EUA permit allows one tonne of CO2 emissions.
12Renewable generation benefits from a feed-in guarantee on the market and thus reduces the residual
demand for all traditional electricity producers.
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considerations of dynamic costs into account. We emphasize again that our theoretical
prediction does not take capacity constraints into account. These capacity considerations
drive the vertical parts of the bid functions. Effectively, capacity constraints are a type
of infinite dynamic costs which arise towards the extremities of the bid functions. We
therefore focus on the central part of the bid functions.
We lay out the methodology top-down. First, in section 3.4.2 we show the final regression
of interest. Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 then detail the theory and empirics underlying the
variables that feed into the final regression.
Some of the information used in our analysis is drawn from the bid functions of the EPEX
Spot market. As introduced in section 3.3, we observe the full aggregate bid functions for
both supply and demand, the shape of which (and thus the information that we aim to
extract from them, e.g. their slope) varies differently at different points (recall the graphs
in figure 3.4). We therefore adopt a functional data analysis approach, which allows us
to condition our analysis on specific points k = 1, .., K of the functions. These points
must be comparable across auctions in order to derive insights.
The methodology to select comparable points across auctions is presented in section
3.4.1 and discussed in more detail in appendix 3.8. This appendix also evaluates the
results when applying the technique to our data from the Epex Spot market. We use
the obtained points in the subsequent stages of our work. Figure 3.5 shows the selected
points on an exemplary demand and supply curve and labels points according to their
type k = 1, .., 5.
The different types of points selected represent different parts of the aggregate bid func-
tions and capture different information. The most important point is k = 3, which cor-
responds to the point of inflection were a smooth underlying logistic function assumed.
This point is most relevant for equilibrium determination13. We expect to measure our
theoretical prediction at this point, as compared to points towards the extremities of the
bid function which are affected by capacity constraints.
The points k = 2, 4 are the points of maximum curvature and represent the transition
points between the central (very price elastic) region and the outer (very price inelastic)
regions of the bid function. The analysis of the slope at points k = 2, 4 does not make
much sense since they are defined as the points of maximum curvature, i.e. where the
13See figure 3.29 on page 160 for a glimpse at the distribution of equilibrium outcomes.
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slope changes most. Last, we have the points k = 1, 5 which are imposed by the auction
rules and are the endpoints of the bid functions. We suspect these points to be strongly
influenced by capacity considerations and thus do not focus on them.
Figure 3.5: Selected points on original bid functions
Note: The demand function left, the supply function right, the graph superposes and
names the points selected according to the methodology of section 3.4.1.
3.4.1 Point selection
We develop a methodology to analyse data of a specific format. The focus of this sub-
section lies on the methodological details. The evaluation of the performance of our
technique is detailed in appendix 3.8. The aim of this methodology is to extract points
of interests from functional data. The economic interpretation is secondary in this sub-
section.
Motivation
Reduced form models often rely on exploiting market outcomes, i.e. equilibrium prices
and quantities, for their analysis in order to identify the determinants of firm behaviour
and test predictions of the theory. On a few markets, we observe sufficient information to
get around the problem of using endogenous equilibrium data. For example on the gov-
ernment bond markets, we observe both the full aggregate demand and supply functions.
This market is of a specific type, it is a divisible goods auction (also called multi-unit or
share auctions). These are auctions, where multiple units of a good are sold in a single
auction. The exact quantity is not predetermined, but endogenous and depends on the
price. Furthermore, the auction format is more complex than for indivisible, single unit
auctions and most notably requires that bidders simultaneously submit full bid functions
for the goods, i.e. multiple price-quantity combinations at which each bidder is willing to
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buy or sell the goods. The market price and quantity are determined by the intersection
of the aggregate demand and supply functions.
The aggregate bid functions are very rich in information and the reduced form models
can be adapted to use this data. However, the literature on exploiting functional data is
limited. Préget and Waelbroeck (2005) do this to investigate the determinants of demand
bid functions in French government bond auctions. They rely on the propositions first
put forward by Boukai and Landsberger (1998) and Berg et al. (1999), who identified that
aggregate bid functions in divisible goods auctions follow an S-shaped curve that can be
estimated by a logistic function. The fluctuations across auctions are claimed to be due
to random shocks on the parameters of the estimated logistic function. This relation can
be exploited in a cross-section (cross-auction) reduced form analysis. Doing so, Préget
and Waelbroeck (2005) show that cross-auction variation of the demand functions arises
from differing auction covariates. Özcan (2004) applies the methodology to investigate
the revenue superiority of the discriminatory price auction format over the uniform price
auction format for the Turkish government bonds market.
More generally, their methodology consists of a two-stage regression. The first stage sum-
marises the (presumably parametric) functional data of the aggregated demand function
as parameters of an estimated smooth logistic function. The second stage reuses the in-
formation (concentrated in the estimated parameters) for cross-sectional analyses.
This method has worked remarkably well in the context of treasury auctions14. In Bel-
sunce (2011), the same logistic function approach is applied to data from the French
day-ahead electricity market. Although the auction mechanism is identical to that of the
Treasury market and data availability is comparable, the author shows that the logistic
function approach does not suit the context of the electricity market due to the strong
heterogeneity of the bid functions.
The heterogeneity arises from the fact that the bid functions for the electricity auctions
are much richer since we have multiple, strategic players on both the demand and the
supply side of the market (unlike the market for government bonds, where the supply
is monopolistically determined by the Treasury itself). Furthermore, supplier bidding is
strongly influenced by the underlying (step-function-like) marginal cost of the production
14As an example, Préget and Waelbroeck (2005) results provide a forecasting tool of remarkable fit for
upcoming treasury auctions. Their correlation coefficient between the observed and estimated stop out
rates is 0.99997. This forecasting tool is still in use by the French Treasury (Source: Personal discussions
with one of the authors, June 2014).
100
Chapter 3
technology - in particular towards the extremities of the bid functions15. The observed
data is consequently less homogeneous and the fitting of the logistic model not convinc-
ing. Furthermore, the economic interpretation of the logistic function parameters is very
difficult and reducing the whole bid function to two parameters of interest discards a lot
of the original information of the bid functions. Finally, we are uncomfortable with the
strong assumption of smooth underlying functions and want to circumvent the problems
of fitting these.
Instead, we develop a non-parametric, functional data analysis approach to select compa-
rable data points from the original bid functions. These selected points are comparable
across repetitions of the market (i.e. auctions for different hourly contracts) and can
then be used to run a cross-sectional reduced form model. The utility of this approach
is threefold. First, it aims to use as much of the original information as possible without
distorting it into parameters of a logistic function. Also, information of different parts of
the bid function is not mixed. Second, our approach is “scalable” and as many points as
necessary can be extracted. The cross-sectional analyses are then conditioned on the type
of comparable points selected. Third, while our analysis provides support for an underly-
ing tri-linear or S-shaped functional form, we do not need to assume a specific functional
form nor impose overly simplistic assumptions, such as symmetry of the functional forms,
to ensure convergence of the estimator.
In terms of the literature related to our technique, we are only aware of Wölfing (2013).
He uses a functional approach to measure the cost impact of CO2 emission prices on
supply functions on the electricity market. While his results are mixed, his work is
notable since it is the first effort to implement these techniques. Our approach is more
refined with respect to the relative (non-parametric) measures that we use to identify
our landmarks as opposed to his approach of selecting landmarks based on absolute
(hard-coded) criteria.
Purpose
To briefly fix ideas, let’s assume that we are interested in a regression:
S ′i = α + βXi + ε
15Low volume bids are strongly impacted by marginal costs of base load production technologies (e.g.
nuclear), while high volume bids are driven by peak-load production technologies (e.g. gas). The latter
especially motivates bids closer to a linear function and not an S-shaped form.
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where S ′i is the steepness of the bid function in auction i, Xi the stacked vector of
exogenous variables (not specified further here), α the regression constant, β the stacked
vector of regression coefficients and ε the error term.
This is a cross-sectional regression, where the information S ′ is drawn from the observed
bid functions. These bid functions have the specificities detailed in section 3.3. The
information (S ′) that we want to measure varies along the bid function (see figure 3.3)
and furthermore, the information also varies differently for bid functions of different
auctions (see figure 3.4). In order to derive insights with our regression, we must make
sure that the information included in the regression is comparable across auctions. We
therefore adopt a functional data analysis approach, which allows us to condition our
analysis on specific points k = 1, .., K of the functions.
In terms of comparability, we require that a chosen point k from a supply function must be
comparable to the kth point from the supply functions of another auction. The same goes
for chosen points of the demand functions. Note that we do not impose comparability
between a pair k of points from a supply and a demand function of the same auction.
Non-parametric technique to compare bid functions
Consider two demand functions (as shown in figure 3.6). One could compare the kth
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of two aggregate demand functions for the same hour
point of each function to one another. Unfortunately the number of points varies from
one auction to another, so this approach would be meaningless. Instead we have to
identify ”features” of the different functions in order to determine which points can be
compared to one another. We aim to reproduce the type of analysis that the brain
performs automatically when faced with such curve: we clearly identify three regions of
different slope, where the central region is less steep than the left and right regions.
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To recognise these features, we perform two successive kernel density analyses16. For de-
tails on the bandwidth and kernel selection as well as algorithm specificities, see appendix
3.8.5. This allows us to access estimates of the absolute values of the first and second
derivatives of the demand functions as shown in graphs B and C of figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: Steps of the point selection process
Top left (A): The full original aggregate demand bid function for hour 8 on 15.01.2011 in the
Price- Volume dimension. Top right (B): Kernel density estimates of the first derivative, zoomed
on the relevant price range. Bottom left (C): Zoomed kernel density estimates of the second
derivative. Bottom right (D): The full original bid function with the K = 5 selected points.
We are therefore able to identify the regions of very high curvature, which define the
transition between the three characteristic regions of these functions. We assume that
these maxima can be compared across different auctions. This hypothesis is commonly
made in functional data analysis and known under the method of landmark registration
(Silverman and Ramsay, 2005).
16Bandwidth in the first estimation = 45, bandwidth in the second estimation = 2, kernels: epanech-
nikov.
103
Chapter 3
We can develop this method further and define intermediary points17 that can again be
compared to one another. This method allows to define as many points as needed, for
computational reasons we limit ourselves to K = 5 points18.
Graph D of figure 3.7 visualises an original demand bid function and the selected points
that we retain as an informative summary of the original curve. Once this work is done
we are left with K = 5 points per observed aggregate function, those points defined in
such a way that they can be compared from one auction to another.
In our setting, the selected points are the two end-points of the curves (where bidding
is imposed by the auction rules at the minimum (k = 1) and maximum (k = 5) Price),
the point corresponding to the point of inflection were a smooth functional form imposed
(determined by the maximum of the first derivative, (k = 3)) and the points separating
the regions of high and low elasticity in price (determined by the maximum second
derivatives to the left (k = 2) and right (k = 4) of the point of inflection).
We described the technique here for the case of a demand function. The information
measured at these points (e.g. price, volume or slope) can thereby be compared across
demand bid functions of different auctions. The method is used analogously for selecting
comparable points on the supply function.
As the focus of this paper is not on this methodology but on what it allows us to study,
we describe the results of this specific methodology in appendix 3.8 (starting page 135).
In the appendix, we also provide a discussion of the robustness of these results.
3.4.2 Regression methodology: identification
At each of these comparable points, we want to identify the effect of uncertainty on the
slope of the supply function. Defining S ′i,k the slope of the supply function of auction i
at point k in the quantity (X-axis) - price (Y-axis) dimension, XS being the vector of
exogenous variables, PLUDi,k being the proxy for the level of demand uncertainty, PLU
R
i
being the proxy for the level of uncertainty from renewables, α being the regression
17As an example, we could extract those points corresponding to half the density value of the maximum
density of the second order derivative. The four points selected (one for each monotone portion of the
graph of second derivative estimates) would then correspond to those where the curvature of the function
is halved. Together with the maximum, the additional point would contain information on the speed
(radius of the curvature) at which the function changes.
18The point selection algorithm took 2 weeks runtime to complete its task of selecting 5 points per
function. Defining intermediary points would have taken disproportionately more time since many sorting
and interpolation steps are necessary for each intermediate point.
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constant and ε being the error term, we estimate the following:
S ′i,k = α
S
k + β
S
k PLU
D
i,k + γ
S
k PLU
R
i + δ
S
kX
S
i + ε
S
i,k (3.1)
We are interested in the sign and magnitude of the coefficients βS and γS, which identify
the effects of the PLUs (PLUD and PLUR, respectively) on the shape of the supply bid
function. From the predictions outlined in section 3.1.2, we expect a positive coefficient
when uncertainty levels increase19.
3.4.3 Left-hand-side variables
We extract the slope of the aggregate supply function at any given point k from a kernel
density estimation with a bandwidth of 45 units20.
Effectively, this is a smoothed version of the slope. Thereby, we aim to make our slope
estimates robust to steps in the bid function21. Steps in the bid functions mostly arise
towards the extremities of the bid functions and could arise from marginal cost bidding.
Working with smoothed slopes is in line with previous work à la Préget and Waelbroeck
(2005) and Özcan (2004), who also apply reduced form models to aggregate bid function
data.
3.4.4 Right-hand-side variables
We are regressing an ex-post measure of the auction market (realised slope of the supply
bid function) on ex-ante information that bidders have at the time of bidding, i.e. which
is available at midday of the day ahead of delivery. We thus keep a strict separation
of the ex-post and ex-ante information to the left and right hand side of equation 3.1,
respectively. This separation allows us to circumvent endogeneity problems and validates
the use of simple OLS regressions.
19Specifically, we want βS to be positive, γS1 positive and γ
S
2 negative. For details on γ
S , see section
3.4.4.2.
20The slope is a by-product of the point selection mechanism and the bandwidth selection for the
smoothing thus follows the same considerations as for the latter. The details of this choice are specified
in appendix 3.8.5.
21In our data, we observe that bid functions are effectively step functions. On EPEX spot 256 price-
quantity combinations are allowed per bidder. When additional bid points are costly, then stepwise
bidding behaviour may be very different from a setting where continuous functions can be bid (Kastl,
2011). Due to the fact that, on average, we do not observe that firms use up all available price-quantity
combinations , the cost argument of an additional bid point seems weak. Hence, by smoothing the slope
we approximate the unconstrained, continuous bid function.
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For this reason, we construct our PLUs on the basis of predicted uncertainty. However,
for data availability reasons we cannot exclude endogeneity problems completely. For
details, see the discussion in section 3.6.2.
In this subsection, we first outline how we generate the proxies for the level of market
demand uncertainty (PLUD) in section 3.4.4.1. Second, we construct the proxies for the
level of uncertainty from renewables energies (PLUR) in section 3.4.4.2. Third, we detail
how the vector of exogenous variables (X) is constructed in subsection 3.4.4.3.
3.4.4.1 Generating proxies for uncertainty from market demand (PLUD)
We construct a proxy for the level of the demand uncertainty (PLUD) by using the resid-
uals from a demand estimation on exogenous parameters as a measure of the uncertainty
that bidders face in an auction. Specifically, our PLUD is the expected squared level of
the prediction errors that firms expect to make when anticipating the demand level of
the day ahead. Under conditions of normality, ex-post prediction errors give consistent
estimates of the uncertainty at the time of bidding.
The uncertainty proxy is obtained as detailed next in a three-step procedure. In the first
step, we explain what kind of uncertainty our PLUD refers to. The second step details the
conceptual details of constructing the PLUD. The third step computes the PLUD.
In the first step, we reduce the demand functions to a fixed number K of comparable
points across auctions by using the non-parametric point selection technique outlined
in section 3.4.1. Each kth point is defined by a price and a quantity, which we regress
independently on the exogenous variables.
Let us call PDi,k andQ
D
i,k the price and quantity of point k of the realised demand function in
auction i,XDi the vector of exogenous variables relevant for the demand estimation.
PDi,k = α
D,P
k + β
D,P
k X
D
i + ε
D,P
i,k (3.2)
QDi,k = α
D,Q
k + β
D,Q
k X
D
i + ε
D,Q
i,k (3.3)
In regressions 3.2 and 3.3, firms try to anticipate the realisation of the demand using the
exogenous information available. We consider that the producers are able to do such an
analysis at the time of bidding.
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The prediction errors εD,Ji,k , J = {Q,P} are a consequence of the stochastic nature of the
demand and hence an manifestation of the uncertainty. We consider that more uncer-
tainty will lead to larger prediction errors being made in equilibrium and adopt the square
of the residuals
(
εD,Ji,k
)2
as our measure for the realised level of demand uncertainty.
In the second step, we recover the residuals from the demand estimation in regressions
3.2 and 3.3 and test for heteroskedasticity using White (1980), which is clearly confirmed
(see tables 3.3 and 3.4).
Heteroskedasticity means here that the variation of error terms varies conditional on the
levels of the exogenous factors: E(ε2i |Xi) = g(Xi). However, they are still orthogonal:
E(εi|Xi) = 0, thus ensuring that the prediction is unbiased, but not “best” in the sense of
the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). Thus, heteroskedasticity results in inefficient
regressions where the estimator is not minimum variance. Since we do not interpret
regressions 3.2 and 3.3 for causality, but only for predictive purposes, we stick to the
unbiased OLS.
The heteroskedasticity regression is given for J = {P,Q} by
(
εD,Ji,k
)2
= αU,Jk + β
U,J
k X
D
i + ε
U,J
i,k (3.4)
In the third step, we compute the predicted PLUDi,k that firms use when bidding in
the auction as:
̂(
εD,Ji,k
)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
P̂LU
D
i,k
= αU,Jk + β
U,J
k X
D
i (3.5)
The idea is that by experience, firms in the market know that their predictions are more
or less accurate depending on the environmental conditions (in the sense of realisations of
exogenous factors). In other words, firms can use the realisations ofXD to infer the accu-
racy of their demand predictions. Technically speaking, they can use the heteroskedastic
nature of the residuals to forecast the level of uncertainty that they face.
The PLUD subs into regression 3.1. For simplicity, we do not include the uncertainty
proxies PLUDi,k measured at all K = 5 points in regression 3.1 simultaneously, but only
a single PLUDi,k at a time. Therefore in the final regression 3.1, we regress the slope at
a point of the supply function on the PLUD.,. estimated at the corresponding point on
the demand function. The pairing is done in the quantity dimension. This means that
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the slope of the supply function at point k = 3 is regressed on the uncertainty measured
at point k = 3 of the demand function (recall the labelling of the points as given in
figure 3.5)22. We indicate this quantity paring in the index k−1 of the PLU:
PLUDi,k = P̂LU
D
i,k−1 (3.6)
An increase in PLUDi corresponds to an increase in the uncertainty about the market
demand realisation. We thus expect βS to be positive in regression 3.1.
3.4.4.2 Generating proxy for uncertainty from renewable energies (PLUR)
We have already referred to the statement that the intermittency of renewables causes
large residual demand shocks (EPEX, 2014). Suppliers are thus wary of the expected
production of renewables generation.
Given that renewable generation is an exogenous source of supply, it affects the resid-
ual demand curve for each supplier, but does not enter the PLUD, which captures the
uncertainty on market demand only.
In predicting the generation from renewables, we assume that suppliers are able to in-
fer renewables generation from meteorological forecasts23. When forecasting the residual
demand shocks due to generation from renewables, we consider that suppliers have an
idea of the precision of their estimate based on the ”look” of the meteorological forecasts
that they have. By look, we mean the geographical heterogeneity or homogeneity of the
forecasts. Depending on the disparity of local weather forecasts, inference of the national
level of renewables generation is more or less difficult. The geographical disparity of the
forecasts is captured by the characteristic lengthscale of autocorrelation of weather fore-
casts, which feeds into our proxy for the level of uncertainty from renewables production
(PLUR).
Intuitively, the characteristic lengthscale of autocorrelation represents the distance re-
quired between two geographical points on a map of weather forecasts to observe a
decorrelation of half of its maximum value. For example on the wind speeds predic-
tion, a characteristic length of 80 km means that if we observe two very distant points
to have a difference in wind speeds of, on average, 50km/h (this being the maximum
22This also means that we would pair point k = 2 from the supply function with the point k = 4 of
the demand function.
23We specify the technique in appendix 3.9.3 and use it to construct our controls in section 3.4.4.3.
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difference), then we will observe, on average, wind speed differences of 25km/h for points
distant from each other by 80km.
We compute this characteristic lengthscale (L) as described in appendix 3.9. Our PLUR
is defined as the two proxies
PLUR1,m =
1
Lm
, where m = {Wind, Solar, Temperature} (3.7)
and PLUR2,m =
( 1
Lm
)2
(3.8)
Generally, we expect firms to face less uncertainty in predicting weather conditions when
the lengthscale of autocorrelation L is longer since the overall weather conditions will be
more homogenous. A longer length L (less uncertainty), will yield a smaller PLUR and
we expect a flattening of the supply curve. I.e. we expect a positive coefficient γS1 on the
PLUR1,m variables in the final slope regression.
However, we also expect the effect of L on the slope to be attenuated, if not counter-
balanced, by the squared term24. This means that for very short or long L, we expect
an additional effect, which signifies reduced uncertainty. In the former case of short L,
we observe a high amount of noise in weather predictions. According to the law of large
numbers, these errors should cancel out and the uncertainty decrease. In the latter case
of long L, we expect that exponentially less uncertainty results from very homogenous
weather conditions. We thus expect a negative coefficient γS2 on the squared PLU
R term
in the final slope regression (equation 3.1).
3.4.4.3 Controls
This section details the exogenous variables, which we use for our study. The stacked
vector of exogenous variables is not identical for the supply and demand regressions of
equations 3.1 and 3.2.
The vectorXD for the demand equation includes the variables: Tempeff15, Roll Temp24,
Roll Temp240, suncycle, morning, deltasun, EWH, SolarRest, RteBlackBox.
For the supply regression we include in XS the following variables25: Coal, Brent, Gas,
IT2, EUA, Wind1DA, Hydro.
24We expect the effects of L on the slope to be of the shape of a Laffer curve.
25We do not include the variables used for the demand estimation as they indirectly feed into the final
regression via the PLUD.
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Table 3.2 gives a brief overview of the controls used. Details on the computation of some
variables are given in the appendix (see links in table). The last column indicates the
frequency with which we observe the variable in question.
Name Explanation Unit Frequency
Wind1DA The day-ahead predicted electricity volume
generated from wind turbines. Details on p.
151.
MWh Hourly
Solar The electricity volume generated from photo-
voltaic sources. Details p. 153
MWh Hourly
Tempeff15 Effective predicted temperature in France
(with a cutoff point at 15oC to reflect demand
patterns), aggregated on a national level. De-
tails on p. 155.
oC Hourly
Roll Temp24 Mean of Tempeff15 over the last 24 consecutive
hours.
oC Hourly
Roll Temp240 Mean of Tempeff15 over the last 240 consecu-
tive hours.
oC Hourly
suncycle Luminosity as a percentage of maximum lumi-
nosity of the day. Midday defined as suncy-
cle=1. Details on p. 156.
% Hourly
morning Indicator variable for hours before Midday. {0, 1} Hourly
deltasun Absolute value of the change in suncycle. De-
tails on p. 156.
[0, 1] Hourly
EWH Indicator variable for hours between 10pm and
4am.
{0, 1} Hourly
SolarRest The unexplained component of photovoltaic
generation. Specifically, the residuals from a
regression of Solar on suncycle. Details on p.
156.
MWh Hourly
Continued on next page...
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... table 3.2 continued
Name Explanation Unit Frequency
RteBlackBox The unexplained component of the day ahead
prediction of total consumption in France is-
sued by the grid operator (RTE). Specifically,
the residuals from a consumption estimation.
Details on p. 157.
MWh Hourly
Coal Average coal import prices at the French bor-
der.
e /ton Monthly
Brent Average of spot prices for crude oil on the Lon-
don based stock exchange.
$/bl Monthly
Gas Average of closing prices for natural gas at 1
month on the London market (NBP).
£/Therm Monthly
IT2 Interaction term: Gas weighted by an hourly
index for the demand level. Details on p. 158.
£/Therm Hourly
EUA Price of CO2 emissions. e /ton Daily
Hydro Sum of dam level heights on a national level. % Weekly
Table 3.2: Overview of exogenous variables.
The rationale for the included variables is the following: First, Wind1DA and Solar
control for the expected level of renewables generation26 on the day ahead market. These
are computed using a novel bottom-up methodology described in the appendix 3.9.1.
Second, Tempeff15 controls for the demand patterns as a function of the temperature27.
Tempeff15 includes a cut-off at 15oC in order to take into account the demand pattern as
a function of temperature according to RTE (2014). Table 3.13 on page 158 reveals the
improved fit over a simple temperature variable that does not respect the demand cut-
off (Tempeff). Third, Roll Temp24 and Roll Temp240 capture the demand seasonality
26For data availability reasons, Solar is computed on realised luminosity values rather than forecasts
of luminosity.
27Note that electric heating is widely spread in France. It is used in 32% of principal residences
(INSEE, RP2011 exploitation principale).
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via the temperature. The former gives the daily average temperature, while the latter
captures the average temperature over the last 10 days. The demand cut-off at 15oC for
Tempeff15 is respected for these means. Including these as seasonality controls allows to
get away from using dummy variables for the seasonality. In short, avoiding dummies
yields more transparency of the results as we do not have the problem of interpreting
the dummies, which are often black boxes28. Figure 3.8 illustrates the complementarity
of the three continuous seasonality controls. Fourth, we use the four variables suncycle,
Figure 3.8: Temperature based seasonality controls
Note: The graph shows the evolution of the temperature based controls for seasonality for the
month of February 2012. The graph shows the lagged nature of the rolling average temperature
controls.
morning, deltasun and EWH collectively to continuously control for the time of the
day. The reasoning is again the ability to get away from using dummies and being able
to interpret the results. Figure 3.9 shows how the controls describe the daily patterns
continuously. Fifth, SolarRest and RteBlackBox are the residual information gained from
the variables Solar and the day ahead consumption prediction of RTE (PrevConsoH)
over other variables29 included in XD. Sixth, Coal, Brent, Gas, IT2 and EUA are rough
proxies for the input prices for electricity suppliers. Hydro is used as a crude proxy for
dam operator’s ability to generate short term electricity using hydro reserves.
We briefly emphasize that novel methodologies have been used to compute all variables
derived from weather forecasts or observations. When tracing back the shape of aggre-
gate bid functions on exogenous factors in the second stage estimation, we use aggregated
28See section 3.6.1 for a full discussion on the advantage of avoiding dummies.
29E.g. Solar is strongly correlated with suncycle, thus SolarRest is the residual from a regression of
the former on the latter. RteBlackBox is computed as the residuals from regressing PrevConsoH on
Tempeff15, Roll Temp24, Roll Temp240, suncycle, morning, deltasun and EWH. See appendix 3.9.5 and
3.9.5 for details.
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Figure 3.9: Continuous controls for daily patterns
Note: With the exception of EWH, all intraday seasonality controls (suncycle, morning, delta-
sun) are determined endogenously by the prevalent luminosity as captured by Solar.
statistics (at the national level) for the exogenous variables. We thus use an aggrega-
tion methodology to summarise local information (collected at the level of the individual
postcodes) in order to generate an aggregate statistic at the national level. The general
methodology for the aggregation is explained using the example of Solar and as follows:
We observe the value of a weather parameter (e.g. luminosity) every hour at known
weather stations in France (for details see appendix 3.9.1 and 3.9.2). We apply an inter-
polation technique (for details see appendix 3.9.3) in order to obtain parameter values
for all possible geographic locations in France. At any local point, we can thus infer the
electricity volume generated by using the information of the locally installed capacity (of
solar panels) and the renewable energy available (i.e. sunlight inferred from luminosity).
We then take the sum of all solar generated electricity per hour in France and use this as
our aggregate statistic at the national level in our regression analyses. We used forecast
data wherever possible in order to approximate the level of information that bidders have
at the time of bidding and circumvent endogeneity problems. For cases where forecast
data was not available, e.g. Solar, realised weather data was used. We emphasize that
both Tempeff15 and Wind1DA are computed from forecast data.
3.4.5 Extensions and robustness checks
In order to test the robustness of our results and circumvent some drawbacks of the
baseline model, we use a few alternative specifications of our empirical model.
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3.4.5.1 Bootstrapping standard errors
The set-up of our empirical analysis relies on stochastic variables, e.g. PLUD, which
are computed in the first stage of our identification. The assumption made for an OLS
regression of normally distributed residuals is a very strong one (particularly with the
forecast variable) and one which can flaw the precision of estimates in the second stage
regression. We therefore bootstrap the standard errors of the final regression by using
random sampling with replacement at each stage of the analysis, i.e. for both the PLU
computation and the final slope regression with 300 repetitions.
Bootstrapping allows us to non-parametrically approximate the distribution of the fore-
cast PLUs and thus enables us to correct the standard errors of our coefficient esti-
mates.
3.4.5.2 Kernel based uncertainty forecasts (PLUDXi)
The PLUD computed as described in section 3.4.4.1 is noisy since we assume a linear
forecast model to be valid for any combination of realisations of exogenous parameters,
i.e. the same model applies winter and summer, day and night. While the results are as
desired for the baseline PLUD, a bootstrapping of the standard errors indicates that the
first stage forecast is too imprecise for effects of a satisfactory significance level30.
We therefore develop an extension of the uncertainty prediction model in which we use the
idea of demand forecasts (equation 3.5) only locally, i.e. for a limited range of variation
in the exogenous parameters. In other words, we estimate the PLUD corresponding to
an auction only in the neighbourhood of this auction, i.e. over all auctions that occurred
in similar conditions. By conditions, we mean realisations of exogenous parameters and
the neighbourhood refers to the concept of measuring the similarity of these realisations
by means of a range. The next steps explain how this is done formally.
The methodology is analogous to the computation of the baseline PLUD. However, we
now consider that firms predict the level of the uncertainty by comparing it with the level
of uncertainty in past31 auctions of similar exogenous conditions. Thus, the suppliers
30Table 3.5 shows that the corrected standard error using a bootstrapping technique (column 2) is
considerably larger than what an OLS regression suggests under the assumption of normally distributed
PLUs (column 1). The coefficients of the PLUs change from a 1% significance level (col.1) to insignificant
(col. 2) . Furthermore, the lack of significance of the PLUs in column 2 indicates that the PLU measures
could include too much noise, which is likely in our simple linear baseline forecast.
31For data availability reasons, we pool all (past and future) auctions for the computation of this PLU.
This introduces some endogeneity. For a discussion of this choice, please see section 3.6.2.
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forecast the precision (squared residuals) of their demand estimation as before, but only
on a subsample of the data. The subsample is defined as all observations which lie within a
distance bXe of the observation of interest with respect to each control variable Xe, ∀e =
{1, .., E}. Effectively, this is a multi-variate kernel regression and subsequent forecast
with a rectangular (also called boxcar) weighting function. Observations within the kernel
window are given equal weight, while observations outside the kernel window are given
zero weight. We set the bandwidth bXe with respect to each variable equal to
1
3
of the
range of that variable32.
Call Ω the set of all auctions i. LetXi be the realisation of the stacked vector of exogenous
variables (Xe) for an auction i. The simple weight function Wi,j : {Xi,Xj} → {1, 0} is
an indicator function from the set of the X for two observations i, j ∈ Ω, which indicates
if the auctions i and j are considered similar for our purposes based on the similarity of
their realisations of exogenous variables. Specifically,
Wi,j =
∏
e
Wi,j(Xe) , where Wi,j(Xe) =
1, if |(Xe)i − (Xe)j| ≤ bXe0, otherwise. (3.9)
This weight function defines a subsample of comparable auctions for each auction i:
Ωi ⊂ Ω, Ωi = {j : j ∈ Ω, Wi,j = 1}, where the size and exact composition of
that subsample depend on the auction’s specific Xi. In the following, the index ω is
taken from these Ωi and we iterate the regressions over all subsamples. The individual
subsample based regressions are then for the demand estimation
PDω,k = α
D,P
k,Ωi
+ βD,Pk,ΩiXω + ε
D,P
ω,k (3.10)
QDω,k = α
D,Q
k,Ωi
+ βD,Qk,ΩiXω + ε
D,Q
ω,k (3.11)
where the estimated coefficients are specific to each subsample, which is indicated using
the additional index Ωi . Similarly, the local uncertainty regression is given ∀J = {P,Q}
and ∀ω ∈ Ωi by
(
εD,Jω,k
)2
= αU,Jk,Ωi + β
U,J
k,Ωi
Xω + ε
U,J
ω,k (3.12)
32See appendix 3.10.1 for details. Column 2 of table 3.14 indicates the choice of bXe for each exogenous
variable considered.
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Finally, we compute the PLU for each auction i based on the subsample-estimated coef-
ficients and the specific realisation of exogenous variables Xi:
(̂
εD,Jk,Xi
)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
P̂LU
D
k,Xi
= αU,Jk,Ωi + β
U,J
k,Ωi
Xi (3.13)
When firms infer the upcoming uncertainty by looking at the uncertainty in past auctions,
the precision of their estimate depends on the number of comparable auctions available,
i.e the sample size Ωi. Given that the sample size varies greatly across auctions, we use a
sample-size-weighted OLS regression in the final estimation of equation 3.1. Finally, we
bootstrap the standard errors on the kernel-based PLUs using 50 repetitions33.
3.4.5.3 Locality of prediction
To support our local prediction for the central part of the bid function, we also disclose
the results for the points k = 1, 2, 4, 5 in on page 126. We expect the effect of uncertainty
to be insignificant for all points not on the centre portion of the supply bid function.
As discussed in section 3.1.2, the theoretical prediction (of an increased slope of the
supply function when uncertainty is high) is a local prediction. We have two reasons
for the locality of our prediction: (i) it is based on linear functions and (ii) we ignore
capacity constraints.
The first point implies that we can only test this prediction on bid functions that are (at
least roughly) linear. However, the overall bid functions on EPEX Spot that we observe
have the characteristic S-shape that we have introduced in section 3.3. By focussing
on the central part of the bid functions, we have a (sub-)bid function which exhibits a
linear shape over our window of interest, i.e. the volumes interval that occurs normally
in equilibrium. The analysis of this part of the bid function is important as it is the
most relevant in equilibrium. The extremities of the bid functions rarely determine the
equilibrium outcome - they only have an impact when there is a major discrepancy
between demand and supply. The central portion of the bid function is represented by
the point k = 3, which we focus on for our main results.
33For computational reasons, we only bootstrap the kernel based PLUs for the point of inflection
(k = 3). We choose only 50 repetitions for the same reason. Given the size of our dataset, we consider
it acceptable. The general criterion for convergence is that each observation is selected at least once in
the bootstrapping exercise.
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The second point refers to the fact that our prediction abstracts of firms’ considerations
regarding capacity constraints. These considerations drive the vertical extremities of the
bid functions and (by virtue of representing an infinite dynamic cost) erode dynamic cost
considerations due to uncertainty. We therefore see a lack of significant results on the
PLUs for the points k = 1, 2, 4, 5 as support for our local prediction.
3.5 Results
We first present the results for the demand estimation in both the Price and Volume
dimension since this step is identical for all PLU specifications. We then present the
results of the final regression in the baseline and alternative specifications.
3.5.1 Demand estimation
Table 3.3 gives the results for the demand estimation on volumes (equation 3.3). Table
3.4 shows the results for the demand estimation on prices (equation 3.2).
These tables are interesting for two reasons. First, they provide the basis for our com-
putation of the PLUD. Second and the reason why we disclose them in such detail, they
are already a result in themselves.
It is comforting to see that all variables used are significant and, more importantly, of the
expected sign. Thus, these results provide support for our specification of the demand
estimation. For the interpretation here, we focus on the effects at the point of inflection34
(k = 3).
First, looking at the volume effects of the exogenous variables: All variables included in
the regression are highly significant at the 1% level. All temperature statistics (Temp-
eff15, Roll temp24, Roll temp240) bear coefficients with a negative sign and confirm that
electricity demand falls with increasing ambient temperature. All daytime controls show
up the expected sign as well: suncycle and deltasun have positive coefficients. This is sen-
sible as electricity demand is higher during the day than at night (proxied for by suncycle)
and rush or activity hours (proxied for by deltasun) in the morning and evening are also
characterised by increased demand. The variables morning and EWH have coefficients
34As mentioned, the point of inflection is the centre point of the bid curves and the most relevant for
equilibrium determination.
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of a plausible negative sign. The morning as controlled for by our indicator variable35
is shorter than the afternoon and evening together, thus total electricity consumption
is lower as well. EWH stands for the deep night between 10pm and 4am and thus also
corresponds to low demand periods. SolarRest controls for selfgeneration to cover own
consumption and has a plausible negative coefficient. RteBlackBox on the other hand has
a positive coefficient and confirms that actual demand is higher when the grid operator
expects it to be the case.
The analysis of the price effects of these controls on demand functions is in line with the
analysis of volume effects. This is coherent since for a linear downwards sloping demand
curve, a left shift (volume decrease) is synonymous for a downwards shift (price decrease)
of the curve. We consider that at the point k = 3, the demand functions are locally
linear. We note the only exception for the coefficient of SolarRest which has a positive
price effect, while a negative volume effect36.
Second, these tables already give a descriptive analysis of the effects of exogenous vari-
ables on the shape of the demand bid function: We now compare all coefficients for a
specific variable on the K = 5 different points on the demand function (we read the
table horizontally and compare sign changes across columns). In table 3.3, we observe
for each row at most a single sign change across the coefficients for the different points.
Furthermore (and with few exceptions), the magnitudes of the coefficients generally in-
crease or decrease monotonically along a row. This is very convincing as it suggests
that exogenous variables have a monotone effect on the shape of the bid function. We
thus only observe one-directional shifts (e.g. a unilateral left shift) or two-directional
shifts (extension or contraction) in the volume dimension induced by the variation in
exogenous variables. While the unilateral effects are explained analogously to our point
specific interpretation on the point k = 3 above, we do not have a story to tell about
two-directional effects. Tempeff15 results in a contraction of the bid function in terms of
volumes (right shifts on low volume points, k = 5, 4 and left shifts on high volume points
k = 3, 2, 1). Roll Temp24 has the opposite effect and results in a volume extension of the
35The morning is defined as the hours before midday, which occurs when luminosity is at its daily
maximum.
36We emphasize in the construction of our variable (appendix 3.9.4) that it is not possible to build a
proxy for lighting consumption that would allow us to decorrelate the effects from photovoltaic production
and lighting consumption. We therefore stick to the SolarRest proxy, which aims to capture the effect
of Solar which is not captured by suncycle.
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curve. Roll Temp240 induces a pure left shift of the whole function37. For the intraday
seasonality controls, the results are very clear. While suncycle results in an extension of
the demand function38, all other intraday controls (morning, deltasun, EWH) have uni-
lateral effects. When the indicators morning and EWH are positive, we observe volume
decreases at all points and thus a left shift of the function. Higher values of deltasun
induces volume increases at all points of the bid function. Finally, we have SolarRest
which induces an expansion of the curve and RteBlackBox which has a unilateral right
shifting effect on the aggregate demand bid function.
The price variation of the demand bid function yields interesting results, too. Given that
the prices of points k = 1, 5 are fixed, we only observe effects for the interior points.
We thus focus on the effects on the points k = 4, 3, 2 only (called the “central demand
function” here). Again, we only observe at most a single sign change across columns
for any exogenous variable. Both Tempeff15 and Roll Temp240 lead to an extension
of the central demand function (we are now looking at vertical variation of the bid
function as shown in fig. 3.5), while Roll Temp24 causes a unilateral downwards shift. For
intraday seasonality controls, we see that suncycle and deltasun have a contracting effect
on the central demand function and morning a unilaterally negative effect. EWH leads
to an expansion of the central demand function. SolarRest and RteBlackBox indicate an
extension of the central demand function in the price dimension.
Overall, we take away a solid R2 with coefficients of the correct sign. We furthermore
have disclosed the White statistic which unanimously confirms heteroskedasticity in these
regressions. The significance levels have been measured using robust standard errors
(Huber-White). We point to the fact that the explanatory power of our demand esti-
mations is highest for the point of inflection, in line with our expectations. Points of
maximum curvature k = 2, 4 reveal lower R2 statistics. This is likely due to the under-
lying data patterns that arise from bidding frictions, e.g. focal price points. For these
points, it is thus not surprising that we do not observe convincing demand estimates - we
note in particular the lack of explanatory power for the demand estimation in the price
dimension for points of type k = 4.
37Excluding interaction effects, we note that the net effect of a simultaneous 1oC increase for all three
temperature variables results in a net left shift of the function. In the price dimension (table 3.4) we
observe a net downwards shift. Both effects suggest that electricity demand decreases with the prevailing
temperature.
38Combined with the observed price effects from table 3.4, this suggests that demand is more price
elastic during the day.
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k = 5 k = 4 k = 3 k = 2 k = 1
VARIABLES Volume Volume Volume Volume Volume
Tempeff15 50.72*** 38.58*** -130.3*** -189.3*** -204.0***
(9.942) (10.13) (10.94) (13.32) (13.20)
Roll Temp24 -63.57*** -67.13*** -48.87*** 19.76 34.16**
(11.78) (12.06) (13.14) (15.83) (15.76)
Roll Temp240 -60.15*** -68.38*** -78.49*** -78.44*** -87.38***
(6.655) (6.867) (7.450) (10.05) (10.00)
suncycle -894.0*** -652.1*** 508.2*** 1,351*** 1,400***
(44.27) (45.50) (48.52) (56.36) (55.73)
morning -101.2*** -220.3*** -814.8*** -872.2*** -885.8***
(27.52) (28.33) (30.44) (37.71) (37.28)
deltasun 2,659*** 2,850*** 3,201*** 1,721*** 1,821***
(153.5) (158.5) (166.1) (197.8) (196.5)
EWH -803.1*** -833.1*** -782.7*** -354.7*** -322.8***
(30.74) (31.91) (33.15) (42.09) (41.78)
SolarRest -0.595*** -0.363*** -0.145*** -0.0137 0.246***
(0.0282) (0.0305) (0.0342) (0.0418) (0.0407)
RteBlackBox -0.00259 0.0127*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.0979***
(0.00235) (0.00243) (0.00255) (0.00316) (0.00317)
Constant 6,054*** 7,086*** 11,446*** 15,215*** 15,502***
(33.71) (35.04) (37.15) (48.68) (48.27)
Observations 14,691 14,691 14,691 14,690 14,691
R2 0.201 0.219 0.478 0.344 0.346
White 548.6 524.9 407.9 961.8 944.8
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.3: Estimation results for demand volumes
Note: The estimated constants of this table or the left graph of fig. 3.5 indicate to
which portion of the demand function the types of points k = 1, .., 5 refer.
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k = 5 k = 4 k = 3 k = 2 k = 1
VARIABLES Price Price Price Price Price
Tempeff15 0 4.675*** -0.969*** -1.308*** 0
(0) (1.523) (0.0599) (0.0980) (0)
Roll Temp24 0 -10.07*** -0.124* -0.0470 0
(0) (2.233) (0.0713) (0.116) (0)
Roll Temp240 0 4.250*** -0.0901** -0.353*** 0
(0) (1.147) (0.0404) (0.0607) (0)
suncycle 0 -10.98** 6.870*** 11.60*** 0
(0) (5.020) (0.258) (0.445) (0)
morning 0 -0.226 -5.748*** -9.009*** 0
(0) (4.133) (0.173) (0.285) (0)
deltasun 0 -16.54 10.60*** 18.72*** 0
(0) (19.16) (0.881) (1.497) (0)
EWH 0 5.136 -1.756*** -3.014*** 0
(0) (4.448) (0.192) (0.302) (0)
SolarRest 0 0.000532 0.00192*** 0.00253*** 0
(0) (0.00307) (0.000193) (0.000326) (0)
RteBlackBox 0 9.91e-05 0.000906*** 0.00147*** 0
(0) (0.000301) (1.47e-05) (2.26e-05) (0)
Constant 3,000 131.3*** 39.45*** -39.43*** -3,000
(0) (4.210) (0.217) (0.319) (0)
Observations 14,691 14,691 14,691 14,690 14,691
R2 0.005 0.463 0.420
White 138.2 640.9 761.2
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.4: Estimation results for demand prices
Note: The estimated constants of this table or the left graph of fig. 3.5 indicate to
which portion of the demand function the types of points k = 1, .., 5 refer.
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3.5.2 Final regression
In the final regression, we investigate the effect of uncertainty on the aggregate supply bid
function. We lay the focus on the point of inflection (k = 3) for a detailed interpretation
of our results. We choose the point k = 3, because this type of point represents the
region of the supply function that is most relevant for equilibrium determination. As
mentioned, our prediction is only applicable to this centre portion of the supply function.
We disclose the results for all other points k 6= 3 as a robustness check.
Each result table has four (three39) columns to show the results for different estimators
and two specifications of the PLUD. All other variables remain unchanged across the
columns. In the tables, column 1 refers to the baseline specification of the PLUD,J ,
where standard errors are calculated using the Huber-White sandwich estimator. Column
2 reports the results for the baseline model using bootstrapped standard errors with
300 repetitions. Column 3 reports the results for the regression on the kernel based
PLUD,J
X̃
, using the sample size of each kernel as weights in the regression. Column 4
reports the results of the kernel based model using bootstrapped standard errors using
50 repetitions40.
Regarding notation: In the results tables, PLUvRvar‘m’ stands for PLUR1,m with ‘m’
being replaced by the initial of the variable in question (W, S and T, respectively).
PLUR2,m is indicated by the extension “sq”. PLUvDvar‘J’ stands for PLU
D,J with J =
{P,Q} representing the dimension in which the demand uncertainty is measured. The
kernel based PLUD
X̃
are given by PLUvDvarK‘J’ in the tables. To facilitate the reading
of the tables, we adopt this notation for the discussion of the results.
For the point of inflection (k = 3), the results are shown in table 3.5. Regarding
uncertainty from renewables production, only that of wind has a significant and robust
impact. PLUvRvarW has a positive effect (significant at the 1% level) on the slope in
all specifications. PLUvRvarWsq has a negative effect on the slope in all specifications,
however this second effect is not robust to bootstrapping the standard errors. The signs
of the estimated coefficients are in line with our expectations. To show this, we recall
39For computational reasons, we do not run the bootstrapping of the kernel based PLUD for the points
k 6= 3, thus we only have three columns for these tables.
40Coefficients vary slightly (< ±20%, no sign change), because the bootstrapping loop includes the
kernel-based prediction of the uncertainty and thus varies the kernel sample sizes, which are used as
weights in the final regression. Furthermore, the estimator has probably not yet fully converged with 50
repetitions, however for computational reasons we stick to this choice.
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that both versions of the PLUvRvarW are based on the inverse of the characteristic
lengthscale LW of autocorrelation of the wind speed measurements. Thus, when LW
increases (it represents a decrease in the uncertainty since wind speeds are homogenous
over longer distances), the PLU decreases (corresponding to a decrease in uncertainty).
While an increase in the PLUvRvarW leads to an increase in the slope of the supply
function, the effect is attenuated by the squared term PLUvRvarWsq for very small and
large LW
41. The estimated coefficient for the latter is negative and suggests that for very
short LW (i.e. very heterogenous wind speeds over the country), prediction errors cancel
out. For very long LW (i.e. very homogenous wind speed profile), the marginal impact
of LW on the level of uncertainty decreases.
With respect to the uncertainty from temperature forecasts, the results are always of the
anticipated sign, but insignificant in most specifications. Note that we expect the main
impact of temperature uncertainty to go via the demand response, which we account for
in our proxy for the uncertainty from demand realisation (PLUvD). Uncertainty from
Solar production is attributed no effect. This is not surprising as generation from solar is
only a fraction of that generated from wind power and thus negligible. Furthermore, we
are unable to disentangle the effect of solar generation from the reduced demand effect
from high luminosity (which results in low demand for lighting). We do not find evidence
for a direct response from suppliers to uncertainty in solar predictions.
Uncertainty from the realisation of market demand has a negative and significant effect
when proxied for by price-based PLUvDvarP (see table 3.5) as opposed to a positive and
significant effect when proxied for by a volume-based PLUvDvarQ (see table 3.5). The
positive effect on PLUvDvarQ is in line with our prediction made in section 3.1.2. This
results supports the theory that firms take uncertainty when bidding into account and
consequently adjust their bidding strategy in order to minimise dynamic costs. However,
our theory produces a prediction for volume based uncertainty only. We include the
uncertainty proxy for price PLUvDvarP as a control and its effect seems rather robust.
The effects of PLUvD in either the price or volume dimension are robust to the exclusion
41By looking at the variation of our data, we see that the negative effect of the PLUvRvarWsq term
merely attenuates, rather than overrides, the positive effect of the PLUvRvarW term on the slope since
in our dataset we very rarely observe PLUvRvarW values sufficiently large to exceed the maximum of
the Laffer curve of the impact on the slope.
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of the other42. We do not have a story to explain the opposing signs for the coefficients
of the two proxies.
Furthermore, table 3.5 gives support to our extension using kernel based PLUvDs. Col-
umn 2 shows that the effects of the baseline PLUvD are not significant when boot-
strapped. Our alternative is to use a more elaborate uncertainty prediction model. These
kernel based PLUvD are more sophisticated in two respects: (i) the forecasting model
is only applied locally, that is auctions are only compared to similar auctions and (ii)
the obtained forecast is weighted by the sample size used for its prediction. Thereby, we
control for the confidence of the firms in making those predictions. The results of the
weighted regression are given in column 3. The results using the more elaborate predic-
tion model are in line with those from the baseline regression, while being more accurate
as indicated by the improved explanatory power of our model (we see a 16.5% increase of
the R2 from columns 1-2 to columns 3-4). Finally, the results of our kernel based model
are more precise as indicated by the higher significance level for the PLUvDvarKP and
PLUvDvarKQ, which are now also robust to a bootstrap (column 4).
We explicitly include the controls for the levels of the input prices of electricity producers
(XS). We do not interpret these coefficients since there are no ex-ante expectations of
their levels to affect the slope of the supply bid function. We briefly mention that intraday
seasonality controls as well as other demand related variables are not included in this
regression to avoid multicollinearity problems with the PLUvD, which are themselves
computed as a linear combination of the demand control variables (XD).
Overall, we take away a goodness of fit of ≥ 20% for our empirical model as well as the
robust positive coefficients for both the demand based uncertainty proxy (PLUvDvarQ)
and the weather based uncertainty proxies (PLUvRvarW and PLUvRvarWsq). We note
the puzzling result for the PLUvDvarP, which we discuss in section 3.6.3.
42Thereby controlling for collinearity (correlation coefficient of 0.62) does not affect the results as
otherwise OLS remains unbiased, standard errors are larger. Full results available from the authors.
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For k=3 (Point of inflection)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES fxInvertQP fxInvertQP fxInvertQP fxInvertQP
PLUvRvarT 0.000882 0.000882 0.00374** 0.00508
(0.00152) (0.00415) (0.00155) (0.00354)
PLUvRvarTsq -0.000529 -0.000529 -0.00161*** -0.00215
(0.000584) (0.168) (0.000603) (0.183)
PLUvRvarW 0.00790*** 0.00790*** 0.00647*** 0.00574***
(0.00123) (0.00257) (0.00121) (0.00207)
PLUvRvarWsq -0.00235*** -0.00235 -0.00192*** -0.00170
(0.000373) (0.0644) (0.000370) (0.0479)
PLUvRvarS -5.20e-10 -5.20e-10 -2.28e-09 -2.23e-09
(2.68e-09) (3.58e-08) (3.16e-09) (3.69e-08)
PLUvRvarSsq 0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Coal 6.90e-06*** 6.90e-06*** 5.18e-06*** 6.29e-06***
(4.35e-07) (4.64e-07) (4.39e-07) (6.87e-07)
Brent -2.36e-05*** -2.36e-05*** -1.18e-05*** -1.40e-05***
(1.51e-06) (1.96e-06) (1.53e-06) (2.01e-06)
Gas -2.82e-07 -2.82e-07 1.37e-05*** 1.36e-05***
(1.89e-06) (9.41e-06) (1.67e-06) (2.46e-06)
IT2 -2.71e-05*** -2.71e-05 -1.73e-05*** -1.99e-05***
(2.17e-06) (1.80e-05) (1.34e-06) (1.69e-06)
EUA 7.20e-05*** 7.20e-05*** 2.62e-05*** 2.71e-05***
(2.31e-06) (4.49e-06) (3.34e-06) (6.84e-06)
Wind1DA 1.04e-07*** 1.04e-07*** 1.18e-07*** 1.25e-07***
(6.45e-09) (1.03e-08) (6.51e-09) (7.63e-09)
Hydro -7.55e-06*** -7.55e-06*** -4.08e-06*** -5.88e-06***
(8.33e-07) (2.24e-06) (8.61e-07) (1.11e-06)
PLUvDvarP -0.000219*** -0.000219
(4.57e-05) (0.000203)
PLUvDvarQ 0.000567*** 0.000567
(9.44e-05) (0.000585)
PLUvDvarKP -0.000600*** -0.000462***
(2.69e-05) (4.24e-05)
PLUvDvarKQ 0.000151*** 0.000170**
(3.39e-05) (6.80e-05)
Constant 0.00651*** 0.00651*** 0.00513*** 0.00538***
(0.000208) (0.000789) (0.000195) (0.000257)
Observations 11,702 11,702 11,702 11,702
R2 0.200 0.200 0.233 0.234
Standard errors in parentheses. | p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.5: Regressions of slope on PLUR and PLUD at k = 3
Note: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Column 1 refers to the baseline speci-
fication. Column 2 reports bootstrapped results for the baseline model. Column 3 reports
the results for the (weighted) regression on the kernel based PLUD
X̃
. Column 4 reports
bootstrapped results of the model in column 3.
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For the other points (k = 1, 2, 4, 5), the results are given in tables 3.6, 3.7. Table
3.6 compares the bootstrapped results of the baseline specification of the PLUvD across
all points k = 1 − 5. Table 3.7 compares the weighted regression for the kernel based
PLUvD across all points. Recall our labelling for the points on the supply curve refers
to low volume points for k = 1 and high volume points for k = 5. We comment on the
effects over all points collectively in order to give an overview of the full bid function
behaviour.
The results give support to our restriction that the prediction is local on the point k = 3.
First of all, the explanatory power is highest for the point k = 3. Second, we observe
coefficients of the anticipated sign for all43 uncertainty proxies at the point k = 3, but
we do not observe this for the points k = 1, 2, 4, 5.
However, we do observe a rather robust effect in both tables 3.6 and 3.7 for the uncertainty
from market demand. Market uncertainty measured in volumes has a robust positive
effect44, while it has a a negative effect when measured in prices. While we note the
robustness of the result for market uncertainty, we are cautious to rely much on the
points k 6= 3 for the reasons outlined in section 3.4. Specifically, we referred to the
definition of the points k = 2, 4 (based on maximum curvature) which make an analysis
of the slope at these points questionable. We also referred to the importance of capacity
constraints for the analysis of high and low volume points (k = 1, 5).
On the remaining controls, we do not observe a clear pattern on the effects at the different
points. We run the analysis without these controls and note that the signs of all significant
variables remain unchanged45.
While we look at multiple points on the whole bid function (similar to a functional anal-
ysis), we do not learn about the functional behaviour of the bid function precisely in the
central region of the bid function, where our prediction applies. There we unfortunately
only have a single point to analyse. We highlight the importance of more reference points
on the centre part of the bid function (close to k = 3) for further work in the discussion
in section 3.6.1.
43We note the mentioned exception of PLUvDvarP, which we address in section 3.6.3.
44We note the only exception for k = 1 in the bootstrapped baseline regression model.
45Results available from the authors.
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Comparison of column 2 for points k = 1− 5
(k=1) (k=2) (k=3) (k=4) (k=5)
VARIABLES fxInvertQP fxInvertQP fxInvertQP fxInvertQP fxInvertQP
PLUvRvarT -4.14e-05 -0.00252 0.000882 -0.00442 -0.000252
PLUvRvarTsq 1.56e-05 0.00106 -0.000529 0.00149 9.10e-05
PLUvRvarW -6.04e-06 -0.00549** 0.00790*** -0.000137 -0.000555**
PLUvRvarWsq 1.71e-06 0.00158 -0.00235 0.000173 0.000169
PLUvRvarS 0 -6.82e-10 -5.20e-10 2.59e-09 -4.17e-10
PLUvRvarSsq -0 0 0 -0 0
Coal -8.54e-09*** 2.36e-06*** 6.90e-06*** 2.22e-07 -8.70e-07***
Brent 8.64e-08*** -1.86e-05*** -2.36e-05*** -7.46e-06*** 1.72e-06***
Gas -6.20e-08*** -8.94e-06*** -2.82e-07 9.04e-06*** 4.53e-06***
IT2 4.95e-08*** 1.98e-05*** -2.71e-05 -1.96e-05*** 2.23e-06***
EUA -3.14e-08*** 8.69e-05*** 7.20e-05*** 4.71e-05*** 2.89e-06***
Wind1DA -3.38e-10*** 6.13e-09 1.04e-07*** 1.64e-08** -5.41e-10
Hydro 4.69e-08*** -5.82e-06*** -7.55e-06*** -8.73e-06*** 1.78e-06***
PLUvDvarP -4.81e-05*** -0.000219 -0.000212***
PLUvDvarQ -3.87e-06*** 0.000442*** 0.000567 0.000110** 4.29e-05***
Constant 2.11e-06** 0.00319*** 0.00651*** 0.00370*** -0.000494***
Observations 11,702 11,702 11,702 11,701 11,702
R2 0.152 0.158 0.200 0.086 0.128
Standard errors available upon request | p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.6: Regressions of slope on PLUR and PLUD at all points
Note: Comparison of regressions using baseline PLUvD with bootstrapped SE.
127
Chapter 3
Comparison of column 3 for points k = 1− 5
(k=1) (k=2) (k=3) (k=4) (k=5)
VARIABLES fxInvertQP fxInvertQP fxInvertQP fxInvertQP fxInvertQP
PLUvRvarT -4.35e-05*** 0.00231 0.00374** 0.000559 0.000734***
PLUvRvarTsq 1.65e-05*** -0.000735 -0.00161*** -0.000368 -0.000280***
PLUvRvarW -7.84e-07 -0.00527*** 0.00647*** -0.00205 -0.000545***
PLUvRvarWsq 1.25e-07 0.00152*** -0.00192*** 0.000739* 0.000163***
PLUvRvarS 0 -1.09e-09 -2.28e-09 2.40e-09 -3.07e-10
PLUvRvarSsq -0 0 0 -0 0
Coal -1.23e-08*** 2.20e-06*** 5.18e-06*** 1.48e-06*** -4.90e-07***
Brent 6.62e-08*** -1.59e-05*** -1.18e-05*** -1.30e-05*** 4.90e-07**
Gas -6.50e-08*** -2.68e-06 1.37e-05*** 2.04e-05*** 2.96e-06***
IT2 3.02e-08*** 1.12e-05*** -1.73e-05*** -2.61e-05*** 2.47e-06***
EUA -6.75e-08*** 8.19e-05*** 2.62e-05*** 3.19e-05*** 8.35e-06***
Wind1DA -4.91e-10*** 3.77e-08*** 1.18e-07*** 1.50e-08** 3.49e-09***
Hydro 4.60e-08*** -1.04e-05*** -4.08e-06*** -1.33e-05*** 1.19e-06***
PLUvDvarKP -4.95e-05*** -0.000600*** -0.000163***
PLUvDvarKQ 2.26e-08 6.56e-05** 0.000151*** 4.08e-05 5.56e-05***
Constant 2.17e-06*** 0.00341*** 0.00513*** 0.00406*** -0.000351***
Observations 11,702 11,702 11,702 11,701 11,702
R2 0.107 0.149 0.233 0.117 0.131
Standard errors available upon request. | p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.7: Regressions of slope on PLUR and PLUD at all points
Note: Comparison of regressions using kernel based PLUvD using weighted regressions.
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3.6 Discussion
In this section we reflect on the results and use the opportunity to address a few issues,
drawbacks as well as qualities of the research conducted. We first review the design of the
empirical strategy and lend particular focus to how we deal with the issue of endogeneity.
We then discuss the finding of the paper.
3.6.1 Internal and external validity
We believe that the work is credible due to many aspects of the research design. First,
our set-up is based on rather intuitive relations which we test exclusively using simple
OLS regressions. These regressions are econometrically unbiased given the data impu-
rities that we observe. To guarantee precision of our estimates, we use bootstrapping
techniques.
Second, considerable effort has gone into the treatment of the information that goes into
the right hand side of our regressions. We do not only refer to the final PLUs used, but
also point at the precise use of our controls. See for example the treatment of the variable
RteBlackBox (details see page 157), which proxies for the information contained in the
day ahead demand estimates (PrevConsoH) given out by the grid operator RTE. In order
to extract the marginal information of the PrevConsoH estimate, which is not explained
by other controls variables that we include in our analysis, we compute the residuals
from a regression of PrevConsoH on our other controls, e.g. daytime controls such as
suncycle. These residuals (called RteBlackBox) enable us to achieve a more sophisticated
understanding of our regression output46.
We also emphasize the aspect that we understand our dataset as a cross-sectional dataset
rather than a time-series. While we do segment our dataset into weekday and weekend
days and only run our analysis on the former, there is no reason why demand on a Tuesday
afternoon should not be comparable to demand on a Thursday afternoon. We therefore
ignore weekday dummies to increase our sample size. Furthermore, we avoid the use of
dummy variables to control for the hour of the contracts in our regressions in order to
further increase the sample size. However, we cannot compare electricity consumption
between 4am and 4pm within a day. Neither can we compare two 4pm hours of a day
in winter and another in the summer. Using dummies would first restrict our sample
size, plus make our interpretation more difficult since the dummy variable aggregates the
46See for example the regression output of the demand estimation in tables 3.3 and 3.4.
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effect over all conditions that change between samples. We use a bottom up approach
that allows us to circumvent the sample size restriction and interpretation difficulties
from daytime or seasonality dummies. Instead, we use continuous variables to control for
the daytime and season by means of short and longer term temperature averages or other
weather characteristics such as luminosity, which generates controls like deltasun47.
Finally, we point at the empirical framework that allows us to run reduced form regres-
sions on multiple regions of bid functions to better understand functional responses of
those bids to variation in exogenous factors. We use 5 points for our analysis and refer to
section 3.4.1 for the full details on this choice and the evaluation of the point selection.
With hindsight, we feel that an additional two points would have been useful to better
understand functional behaviour of the part of the bid functions, which is more relevant
in equilibrium, i.e. on the centre part48. We note the computational demands of more
points.
The methodology developed for our exercise on data from the French electricity market
has applications in other domains. This is valid for the non-parametric point selection
mechanism (section 3.4.1), the mechanism to aggregate local geographic data to a national
level (appendix 3.9) as well as the identification strategy based on purely ex-ante data.
In particular, we note the possibility to run reduced form estimation strategies for the
analysis of markets which make access to functional data available. This includes all
markets which use a multi-unit, uniform (or discriminatory) auction mechanism.
3.6.2 Endogeneity
The set-up of this work is specifically aimed at circumventing problems of endogeneity.
For that sake, we keep a strict separation of ex-post and ex-ante information to the left
and right hand sides, respectively, of any regression (which we achieve except in two
instances that are described below).
To achieve this separation of ex-ante and ex-post information, both newly developed
methodologies are highly useful. The point selection methodology from section 3.4.1
allows us to extract proxies for the level of uncertainty about the realisation of market
demand, which are unaffected by the equilibrium interaction with the market supply. The
weather data treatment methodology from appendix 3.9 enables us to base our proxies
47See section 3.4.4.3 for full details on our set of control variables for both demand and supply.
48For that we would recommend the points representing half of the maximum curvature between the
current points k = 2, 4 and k = 3.
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for the level of uncertainty from renewables on measures of the expected homogeneity of
weather forecasts. Both methodologies allow us to recover ex-ante information on the pre-
vailing uncertainty that firms have at their hands at the time of bidding. The information
contained in all other controls used is also available at the time of bidding.
However for data availability reasons, we are not able keep this strict separation at all
times in practice and revert to using ex-post data to compute some variables that should
ideally be computed on ex-post information only. This is the case twice in this work: (i)
we use observed weather data to compute the variable Solar49 and (ii) we use the pooled
data over all auctions for the demand estimation and subsequent uncertainty forecast of
equations 3.2 - 3.5.
In both cases, we do not believe that this choice compromises our results. For the case of
Solar, we use realised luminosity instead of forecast data. This is as if weather forecasts
were perfectly accurate. Given that solar production only accounts for a small fraction
of total electricity generation and that we extract the very informative component of the
Solar variable by using the variable suncycle (which is arguably well predictable), we do
not see the use of ex-post data as problematic.
For the case of the PLUD computation, we run the demand estimation pooled over all
observed auctions (i.e. past and future) and say that firms have this level of informa-
tion when bidding in each auction of our sample. We do so, because we do not have
the necessary data before 01.01.2011 and thus cannot calibrate our forecasting model
on a “learning” dataset. Instead, we assume that demand patterns conditional on the
explanatory variables have remained constant over our 2.5 years time period of analysis.
The estimation based on pooled data then yields, on average, the same insights as an
analysis conducted purely on past data.
We could test robustness of our pooled approach by investigating the effect of a restriction
on using only past data in the demand estimation. A learning effect could arise from more
precise estimations of demand functions. However, due to the long experience of most
firms on the market in reality, this learning effect would be artificial and not represent
a real insight. We therefore accept the possibility of a (small) endogeneity concern in
this paper and further work could fully circumvent this issue by extending the database
appropriately.
49Contrary to Wind1DA and Tempeff15, which we are able to compute purely on forecast data.
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3.6.3 Findings
This chapter investigates whether uncertainty affects supplier bidding as predicted by the
theory. We find that uncertainty from weather forecasts indeed affects the suppliers’ bid
function as expected. The central part of the aggregate supply function steepens when
the level of uncertainty increases. We take this as evidence that firms take dynamic cost
considerations into account and adjust their behaviour when facing increased expected
dynamic costs.
We also find significant results for the effect of the level of uncertainty about the real-
isation of market demand on the suppliers’ behaviour. However, we observe a strong
discrepancy between the effect of uncertainty as measured on price volatility and the
effect of uncertainty as measured on volume volatility. While the former is attributed
a negative effect, the latter is attributed a positive effect on the slope of the aggregate
supply function. The differing opposing results are robust in all specifications and seem
to be of too much importance to be neglected.
The two proxies in question (PLUD,P and PLUD,Q) are two variables designed to measure
the same information, namely the prediction error of the demand function. As such, they
are identical with respect to the set-up, computation as well as point at which they are
extracted. They only differ with respect to the dimension in which the variation of the
demand function is measured, the former in the price dimension and the latter in the
volume dimension.
A theory using linear functions would predict that these measures of the shifts of the
demand line are identical and interchangeable (modulo a translation by the slope). Also
our data, i.e. the observed bid functions, suggests that, at least locally at the point
k = 3, the bid functions are linear50. Furthermore, our demand estimation models for
both price and volume variation51 indicate that the prediction model used works well in
both dimensions. In particular at k = 3, significance and equal signs on coefficients for
all terms included as well as similar explanatory power52 in both regressions confirm the
similar nature of the two proxies.
Our recovered PLUD,P and PLUD,Q are, as expected, collinear53. While OLS remains
unbiased in the presence of collinearity between two regressors, its precision is reduced.
50Recall the graph in figure 3.4.
51Precisely look at columns 3 of tables 3.3 and 3.4.
52R2 of 0.463 for the price and 0.478 for the volume regression.
53Not perfectly, but with a correlation coefficient of 0,62
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We correct for the collinearity by dropping one proxy or the other, but the individual
results remain unchanged - the coefficients of the two proxies keep opposite signs.
Assuming that our empirical strategy is valid to test the relationship of interest, a possible
reason for our intriguing observation could be that the slope of the demand function,
which relates PLUD,Q and PLUD,P , is endogenous on the uncertainty. Uncertainty could
not only unilaterally shift the demand function in one dimension (either P or Q), but
also affect the shape and thus the slope of the curve. This effect is not accounted for
in our research design and could drive the opposing results for both proxies. Also, our
theoretical model gives no prediction on this effect. Thus, the possibility of a demand
function that reacts to uncertainty hints at the fact that we need new theories to explain
both demand and supplier bidding behaviour on the electricity market. This calls for
new theoretical models to better explain the shape of aggregate bid functions, which are
S-shaped overall. Special attention in these models should be placed on the effect of
uncertainty and its importance for bidders via the link of dynamic costs.
Finally, we give attention to the functional data analysis. For the demand estimation,
we have disclosed a descriptive analysis of the full bid function. Results are coherent
with a single sign change per “row” in tables 3.3 and 3.4. We also highlight specifically
the strengthening or weakening effects of exogenous variables on different points in these
tables. On the slope estimation in tables 3.6 and 3.7, we show that our prediction and
results are local for the central part of the supply function. When we leave this central
region, the effects of uncertainty on the suppliers’ behaviour disappear for uncertainty
from meteorological forecasts and weaken for uncertainty from market demand.
We conclude that the impacts of variations in exogenous factors on the shape of the
bid functions are not uniform. Non-linear effects are neither predicted by our linear
theory nor have been shown in previous studies apart from Wolfram (1999) and Wölfing
(2013). Our results hint at more intricate mechanisms which drive the shape of these bid
functions.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter applies two novel methodologies, the point selection technique (section 3.4.1)
and the aggregation of geographic information methodology (appendix 3.9.1), for an anal-
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ysis of the electricity market. We observe that bidders take uncertainty from meteorolog-
ical forecasts, which affects renewables generation, as well as uncertainty from demand
realisation into account. The results indicate that electricity suppliers react to an in-
creased level of uncertainty by bidding more volume elastically (steeper supply functions
in the dimension Q (x-axis) - P (y-axis)) in order to minimise expected dynamic costs,
which increase with the uncertainty. This is particularly true for the central part of the
supply bid function, where capacity constraints are negligible. The results also indicate
that not only supplier bidding is affected by uncertainty, but that the level of uncertainty
also impacts bidding from the demand side of the market.
We identify three aspects for further empirical work. (i) More points on the central region
of the bid functions would allow to have a functional analysis of the effects of uncertainty
on the supply function. This analysis could reveal the interval of points on the supply
function for which we see significant effects of uncertainty on bidding. (ii) Future work
should focus on investigating the endogeneity of the demand function and address the
differing results for market uncertainty as measured in prices or quantities. (iii) We
believe that frictions in the bidding, in particular the focal price points discovered using
our point selection methodology (details appendix 3.8), deserve further attention.
Concurrently, the results also call for more advanced theoretical work on the shape of
bid functions of players, in particular to explain non-linear shapes. This is also suggested
by our functional analysis of the demand functions which hints at non-unilateral effects
of exogenous variables on the shape of the functions. The economic insight hidden in
full bid functions is vast and a better understanding of these could be applied to address
important welfare questions54.
54One such application, which the authors currently focus on is the question of the optimal choice of
the geographic installation of renewable electricity generation units (solar panels and wind turbines) with
respect to minimising the intermittency of renewables generation. A clear understanding of the effects of
uncertainty on the market is vital to close the analysis on organisational questions of the market. This
is outside of the focus of this chapter.
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3.8 Appendix: Results of the point selection
3.8.1 Precision of point selection
We have selected K = 5 types of comparable points for each of the 31500 demand and
supply functions. This section details the results of the point selection methodology and
presents evidence why the point selection algorithm has worked reliably.
The graphs in figure 3.10 show the local density of selected points in the quantity -
price space for the demand (left) and supply (right) curves. The fact that the groups of
data points are disjoint from one another indicates that the points selected are distinctly
different across groups.
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Figure 3.10: Heat map on selected, comparable demand and supply points
Note: Please note the discontinuity in the scale of the y-axis. The three separate graphs are
arranged to be understood as a single one. The warmer the colours of the heat map, the higher
the frequency of selected price-quantity pairs. The colour legend is omitted for brevity, density
changes between contours are of the order of 10−4.
In figure 3.10, selected points of type k = 1 manifest at the bottom of the graph with
prices fixed at −3000e/MWh. Similarly, k = 5 points appear at the top of the graph
with prices fixed at +3000e/MWh. The three distinct groups of data points refer to
points of type k = 4, k = 3 and k = 2, respectively, when reading the zoomed, center
part of the graph from top to bottom.
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In appendix 3.8.7, tables 3.8 and 3.9 allow to match data frequencies in the left graph of
figure 3.10 with their types. Tables 3.10 and 3.11 relate to the data of the right graph in
figure 3.10.
We note that the point selection for the demand curves has produced groups of points
that are more distinct (and thus more robustly attributed to a certain type k) then for the
supply function. While the smooth logistic function approach was unable to cope with
the variations in the data from the electricity market (Belsunce, 2011), our more flexible
non-parametric approach is more robust. Our methodology only relies on assuming that
the first derivative is uni-modal and that sufficient variation exists in the data to distinctly
identify the regions of different slope55. Overall, this is strong evidence that the algorithm
is able to distinctly differentiate between points of different types.
3.8.2 Observations of bidding frictions
Distinct point selection is further supported by the evidence in figure 3.11. These graphs
are analogous to those in figure 3.10 and show the distribution in the quantity - price
space of the selected points separately for the demand and supply function. Distinct
clouds are an indication that selected points are different across types k.
Figure 3.11: Distribution of selected demand (left) and supply (right) points
However, a feature of the graphs is striking: patterns (horizontal lines) seem to exist
for the selected points of type56 k = 2 and k = 4. Many selected points accumulate at
certain prices of regular intervals of 10e/MWh, i.e. there seem to be focal price points
55On very rare occasions, our algorithm was unable to distinctly select between neighbouring point
types, because the original bid function was linear for a large part. E.g. point k = 2 cannot not be
identified if the bid function is linear between points k = 1 and k = 3. We give details on the outlier
removal step in appendix 3.8.6.
56Types k = 1 and k = 5 do not exhibit variation in price, because bidding at the extreme prices of
+-3000e/MWh is imposed by the auction rules. We thus neglect their analysis here.
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for the bidders at the curvature points of the bid functions. The pattern is present for
selected points of both the supply and demand functions, although the selected points
from the supply function exhibit this pattern slightly less.
The points following the pattern (types k = 2, 4) represent the points of maximum
curvature of the aggregate bid functions, i.e. the region where the aggregate bid function
transitions from a price elastic center portion to the price inelastic extremities of the bid
function.
Without prioritising any explanation57, we acknowledge the existence of bid point pat-
terns in the values (i.e. prices and quantities) of selected points. We emphasize that the
observed patterns are not caused by the point selection mechanism since the algorithm
can only choose between explicitly bid points or linearly interpolated points, that could
be part of a market equilibrium under the reigning price setting algorithm. The pattern
arises from many horizontal steps occurring at the same prices in different auctions.
We are interested in S ′, the slope at each selected point - an information measured at
the selected point. Therefore, we investigate whether the values of the first derivative
at the point k = 3 display a pattern. Figure 3.12 shows the histogram of the slope of
the supply function for the point k = 3. No pattern in the values of the derivatives is
apparent.
Figure 3.12: Histogram of the slope of the supply curve at k = 3
57We do not investigate the origins of bidding frictions in this chapter, which focuses purely on the
methodology. For the electricity market, a few possible explanations are that (1) bid functions are driven
by marginal costs consideration towards the extremes of the bid curve, (2) bidders bid coarsely since
the have used up much of their bid point allowance (256 points) on the center portion of the curve, (3)
bidders spend less effort on adequately bidding at extremes since the likelihood of the market outcome
occurring at the extremes is much lower.
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3.8.3 Value of selected points (determining K)
We remind the reader that the aim is to recover points that summarize well the behaviour
of the full aggregate bid functions in different auctions. Our technique allows us to extract
representative and comparable points across bid functions of different auctions. From
the selected points, we can also go back to infer the original bid function from which the
points were selected. In order to evaluate the utility of our methodology, we investigate
the added benefit of an additional point in our point selection.
By selecting K = 5 points per curve, rather than fewer points per curve, we are able
to significantly reduce the degrees of freedom for inferring the original bid function. In
other words, we want to measure how well our information (as captured by the selected
points) captures the variation of the original bid functions. This allows to quantify the
marginal gain of information for an additional selected point.
For this investigation, we first recover the master curve (the mean expectation of a
demand curve) and its confidence interval58 for K = 0 to K = 5 points. Then, we look
at the decrease in uncertainty achieved by including an additional point, obtained using
our technique. Figure 3.13 shows the master curves (red line) and the expected error
(pink shaded interval above and below the master curve) as a function of the number of
reference points59.
Without any reference point, the uncertainty on the inferred bid function would lie in the
interval shown in graph A of figure 3.13. With two reference points (namely the minimum
and the maximum quantity), the uncertainty is reduced as shown by the smaller error
interval in graph B. Graph C adds a third point (the point of inflection) and Graph D adds
another two points (the two points of maximum curvatures). Figure 3.13 shows clearly
that with an increasing number of reference points, we obtain a more precise information
about the original bid function. We quantify the gain in precision by measuring the
surface of the pink shaded area in each of the graphs A to D. The result is shown in
figure 3.14 and reveals decreasing marginal information for each additional point. By
selecting K = 5 points, we are able to reduce the uncertainty about the original curve by
58To compensate for asymmetric variation above or below the master curve, we do not use the standard
deviation to compute the confidence interval. Instead our upper (or lower) bounds are given by the mean
of all curves below (or above) the expected master curve respectively.
59The master curve in A is obtained by rescaling all demand functions by their mean value. The
master curves in B - D are obtained by rescaling the reference points, such that they coincide with
corresponding point on the master curve in A plus rescaling all points between the reference points by
a vector obtained as a linear combination of the displacement vectors of the closest reference points.
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Figure 3.13: Error bars as a function of the number of extracted points
Note: In all graphs: Price on the x-axis, Volume on the y-axis. The graphs represent the master
curve with the error interval for inferring the original bid function, conditional on the number
of extracted, reference points (RP). Top left (A): Computed without any RP. Top right (B):
Computed using 2 RP. Bottom left (C): Computed using 3 RP. Bottom right (D): Computed
using 5 RP.
a factor of about 50 (see figure 3.14). In other words, we capture between 95% and 98%
of the variability of the supply and demand functions. We see this insight as support for
using K = 5 points for further work.
Figure 3.14: Surface of the error function as a function of reference points
Note: The graph plots the size (y-axis) of the pink shaded error area in figure 3.13 against the
number of reference points (x-axis).
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While the graphs in figure 3.13 are displayed on inverted axes and rescaled units, we
show the final master curve and uncertainty interval on the original axes and units in
figure 3.15.
Figure 3.15: Overall and zoomed mastercurve with confidence intervals
Note: Overall (left) and zoomed (right) master curve in the quantity (x-axis) - price (y-axis)
dimension.
3.8.4 Discussion and conclusion of point selection
In this short appendix, we have developed an alternative technique to run a cross-section
reduced form model on data generated by a market that keeps track of the full aggre-
gate demand and/or supply functions. While in this paper we apply it to aggregate
demand functions, the methodology is fit for the analysis of aggregate supply functions
and individual bid functions of either market side.
The methodology is inspired by the techniques used in the literature on Treasury auc-
tions, but has been set up from scratch to allow treatment of more heterogenous data.
Furthermore, the hard assumption of an underlying logistic function is relaxed and our
non-parametric point selection avoids the storing of bid function information in the form
of estimated function parameters, which are difficult to interpret.
Smoothing of the original bid functions is a component in both the traditional logistic
function approach and our comparable point selection methodology. The smoothing
enables the user to abstract of small bid function particularities and imprecision, e.g.
steps in the function. However, in the traditional approach, the reduction of plus 1000
bid points into very few parameters resulted in the mixing up of “local” bid function
information from all parts of the function at once. Our non-parametric approach allows
specifically to control the smoothing parameter and thus enables the researcher to choose
the smoothness of a bid function when extracting the points of interest. In any case,
the smoothing range of the new technique is merely a fraction of that of the traditional
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approach and, hence, we do not mix up information of the different parts of the bid
function.
The results of the comparable point selection are encouraging. We show that each type of
point is distinctly chosen and while we see patterns on the levels of the original bid func-
tion, we do not observe any patterns on the derivative information (i.e. slope) extracted
at the selected points. We acknowledge the existence of bidding frictions in the original
data and highlight this observation for further work. Overall, we deem the selection of
points to be of sufficient precision for a detailed study of the behaviour of the levels (and
slope) of the bid functions (at the point k = 3, respectively60).
Finally, we emphasize that our methodology is scalable in the sense that we can select as
many comparable points as desired61. We restrained ourselves to 5 points for computa-
tional reasons, more points would allow a more detailed functional analysis of the curves.
In particular, more points between k = 2 and k = 4 would be of interest as these are
relevant for equilibrium.
3.8.5 Technical details
3.8.5.1 Using the kernel density estimation (KDE) in our setting
In order to estimate the first and second derivatives of the bid functions, we use a kernel
density estimation. The estimator is essentially a smooth version of a histogram and
counts the number of points in moving intervals (called a window) of predefined width
along a dimension of the data. In our case, it counts bid points per price interval. In
addition, the KDE assigns a weight to each observation based on the distance from the
observation to the center of the window. The weighing function is called the kernel.
The observed bid functions are each a multitude of price-quantity combinations. However,
a kernel density estimation on the observed points of the bid function would be useless
since the number of points per price interval does not vary much with the slope of the
curve.
We use a characteristic of the auction mechanism (the linear interpolation between con-
secutive bid points, for details see section 3.2.2) to our advantage and are able to transpose
the observed bid function to one that suits our needs. This is done by adding linearly
60It does not make sense to look at the slope at points k = 2, 4 since these are defined as points of
maximum change of the slope.
61See footnote 17 for details.
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interpolated points at the unit cent level (corresponding to the minimum bidding unit).
The kernel density estimation is then able to consistently estimate the slope of the func-
tion by simply counting the points in an interval since the number of points per price
interval of constant width varies proportionally with the slope of the function over that
interval.
3.8.5.2 Hard choices in the code of the KDE
A few specific choices have been made in the code and are detailed here.
Kernel choice: First, we use the default Epanechnikov kernel for simplicity. It is
generally considered that the kernel choice has significantly less impact than the choice
of the bandwidth. The use of the kernel is to weigh more the observations close to
the centre of the moving window. The performance of a kernel is judged on the trade-off
between variance and bias. The used Epanechnikov kernel is optimally efficient. However,
even simplistic kernel functions, such as the rectangular, have a relative efficiency of 93%.
Thus, kernel choice is not important and other factors may influence the decision, such
as computational effort (Salgado-Ugarte et al., 1994; Silverman, 1986).
Bandwidth choice: Second, we hard code the bandwidth selection for computational
reasons. The bandwidth of the kernel (and thus the width of the price interval over
which points are counted) is determined on the basis of a trade-off between smoothing
the original bid function and mixing up information of different parts of the bid function.
By smoothing the original bid function, we obtain estimates of the information that our
KDE measures (i.e. points in the interval and thereby the slope) that are less sensitive to
local specificities of the bid functions. The larger the selected bandwidth, the larger the
interval over which points are counted and the stronger the smoothing of the estimates.
However, as the width of the interval increases, we mix up more information of a selected
point of interest with the information of its neighbouring points. Therefore, in setting
the bandwidth we aim to achieve smoothed estimates with a reasonable compromise
between respecting local curve information, while not being fragile to steps in the bid
function.
For estimates of the first order derivative, these considerations are minor and we could
use the default bandwidth, optimal for a Gaussian distribution, to extract the point of
maximum slope from the distribution. However, one reason why we increase it is to ensure
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that the distribution of the first derivatives is uni-modal62. Furthermore, the selection
of the bandwidth in the first stage density estimation impacts both the precision and
speed of the second stage estimation. A better smoothing in the first stage gives a large
advantage in the second stage estimation63, thus we have a further incentive to increase
the bandwidth.
For the second derivative the trade-off is more critical: We want to obtain a reasonably
broad smoothing to obtain a meaningful selection of points that is not driven by random
noise. On the other hand, a large bandwidth reduces the importance of local information
of a part of the curve as a consequence of which, selected points (points k = 2 and k = 4)
are pushed towards the point of inflection (k = 3). This is due to the maximum point
of the first derivative gaining more weight in the second derivative’s estimation. The
fact that first derivative estimates are already smoothed rather strongly, we can choose
a narrow bandwidth in the second stage KDE.
In the end, we select a rather broad bandwidth of 45 units in the first estimation. This
gains robustness of the point selection mechanism against noise in the data and estimation
speed in the second stage. The bandwidth in the second stage is set more narrowly at a
level of 2 units to keep as much information as possible from the first stage estimation
and allow sufficient variation to select the k points.
To support our choice, we illustrate the impact of different bandwidths on the first and
second stage estimation in figures 3.16 and 3.17. Our choice is based on an adequate
point selection and the fastest runtime.
In these graphs, the top row shows the first stage KDE, over the whole function on the
left and zoomed on the right. The large bandwidth in figure 3.16 shows the impact of
smoothing on the estimates of the first derivative as compared to figure 3.17. The second
row in both graphs shows the second stage KDE in two versions: Using a wide kernel
bandwidth on the left and a tight bandwidth on the right. Again, we disclose the result
as seen over the whole function (left) and zoomed on the central price range (right).
The third row details the original demand function with the final point selection given
62Uni-modal at the point of inflection in the price-quantity dimension. The smoothing ensures that
the selected point is not mistaken due to steps in the bid function that have a very large slope locally,
but which is not representative of the neighbouring portion of the bid function.
63The gain in computation in the second stage arises from the fact that a stronger smoothing in the
first stage produces a more homogenous dataset for the second stage estimation. By more homogenous,
we mean that fewer monotone regions of the graph of first derivatives must be interpolated at the unit
cent level to ensure that our algorithm works correctly.
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Figure 3.16: Comparison of bandwidths: Large bandwidth in first stage
Note: Large bandwidth in first stage (top row), large bandwidth in second stage (second row
left), small bandwidth in second stage (second row right), Resulting selection of points for large
bandwidth in stage one and two (bottow row left, A) and selection of points for large bandwidth
in stage one and small bandwidth in stage two (bottom row right, B).
the bandwidth selection as given by the two rows above. Regardless of the first stage
bandwidth, we see that a large bandwidth in the second stage KDE easily distorts the
point selection. Selected points of type k = 2, 4 are either two centred or too wide as a
result of the second derivatives being smoothed excessively and not precisely representing
the local specificities of the curve. The right hand side of both figures show that a tighter
bandwidth on the KDE can easily mistake large slope changes due to steps in the bid
functions as the appropriate points of maximum curvature of the full bid function and
thereby make an error. Therefore, we apply a sensitive second stage KDE on rather
smooth estimates of the first derivatives, which yields an adequate point selection in our
setting (figure 3.16B).
The bandwidth selection received much attention in this work in order to obtain a rea-
sonable selection of points based on local information of the curves, while achieving a
satisfying robustness to noise in the bid function. We are aware that this subjective
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Figure 3.17: Comparison of bandwidths: Small bandwidth in first stage
Note: Small bandwidth in first stage (top row), large bandwidth in second stage (second row
left), small bandwidth in second stage (second row right), Resulting selection of points for large
bandwidth in stage one and small bandwidth in stage two (bottom row left, C) and selection
of points for small bandwidth in stage one and two (bottow row right, D).
setting of the bandwidth is not without consequence for our work. However for compu-
tational reasons64, we do not run a full robustness test on this choice ex-post.
3.8.6 Outlier detection and removal
In some rare cases, our point selection mechanism does not work. This is the case when
curves have very small number of points at a kink and it is thus very difficult to detect
their curvature. As a result, the selected points are then quasi in-differentiable from the
next selected point type, i.e. a point of type k = 2 is almost identical to the selected
point k = 3. The code is unable to select the right points due to a data lack on the
original curve (second derivative on a constant slope up to POI is zero).
We screen for adjacent points that display quasi no variation in volumes. As an example,
figure 3.18 shows a histogram of volumes differences over 2 selected points (from k = 2 to
64The point selection algorithm ran for more than two weeks in the current setting.
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k = 4) and reveals a positive mass point at zero, indicating outliers that do not display any
volume variation between both points of maximum curvature on the same bid function.
We use the histogram to identify and drop those outliers from our dataset.
0
5.
0e
-0
5
1.
0e
-0
4
1.
5e
-0
4
2.
0e
-0
4
D
en
si
ty
0 5000 10000 15000
diff2
Figure 3.18: Histogram of volume variation between points
Note: The histogram shows the volume difference between points k = 2 and k = 4 of the same
bid functions.
3.8.7 Summary statistics of selected points
Mean Median StdDev Min Max
Prices for k = 1 -3,000.0 -3,000.0 0 -3,000 -3,000
Prices for k = 2 -56.7 -55.0 19 -97 70
Prices for k = 3 27.6 26.8 11 -27 93
Prices for k = 4 120.2 105.4 193 -11 2,999
Prices for k = 5 3,000.0 3,000.0 0 3,000 3,000
Table 3.8: Prices of selected demand points
Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max
Volumes for k = 1 13,328 13,222 2,213 4,990 23,254
Volumes for k = 2 12,919 12,824 2,238 3,321 23,001
Volumes for k = 3 8,779 8,664 2,028 1,958 18,335
Volumes for k = 4 5,777 5,730 1,558 987 12,773
Volumes for k = 5 5,031 4,968 1,467 914 11,301
Table 3.9: Volumes of selected demand points
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Prices for k = 1 -3,000.0 -3,000.0 0 -3,000 -3,000
Prices for k = 2 -30.3 -25.0 219 -2,999 439
Prices for k = 3 61.3 58.6 24 11 526
Prices for k = 4 133.9 136.3 32 36 626
Prices for k = 5 3,000.0 3,000.0 0 3,000 3,000
Table 3.10: Prices of selected supply points
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Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Volumes for k = 1 3,721.7 3,526.0 1,344 618 10,594
Volumes for k = 2 4,432.8 4,226.0 1,602 844 11,765
Volumes for k = 3 8,467.2 8,365.5 1,814 3,431 20,932
Volumes for k = 4 11,849.5 11,717.7 2,411 3,641 27,810
Volumes for k = 5 14,390.6 14,142.0 3,052 6,580 35,356
Table 3.11: Volumes of selected supply points
3.9 Appendix: Methodology to extract and aggre-
gate geographically dispersed information (Tech-
nical details on PLUR)
We have two types of meteorological data: observations and forecasts. The methodology
for each differs slightly.
3.9.1 Interpolation methodology on weather observations
Observations are obtained from MétéoFrance for three parameters of particular interest:
temperature, wind speed and light intensity. These observations take the form of tables
of hourly observations for a given set of weather stations. Each parameter is observed on
a different set of stations.
Due to their hourly nature, the analysis of the electricity market’s sensitivity to weather
requires a very high number of observations. Therefore we select between one and two
stations per Département65, a French administrative unit of roughly 6000 km2, i.e. of a
typical lengthscale of about 75 km. We have 161 stations for temperature, 113 stations
for wind speed and 106 for light intensity, as shown in Fig 3.19.
For each hour, we select the corresponding observations and interpolate them in order
to reconstruct the weather on the entire french territory. An interpolation consists on
inferring the value of a variable at query points using a reference data set of known values.
The easiest interpolation method is the linear interpolation: think about a dataset of
hourly observations with one missing value; to reconstruct the missing value, take the
average of the value of the preceding and following hour. There are numerous methods
of interpolation, even more so when the data is spatial in nature, all revolving around
65There are 95 Départements in France
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Figure 3.19: Weather stations for which we have hourly data.
Note: Left: temperature, center: wind speed, right: light intensity.
two main steps. First, given a query point at which one would like to infer the value
of the variable, there needs to be a selection rule to know which of the points from the
reference data set should be used (in our example the preceding and following values).
Second, once these points are selected, one needs a weighting function to know their
relative importance in order to obtain the interpolated value (in our example it is a
simple averaging, that is weights of 0.5).
We use the natural neighbour interpolation method, well known for its good balance
between speed and accuracy. In short, through the use of a Voronoi algorithm (a method
that divides the plane in regions ”belonging” to certain points), one is able to define the
natural neighbours of a point, that are then used to perform the interpolation using a
ratio of surfaces as weights (see Fig 3.20 for more details).
Figure 3.20: Steps in interpolation methodology on weather data
Note: Left: Voronoi’s algorithm is applied once on the reference points highlighted in green
to obtain the white surfaces, and a second time on the same points to which is added the
query point in the center to obtain the new blue cell. The green circles, which represent the
interpolating weights, are generated using the ratio of the shaded area to that of the cell area
of the surrounding points.
Center left: example of a reference surface (color mapped) to be reconstructed through a natural
neighbour interpolation. Center right: interpolated surface with a reference set of 16 evenly
organised points, represented in black. Right: interpolated surface with a reference set of 16
unevenly organised points, represented in black. From 16 points one is able to reconstruct the
color mapped surfaces which aim at being able to reproduce the reference one, represented in
the center left image.
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3.9.2 Picture treatment to recover weather forecasts
Forecasts are obtained from the Global Forecast System (GFS), and come in the form
of colormaps, as shown in Fig 3.21. We are going to illustrate our methodology on
temperature data, but the exact same approach is performed on wind speed data. The
general idea is that the pointwise precision is low (2◦C per color) but the overall map
contains more precise topological data than a few tens of precise but sparse stations.
Figure 3.21: Example colourmap of temperature forecasts
Note: Temperature forecast from a simulation run by the GFS at 6 a.m. on the 3rd of November
2011, for a forecast at 22 p.m.
To extract the relevant data we first clean the color map from its irrelevant information,
namely the temperature in numbers and the borders. Note that this step introduces a
small amount of high spatial frequency noise, see Fig 3.22 left and center left.
Second, a lot of information is lost from the actual GFS simulations by using a color map
representation, as temperature is described as a discontinuous variable: each color has a
precision of 2◦C. In order to correct for this, we leverage the fact that all the information
contained in this color map, that is the color at each pixel, is actually contained in
a smaller set of points. Consider the value at the boundaries between different color
regions: by knowing that the interior of a constant color region has a constant value, one
is able to represent all the information contained in the original image by keeping only
track of the values at the boundaries. To recognise those boundaries we perform image
analysis, more precisely we use edge recognition methods based on finding high gradient
regions, thus obtaining Fig 3.22 center right.
Once we represent the information in this denser form we can perform the last step,
which consists in fitting a surface to our newly defined dataset, i.e. the temperature
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values at the boundaries. We could perform an interpolation, but these methods are
not well suited to such organised reference sets, here data points on curves representing
iso-temperatures. In addition the first step introduced some spatial noise which we want
to correct to some extent. We allow here our fitted surface to take different values than
our data points. This allows us to define the rigidity of our fitted surface, i.e. a cost
associated to spatial noise, and therefore reduce the importance of the high frequency
noise introduced in the first step. The end result is presented in Fig 3.22 right. It is key to
understand that this image is displayed using a colormap close to the one in the original
picture to facilitate comparison but that its underlying data is continuous whereas the
original image describes temperature by bins of 2◦C.
Figure 3.22: Steps of picture treatment methodology
Note: Left: reference image. Center left: borders and numbers are removed. Center right: edge
recognition. Right: final fitted surface.
3.9.3 Autocorrelation lengthscale
We also use this dataset to build measures of the weather uncertainty. To do so we mea-
sure the autocorrelation lengthscale of our three weather variables of interest : tempera-
ture, wind speed and light intensity. This lengthscale measures the extent to which the
weather variables are correlated spatially. We consider that the autocorrelation length-
scale is inversely proportional to uncertainty about the variable we are interested in. The
reasoning is based on the idea that in order to forecast the effect of a weather variable on
a national level, firms must aggregate the local weather information to a national level.
Local correlation of the realisations of a variable is our measure of the uncertainty. When
it is small, the variable is less spatially correlated, leaving more room for noise to blurr
the anticipation of the impact of this variable on a national level. Conversely, when the
autocorrelation lengthscale is large, the variable is very correlated spatially, that is that
the informational content of one datapoint is higher for the prospect of using it for the
evaluation of a national effect.
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Take two points on a plane and a finitely spatially correlated bounded variable. If those
points are infinitely distant, the value of the variable at these points should be uncorre-
lated. That is that the absolute difference between the variable taken at those two points
should have a given average value. Conversely, two points infinitely close should have the
same value, i.e. a zero absolute difference between the variable taken at those two points.
The question is how fast is the transition between those two limit cases. First, we define
the average absolute difference between two points when distant of a given value. Second
we extract a typical lengthscale.
To define the average absolute difference between two points when distant of a given
value, we consider every possible pair of points in our dataset at a given point in
time. For a given pair we compute its distance and its absolute difference in value
(in black in Fig.3.23). For 100 datapoints we obtain 4950 pairs. We then use a kernel
smoother in order to obtain the average non parametric autocorrelation function (in blue
in Fig.3.23).
To recover a typical lengthscale we make the parametric assumption that the autocor-
relation is exponential in nature. We fit an exponential function through our smoothed
data (in red in Fig.3.23), and recover the exponential decay parameter as our lengthscale
(in green in Fig.3.23). We perform this operation for every hour in our dataset and every
weather variable. The results are a time series for the characteristic lengthscale of the
weather parameters.
3.9.4 Aggregation of local information (Wind, Solar, Tempera-
ture)
Wind1DA Wind speed (average speed in km/h): Wind speeds influence the produc-
tivity of wind turbines, which are a source of unpredictable electricity generation. In
general, renewable technologies benefit from a feed-in guarantee by the state. That is,
regardless of the trading outcome on all markets, renewable energies will be the first to
be fed into the power grid at a guaranteed price.
Consequently, the electricity production of renewable technologies represents a production
shock for all actors on the market. The production shock means that the demand to be
served by traditional electricity producing firms is reduced by the amount that is serviced
by the electricity gained from renewable sources.
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Figure 3.23: Autocorrelation lengthscale computation.
Note: In black are the points obtained from all the pairs from our original data, that is absolute
wind speed differences as a function of the distance between the two points. In blue is the kernel
smoothed function from those points. In red is the exponential fit. In black are the derivatives
of the fit at 0 and ∞. In green is the recovered autocorrelation lengthscale. The unit for the
lengthscale is in km.
In the case of wind turbines, the average speed of the wind per hour allows to proxy for
the size of the production shock due to the electricity generation from wind energy.
We use hourly windspeed forecast in the form of color maps from the Global Forecast
System (GFS), giving the speed by bin of 5 km/h at 10m above ground, and the loca-
tion and production capacity of the wind turbines present on the french territory, given
by the SOeS (Service d’observations et d’études statistiques - observations and study
department), a department of the french environment ministry.
We consider that all turbines in France are of the same type, i.e. that they have the same
response curve and height.
A typical response curve is represented in Fig. 3.24. It has three main characteritics :
the wind speed at which the turbine starts to produce electricity, called the cut-in speed,
the speed at which the turbine reaches its rated output, called the rated ouput speed,
and the speed at which the turbine has to stop to avoid damage, called the cut-out speed.
We use data publicly available66 to obtain a rough estimate of the french average wind
66http://www.thewindpower.net
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turbine characteristics. We use a cut-in speed of 2.5 m/s, a rated output speed of 14
m/s, and reduce arbitrarily the cut-out speed from an estimate of 24 m/s to 20 m/s to
account for the fact that a turbine is shut down not when the average speed is too high
but when the maximal speed becomes dangerous for the turbine.
Wind speed also increases with height, and turbines are typically between 60 and 80m
high. We therefore apply a multiplier to the reconstructed wind speed at 10m.
We seek to reconstruct the french wind energy production from meteorological data. The
two adjusted values, the cut-out speed and the speed multiplier, are adjusted by hand to
obtain reasonnable fits. The reason for this is that the reconstruction of wind speed and
aggregate production is computationnally intensive, therefore we cannot perform a full
blown estimation. We choose these values with a precision of roughly 10% with repect
to their admissible range of values.
Figure 3.24: Typical response curves of different wind turbines
We obtain a reconstruction of wind production from day-ahead wind speed forecasts that
we compare to actual observed production and to day-ahead wind production forecast
computed by RTE, the french grid operator as shown in Fig.3.25. We stress here that our
aim is two-fold: to link wind production to weather data and to use forecast data as the
market actors only possess this information when bidding. We do not aim at producing
better forecasts than the grid operator, the figure is only displayed to show that our
methodology produces reasonnable estimates (we obtain a correlation coefficient between
our forecast and the observation of 0.85 where the grid operator obtains 0.97).
Solar Light intensity (in W.m−2) impacts the electricity market through multiple chan-
nels. The most obvious one is the associated electric production from photovoltaic panels.
But there is another channel through which lighting can be seen as impacting electric-
ity consumption : more sunlight decreases artificial light usage. In France, annually, the
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Figure 3.25: Wind production (observed and 2x predicted)
Note: All curves are hourly production data. The origin of the hours is the first of January
2011, and the production is in MWh. In blue: the observed wind production. In dark red:
the day-ahead predictions from the grid operator. In light red: the day-ahead predictions from
weather data.
electric consumption that can be attributed to lighting represents roughly 50 TWh where
solar production is roughly 4 TWh67.
We have photovoltaic production data, which in itself is a blackbox. As we aim to
link meteorological data to consumption we first want to validate the quality of our
meteorological data. To do so we reconstruct the photovoltaic production from weather
data. We know what are the hourly luminosity conditions on the french territory but also
where is installed the photovoltaic production capacity. The SOeS (statistical observation
and study department), a branch of government, publishes each year a file containing the
installed capacity of renewable energy sources per communes, a french administrative
unit with a typical size of roughly 3 km. France is formed of a little bit more than 36
000 of those communes.
We use observed luminosity data from MétéoFrance, as there is no hourly forecast of
luminosity, and assume a sigmoid response from photovoltaic panels to light intensity
with a saturation towards high light intensity, that is approximately a linear response up
to a certain threshold. The results are shown in Fig. 3.26.
67These estimates are computed by the authors based on numbers coming from Bertoldi and Atanasiu
(2007), INSEE and EDF
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Figure 3.26: Solar production (observed and reconstructed)
Note: Hourly solar production in MWh (y-axis). The time origin is the first January 2011.
In blue: observed production by RTE. In dark red: reconstructed production from observed
weather data.
We observe that solar production is much more regular than wind production, therefore it
is not possible to build a proxy for lighting consumption that would allow us to decorrelate
the effects from production and lighting. We therefore stick to this proxy to capture the
net effect of both channels.
Tempeff15 We focus on the effect of temperature on the demand of electricity first. In
France, a high percentage of the population heats their housing with electricity, therefore
cold waves have a high impact on electricity consumption: 2300MW of additional power
consumption for every drop of 1oC below 15oC, as shown in Fig.3.27 sourced from RTE
(2014), the French grid operator.
Figure 3.27: Daily electricity consumption in France as a function of the temperature
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We apply this information to our observed meteorological data in order to build an
effective temperature for France aimed at capturing its effect on consumption. To do so,
we reconstruct temperature data for every french commune. We consider population as
being a good proxy for potential heat consumption, therefore we apply it as a weight to
the commune temperature. Lastly, we consider that temperatures saturate at 15oC. This
allows us to build an effective temperature taking into account where the population is
located and the nonlinearity of heat start up which allows us to account at the country-
level for the local impact of temperature on the electricity consumption.
3.9.5 Other controls
Roll TempH Variable capturing seasonal trends by using the rolling average temper-
ature on effective temperature (Tempeff15) over the last H hours, i.e. the last H/24
days.
Tempeff We also build an effective temperature that does not account for the nonlin-
earity at 15oC following the same methodolgy as for Tempeff15 as a control.
Roll avgTH Variable capturing seasonal trends by using the rolling average temper-
ature on temperature Tempeff (no kink) over the last H hours, i.e. the last H/24
days.
suncycle Variable capturing intraday seasonality be measuring the intensity of sunlight
as a percentage of the maximum daily observation. Midday is defined at the maximum
sun intensity every day, i.e. Midday = max(Solar).
Thus, suncycleH = SolarH / Midday.
deltasun Variable computed to proxy for dusk and dawn. It is computed as the abso-
lute difference between suncycleH - suncycleH−1.
SolarRest Solar represents estimates of solar production. Therefore, it is highly collinear
with the daily suncycle variable since solar production is light dependent. SolarRest is
the residual from a regression of Solar on suncycle and captures the unexplained part of
solar production on top of pure light intensity considerations. Table 3.12 gives the results
of the regression.
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VARIABLES Solar SE
suncycle 1,500*** 3.903
Constant 0.876** 0.383
Observations 150,959
R2 0.702
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.12: Regression of Solar on suncycle
RteBlackBox RTE, the French grid operator gives day ahead predictions of the total
hourly consumption, which are available at the time of bidding. This variable is called
PrevConsoH.
We do not have access to the exact definition of the index and it is thus a black box.
However, it is available to the firms at the time of bidding and we want to include it in
the demand estimations.
At the same time, it is evident that the Index uses much of the information that we
explicitly control for in the regressions, therefore collinearity is an issue. In order to have
correct coefficient estimates, we adopt an instrumental variable approach by regressing
the RTE prediction on our exogenous factors, extracting the residuals and only including
the unexplainable component of the RTE prediction in the demand estimation in the
form of a separate variable called RteBlackBox.
Formally, RteBlackBox is equal to the predicted residuals (u) of the following regres-
sion, where X stands for the vector of explanatory variables: Tempeff15, Roll Temp24 ,
Roll Temp240, suncycle, morning, deltasun and EWH.
PrevConsoH = a+ bX + u (3.14)
In table 3.13 we give the output of regression 3.14 in column 1, which is strong support
that our prepared data for exogenous variables is of very high quality. We highlight the
significance of all explanatory variables at the 1% level and the R2 statistic of 85.3%.
The signs and interpretation of the coefficients are exactly in line with the results of the
demand estimation (in both the price and quantity dimension) for the point of inflection
k = 3.
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(1) (2)
VARIABLES PrevConsoH PrevConsoH
Tempeff15 -682.6***
Roll Temp24 -802.0***
Roll Temp240 -1,175***
SolarRest -0.860*** -0.345***
suncycle 7,849*** 7,418***
morning -4,759*** -4,398***
deltasun 10,108*** 9,010***
EWH -1,245*** -1,254***
Tempeff -301.4***
Roll avgT24 -687.3***
Roll avgT240 -918.2***
Constant 77,701*** 76,651***
Observations 146,909 146,909
R2 0.853 0.816
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.13: ”Black box” regression on RTE predicted consumption
Note: The dependent variable PrevConsoH is the day ahead prediction by RTE of the total
consumption in France.
Furthermore, we highlight that the comparison of columns 1 and 2 gives very strong sup-
port to our adjusted measure of effective temperature (Tempeff15 instead of Tempeff),
which takes into account the demand behaviour as a function of the temperature. Tem-
peratures above 15oC are considered not to impact demand behaviour (RTE, 2014).
Gas and IT2 Gas turbines generate electricity using natural gas as a fuel. We thus
proxy for its input price using a Gas variable for which we take the closing price for
natural gas at 1 month on the London market (NBP). Electricity generation from gas is
expensive and flexible. In general gas plants are only called upon to provide peak load
electricity generation in moments of high demand. WE therefore compute an interaction
term between Gas and an index for the hourly level of the demand. The index acts as
a weight on the gas price. The weight is computed as the percentage demand level as
compared to the maximum demand level observed in our dataset.
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3.10 Appendix : Computational details and descrip-
tives
3.10.1 Hard choices in the kernel-based PLU computation
In computing the multi-variate kernel based prediction of the uncertainty for a given
auction, we select auctions of a sufficient degree of similarity. We base the forecast
equation 3.5 on this subsample dataset. We thereby consider that firms use the forecasting
equation only locally in the neighbourhood of the auction of interest.
In order to define the size of the neighbourhood of an auction, we have to explicitly
specify the width of the kernel window used in selecting the respective subsamples. The
trade-off involved is that we want to have small kernels for a precise computation of the
PLU, while we want large kernels to make sure that we have a sufficient sample size in
each kernel in order to derive meaningful statistics.
We choose to use a constant kernel window length with respect to each conditioning
variable. We set the length of the window for each variable equal to 1
3
of the variation of
that variable. E.g. for Tempeff15, we observe a range of values from −10oC to 14oC. The
subsample used to compute the PLUD corresponding to a specific observation will consist
of all observations that are within a range of ±4oC of that observation for Tempeff15. The
same logic is applied to selecting the neighbourhood with respect to all other conditioning
variables. Table 3.14 gives descriptive statistics about the conditioning variables for the
kernel and the explicit choice m, which determines the length of the kernel window for a
variable Xe using the formula bXe =
2
mXe
.
Xe m Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Tempeff15 6 7.7 8 5 -10 14
Roll Temp24 6 7.7 9 4 -8 14
Roll Temp240 1 7.6 8 4 -7 13
suncycle 6 0.3 0 0 0 1
morning 6 0.5 1 0 0 1
deltasun 6 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.4
EWH 6 0.3 0 0 0 1
SolarRest 6 5.4 -1 364 -1,337 2,241
RteBlackBox 6 -0.0 37 4,755 -16,966 18,209
Table 3.14: Variables used in the kernel based PLUD computation
Note: For the PLUv51, we have excluded the variable Roll Temp240 from the conditioning in
order to increase the size of each subsample used for the calculation of the observation specific
PLUD. Version 52 also conditions on the variable Roll Temp240 using m = 6.
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3.10.2 Descriptive Statistics
3.10.2.1 On realised market equilibria
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Figure 3.28: Realised volumes and prices per hour
Note: Plotted average realised Volume (left) and Price (right) per Hour with 95% confidence
intervals.
Figure 3.29: Distribution of observed market equilibria
Note: The warmer the colours of the heat map, the higher the frequency of realised price-
quantity schedules. The colour legend is omitted for brevity, density changes between contours
are of the order of 10−4.
3.10.2.2 On player bid functions
Figure 3.30: Min, max and range of production volume
Note: Distribution of minimum and maximum production volumes (and corresponding range)
bid in an hourly auction.
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Figure 3.31: Distribution of number of bid function steps
3.10.2.3 On exogenous factors
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Figure 3.32: Histogram of predicted wind (left) and predicted solar (right) generation
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